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Abstract 
Information Security is becoming a part of the core business processes in every 
organization.  Companies are faced with contradictory requirements to ensure 
open systems and accessible information while maintaining high protection 
standards. In addition, the contemporary management of Information Security 
requires a variety of approaches in different areas, ranging from technological to 
organizational issues and legislation. These approaches are often isolated while 
Security Management requires an integrated approach. 
Information Technology promises many benefits to healthcare organizations. It 
helps to make accurate information more readily available to healthcare providers 
and workers, researchers and patients and advanced computing and 
communication technology can improve the quality and lower the costs of 
healthcare. However, the prospect of storing health information in an electronic 
form raises concerns about patient privacy and security. 
Healthcare organizations are required to establish formal Information Security 
program, for example through the adoption of the ISO 17799 standard, to ensure 
an appropriate and consistent level of information security for computer-based 
patient records, both within individual healthcare organizations and throughout 
the entire healthcare delivery system. However, proper Information Security 
Management practices, alone, do not necessarily ensure regulatory compliance. 
South African healthcare organizations must comply with the South African 
National Health Act (SANHA) and the Electronic Communication Transaction Act 
(ECTA). It is necessary to consider compliance with the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) to meet healthcare international 
industry standards. 
The main purpose of this project is to propose a compliance strategy, which 
ensures full compliance with regulatory requirements and at the same time 
assures customers that international industry standards are being used. This is 
preceded by a comparative analysis of the requirements posed by the ISO 17799 
standard and the HIPAA, SANHA and ECTA regulations. 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The economic value of governance is significant: good corporate governance 
beyond legal compliance alone attracts investment and improves shareholder 
value”. 
- EMC, 2005 - 
The main purpose of Chapter 1 is to present the problem statement, objectives 
and methodology of the research. Additionally, the relationship between corporate 
governance and information security is established. This chapter emphasizes that 
Executive Management and the Board of Directors are compelled to be committed 
and responsible for Information Security because it is required both by law and for 
good corporate governance within their organizations. It requires organization to 
have an effective Information Security compliance program ensuring the security 
and privacy of their customers’ information. 
In Chapter 2 the reader is introduced to the general types of privacy and security 
concerns to emphasize that health information is a critical asset in a healthcare 
organization.  
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the current integrated, regulated and litigated environment, it is necessary to 
provide assurance to customers, business partners, regulators, and the courts 
that Executive Management have done due diligence in ensuring the security of 
their Information Technology (IT) infrastructure and their Information Systems 
(IS). This becomes more critical in the healthcare environment where health 
information is an extremely sensitive asset requiring an effective compliance 
program ensuring its privacy and security.   
Information Technology facilitates the storage of large amounts of electronic 
health information and its dissemination to various healthcare business partners. 
In addition, IT enables the creation and analysis of large databases containing 
information from various sources. The absence of proper controls in the 
healthcare organizations can allow unauthorized users to access computer system 
and network resulting in the prevention of medical staff carrying out their duties 
and the sharing of the information of patients by unauthorized users (NRC, 1997). 
These concerns, inadequately addressed, can keep these organizations from 
investing in IT and result in patients loosing trust in their doctors (SALC, 2003). 
There can be little doubt that information security, seen as the discipline to 
ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of electronic assets, is 
currently an extremely critical aspect in the strategic management of any 
organization. Von Solms (2005) argues that the data and information of the 
business have become its “life blood”, and compromising this life blood, could kill 
the business. However, in many cases, Information Security is viewed only as a 
technical issue which is delegated to lower levers of IT and appears to lack the 
attention of top management and the Board of Directors (Entrust, 2004). Swindle 
& Corner (2004) suggest that Information Security needs to be considered as a 
corporate governance responsibility which should constitute risk management 
efforts, reporting and accountability on the part of the Executive leadership and 
Boards of Directors.  
The IT Governance Institute (2001) defines Corporate Governance as the “set 
of responsibilities and practices exercised by the Board and Executive 
management with the goal of providing strategic direction, ensuring that 
objectives are achieved, ascertaining that risks are managed appropriately and 
verifying that enterprise’s resources are used responsibly”. However, attaining 
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the goal of this definition is not an easy task especially in the current dynamic 
business environment. The King Report (2001) clearly states that “Boards have to 
consider not only the regulatory aspect, but also industry and market standards, 
industry reputation, the investigative media, and the attitudes of customers, 
suppliers, consumers, employees, investors, communities (local, national and 
international), ethical pressure groups, public opinion, public confidence and 
political opinion, etc..” This could result as an endless list of activities related to 
the best way of directing and controlling the organization. This confirms that 
corporate governance is about sound leadership efforts (King Report, 2001). In 
order to achieve this sound leadership, the King Report (2001) emphasis that 
seven characteristics of good corporate governance must be in place. These are 
Accountability, Discipline, Responsibility, Transparency, 
Independence, Fairness and Social responsibility. 
These seven characteristics will be briefly described in this section as extracted 
from the King Report (2001).   
• Accountability is concerned with ensuring that decision makers and those 
who take actions on specific issues are accountable for their decisions and 
actions.  
• Responsibility is concerned with those who fail to meet their duties or are 
involved in mismanagement face disciplinary action and penalties.  
• Discipline requires commitment of senior management to follow behaviour 
that is universally accepted and deemed correct and proper.  
• Social responsibility is the demonstration that an organization is aware and 
responds to ethical standards and human rights issues. 
• The main concern of Transparency is ensuring that the organization reports 
an accurate organizational picture to the shareholders.  
• Independence requires organization to install mechanisms which will avoid 
potential conflicts of interests such as the dominance by a large shareholder.  
• Fairness relates to ensuring that the rights of various shareholders are 
acknowledged and respected regardless of the interest value contribution of 
the shareowner.  
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These characteristics provide a good primer for implementing an effective 
approach to corporate governance in any organization (Posthumus & von Solms, 
2005). However, some organizations failed to effectively implement these 
characteristics of good corporate governance and corporate boards are now 
expected to comply with myriads of new laws or face harsh penalties such as 
lengthy jail time or financial penalties (Trillium Software, 2004).  
There have been moves to make directors and senior executives personally 
accountable and responsible for the consequences of failures of internal control 
following the widely publicized failures of organizations such as the cases of 
Enron.corp, WolrdCom and other organizations which failed to meet corporate 
governance compliance (von Solms, 2001). Since internal control ultimately relies 
on Information Security, it follows that a well implemented Information Security 
program plays a key role in protecting the corporate managers. It becomes 
apparent that there is a need to elevate the importance of Information Security 
and integrate it into the overall corporate governance program (Corporate 
Governance Task Force, 2004) who further confirms that “the road to Information 
Security goes through corporate governance”.  
Information Security Governance is the term used to describe how 
Information Security is addressed as a part of the Corporate Governance 
responsibilities of an organization. Moulton & Coles (2003) defines Information 
Security Governance (ISG) as “the establishment and maintenance of the control 
environment to manage the risks relating to the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information and its supporting processes and systems”. It becomes 
apparent, having this definition in mind that, Information Security is strategically 
important to any organization because it ensures that IT risks are kept to a 
minimum level and helps the organization to remain competitive while increasing 
their business value. It is necessary to first understand the relationship that links 
Information Security Governance and Corporate Governance to understand why 
the Information Security must be treated as a corporate governance issue. 
1.1.1 The relationship between Information Security and 
Corporate Governance 
Executive Management and the Board of Directors have started to realize that 
ISG is becoming their direct responsibility (von Solms, 2005) and that ignorance 
of ensuring Information Security can result in serious personal consequences, 
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specifically legally and the loss of the corporate reputation (Vericept Corporation, 
2004).  ISG describes the process addressing Information Security at an 
executive level.  Corporate Governance Task Force (2004) states that ISG is 
considered to be a facet of the broader corporate governance strategy of the 
organization, which itself commences at the Board level (King Report, 2001).  
The King Report (2001) on corporate governance helps to clarify why ISG should 
be addressed as corporate governance responsibility. It states that the Board is 
responsible and accountable to the shareholders of the company and must ensure 
that their organization produces business value and delivers a suitable return on 
shareholder investment. A good Information Security effort, according to Swindle 
and Corner (2004), is the key enabler to guarantee such return.   
It can be summarized that ISG, which is a subset of organizations’ corporate 
governance program deserves attention because it has become an important 
business responsibility and its accountability has escalated to the Board level. Von 
Solms (2001) further confirms that “ISG is a direct corporate governance 
responsibility and lies squarely on the shoulders of the Board of the company”. 
Currently, the Board and Executive managers face abundant challenges to meet 
their corporate governance especially in this litigated business environment. 
1.1.2 The Challenges of implementing Security standards and 
complying with Legislation 
The ability to manage information risks is another critical requirement for 
business success in this technology-centric environment in which we currently 
work (Herold, 2001). An even more challenging environment, is created as the 
government regulates almost every aspect of running a business. These two 
issues combine to create substantial responsibilities on the part of business 
executives. This is especially noticeable in the healthcare environment. 
There are various regulations which have an impact on IT. From the South African 
National Health Act (SANHA), Electronic Communication Transaction Act (ECTA), 
Traditional Health Bill in South Africa and Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) in the United States to various international privacy 
and security laws. What used to be a concern only for corporate legal counsel and 
network administrators has grown to be the focal point of executive and 
boardroom discussions (Herold, 2001). 
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The government is mandating what would otherwise be general IT best practices 
to force healthcare organizations to protect their customer information and 
prevent corporate misdeeds. These new government regulations have ushered in 
a new era for running healthcare transactions business. Healthcare Executives are 
now faced with many questions about how to effectively manage Information 
Security and stay out of legal trouble. General Information Security safeguards 
that are installed and revisited annually for the sake of compliance are not an 
effective way to manage these new regulatory challenges. Information Security 
controls implemented to meet the new regulation requirements can not solely 
provide the solution. Healthcare organizations are expected to have effective 
Information Security compliance programs in place and the task of implementing 
such compliance infrastructure is not simple especially with the increase of 
various Security standards and Legislations targeting the different stringent 
requirements. 
South African healthcare organizations are required to establish a formal 
Information Security program to ensure an appropriate level of Information 
Security management, for example, through the adoption of an internationally 
recognized standard such as the ISO 17799 security standard. It is necessary to 
adopt the Healthcare Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
standards to overcome some of the criticisms of ISO 17799, such as being too 
general and not providing stringent solutions to specific requirements, as in the 
case of healthcare organizations. 
The use of the ISO 22857 Health informatics – Guidelines on data protection to 
facilitate trans-border flows of personal health information can ensure that the 
personal health information of patients is kept secure and private when personal 
health information is transferred internationally to other countries (ISO 22857, 
2003).  South African healthcare organizations, additionally, must ensure that 
they comply with the South African National Health Act (SANHA) and the 
Electronic Communication Transaction Act (ECTA) requirements to ensure due 
diligence practices. Ignorance of legal requirements is not an excuse but can 
result in heavy punishment and loss of credibility (Tuyikeze & Pottas, 2005). 
This increase in government law requirements means Healthcare executive 
managers are now faced with many questions on how to effectively comply with 
these new regulatory requirements and simultaneously have in place security 
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mechanisms aimed at reducing security breaches of health information of the 
patients.  
1.1.3 Privacy and Security concerns regarding Health 
Information 
The security of medical Information Systems is a matter of great importance 
(Janczewski, 1998). It is easily imagined the significant consequences resulting 
from the implementation of corrupted medical information or publishing data 
about the health conditions of particular members of society. 
Healthcare information systems provide many advantages when used for 
improved access, collaboration and data sharing among healthcare providers, 
patients, and researchers (Zhang et al, 2002). The main purpose of health 
information systems is to provide a fully-integrated electronic patient record. 
Briefly, it includes (CPRI toolkit, 1995): 
• patients’ histories 
• families’ histories 
• results from specialties such as pathology, radiology, and endoscopies 
• drug treatment 
• procedures and problem lists. 
• Additionally, it generates and stores plans for nursing care, clinical 
correspondence and dictated notes from ward rounds.  
The use of electronic medical records presents an impeccable solution to 
providing effective medical services to patients and increased communication 
between healthcare business associates.  However, the shift of medical records 
from paper to electronic formats has increased the potential for individuals to 
access, use, and disclose sensitive personal health data (CPRI toolkit, 1995).  
Health information, as shown in Figure 1, is shared by various business partners 
to accomplish their tasks. These range (NRC, 1997) from:  
• Health providers (provider of medical or health services such as physicians, 
hospitals, clinics, pharmacy) 
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• Health plans (health insurance issuer, medical aid, Medicaid) 
• Health clearinghouses (entities that facilitate the processing of health 
information) 
• Business associates (entities to whom the covered entity discloses protected 
health information enabling them to carry out, assist with the performance of, 
or perform on behalf of, a function or activity for the covered entity eg., a 
transcription service). 
Figure -1- Healthcare business associates 
 
It is evident that Health information becomes vulnerable to multiple threats due 
to this increased number of people involved in healthcare business transaction. 
According to the National Research Council (1997), electronic medical records are 
potentially vulnerable to misuse from both authorized and unauthorized users 
who inappropriately access patient information for personal or economic gain. The 
highly personal and potentially destructive nature of the medical data creates 
significant concerns about its privacy and security. It becomes obvious that there 
is a need to implement safeguards aiming at ensuring its Confidentiality, 
Integrity, Availability and Privacy of health information. The question that 
arises is which security management approach should healthcare organizations 
follow, considering the myriads of security standards and guidelines that are 
currently available. 
 
 
Health information 
Business associates 
Health providers 
Health plans 
Health 
clearinghouses 
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1.1.4 Protecting the Privacy and Security of health 
information 
Many countries have adopted different regulation frameworks and security 
standards focusing on achieving data integrity, confidentiality and availability of 
health information due to the importance of security and privacy of such 
information. The following sections present an overview of these regulations and 
standards as related to the South African healthcare organizations environment. 
1.1.4.1 Overview of ISO 17799, HIPAA, SANHA and ECTA 
Healthcare executives are required to establish formal Information Security 
programs, for example, through the adoption of the ISO 17799 standard to 
guarantee to customers that healthcare organizations are doing their utmost to 
ensure the security of their health information. The benefits of this framework are 
to provide a code of practice that induces organizations to consider all factors 
when developing their security program. However, ISO/IEC 17799 recommends 
that it is used as a starting point for developing organization-specific guidance, 
with the particular emphasis that not all the guidance and controls in the code are 
applicable to all organizations. Conversely, additional controls not included in the 
code of practice document may be required (ISO 17799, 2000). Healthcare 
organizations may decide to deal with a subset of controls instead of considering 
the full list. Additionally, it is worthwhile to consider incorporating controls from 
other security standards dealing with specific organizational requirements, for 
example, the use of HIPAA standards by healthcare organizations. 
The Healthcare Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) became law 
on August 21, 1996. The primary focus of HIPAA is to mandate that healthcare 
information becomes “portable” and “available” by legislating the use of uniform 
electronic transactions and other administrative measures (CMMS, 1996). The 
forcing of the healthcare industry to adopt uniform electronic transaction 
standards for healthcare information, necessitated its protection by including 
standards for how the information would be secured and safeguarded (CMMS, 
1996). The portion of the HIPAA law that most impacts technology interests is the 
section on Administrative Simplification (Title II, Subtitle F). This section seeks to 
enforce uniform standards on the electronic interchange of health information 
(through the Transaction standard) and mandates guidelines for the security 
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(Security standard) and privacy (Privacy standard) of that information, whether in 
transit or stored. 
The utilization of best practices can serve as a manifestation of reasonable efforts 
by the healthcare organization to do the right thing. Nevertheless, it is important 
to highlight that proper Information Security Management practices alone do not 
necessarily ensure regulatory compliance and vice versa.  South African 
healthcare organizations must comply with the South African National Health Act 
(SANHA) and the Electronic Communication Transaction Act (ECTA) to meet the 
legal requirements of the government.   
The South Africa National Health Act (SANHA) or Act 61 of 2003 was signed into 
act by the South African president on 18 July 2004. SANHA provides a framework 
for a structured, uniform health system to unite the various elements of the 
national health system in a common goal to improve universal access to quality 
health services (SANHA, 2003). Chapter 2 “Rights and duties of Users and 
Healthcare personnel“ is interesting as it contains a number of requirements 
aimed at protecting the privacy and security of health information. 
The Electronic Communication and Transaction Act (ECTA), or Act No.25 of 2002 
was signed into act by the South African president on 31 July 2002. It was the 
first South African law governing cyber activity. It facilitates the development and 
propagation of electronic communications and transactions within South Africa 
and aims to promote consumer confidence in electronic transacting and their 
online privacy (ECTA, 2003). The Act places a heavy burden on medical providers, 
insurers and claims clearinghouses, as well as other healthcare services partners 
who need to communicate electronically on a day-to-day basis to accomplish their 
tasks with the increased use of electronic communication transactions in 
healthcare business transactions. 
There is little doubt that some sections of these government laws when examined 
more deeply address the security and privacy issues and therefore overlap 
sections of the Information Security Management framework, such as in the ISO 
17799 security standard. This is illustrated in Figure 2. This can result in 
duplication of efforts and resources when Healthcare organizations are 
implementing new controls to comply with the new regulatory requirements. 
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Figure -2- Legislation and Security standards 
 
 
Therefore, there is a need for implementing an Information Security compliance 
strategy aimed at eliminating efforts of implementing existing controls and 
duplicating security endeavors. 
1.1.5 The importance for an Information Security compliance 
program 
Kahn (2005) defines an Information Security compliance management as “an 
approach to Information Security program that is designed to help organizations 
manage information in a way that meets legal, regulatory, business and 
operational goals”. The identification, implementation and management of the 
most effective set of controls are the first steps towards meeting the objective of 
this approach. The identification of most effective controls is always problematic 
and many approaches and techniques have developed to achieve this in the most 
objective way possible (von Solms, 1998). This is even more complex in the 
current changing IT environment with its legislation compliance requirements. 
The major problem, currently, faced by Healthcare organization executives is how 
to effectively manage Information Security and stay out of legal trouble. This 
problem is solvable when there is a formalized approach intended to incorporate 
the new controls aimed at meeting the new regulatory requirements. A problem 
encountered when implementing these new controls is that Healthcare 
organizations duplicate controls with existing controls without knowing it. 
Therefore, this confirms that an Information Security Management compliance 
strategy, with the objective of combining regulatory and standards requirement, 
LEGEND 
~: For the topic of concern, the  
    law and security standard 
    requirements are the same. 
>: For the topic of concern, the  
    law includes a number of  
    requirements not covered in  
    the security standard. 
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would serve well to eradicate redundancy in following an ad hoc approach to 
compliance with various standards and legislations. 
The compliance strategy will ensure that common elements across regulations 
and those already covered in an Information Security Management program will 
not be repeated unnecessarily. This will save on resources dedicated to meeting 
unnecessary requirements. 
It is time for Healthcare organizations to move beyond fear, uncertainly and 
doubt where it relates to compliance. It is time for Healthcare organizations to 
begin architecting and implementing practical Information Management 
Compliance solutions. Healthcare organizations will meet their legal and 
regulatory requirements and realize significant business benefits by managing 
information according to its value, and by protecting the privacy, security of their 
information assets. 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
There are a growing number of laws and security standards, currently, that 
require healthcare organizations to provide security controls and demonstrate 
compliance assurance. The problem addressed in this research is which 
compliance strategy should be followed to meet regulatory requirements while 
ensuring customers that best practices are being used.  
Some of the associated problems are identified with this scenario in mind, by 
asking the following questions: 
• If a healthcare organization has a well established Information Security 
Management framework such as ISO 17799, how much effort is required to 
meet the HIPAA standards? 
• If a healthcare organization has a well established Information Security 
Management framework such as ISO 17799, how much effort is required to 
meet the National Health Act regulation requirements? 
• If a healthcare organization has a well established Information Security 
Management framework such as ISO 17799, how much effort is required to 
meet the Electronic Communication Transaction Act regulation requirements? 
• What compliance strategy should be followed to meet both legislative and the 
security standards requirements? 
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1.3 OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of this research project is to develop a model for 
Information Security Management and regulatory compliance program that will 
provide South African healthcare organizations with an approach towards 
Information Security Management, that ensures full compliance with governing 
regulations and at the same time provides customers with the assurance of 
meeting an international industry standard for health Information Security and 
privacy.  
The following relevant sub-objectives will be addressed based on this primary 
objective: 
• Identify a key set of standards and legislation pertaining to the South African 
health sector; 
• Conduct a comparative assessment; 
• Use the results of the comparative analysis to formulate a generic model for 
Information Security management and regulatory compliance. 
1.4 METHOLOGY 
The methodology will be of an investigative nature. An in depth literature study of 
the government laws (South Africa National Health Act 2004 and Electronic 
Communication Transaction Act 2002, HIPAA) and security standards (ISO 17799) 
will be done to highlight concerns pertaining to protecting the privacy and 
security of health information. 
An investigative comparison between the South Africa National Health Act 2004, 
Electronic Communication Transaction Act 2002 and HIPAA Security, Privacy and 
Transaction and Code Set standards will be conducted to identify areas of 
convergence with the ISO 17799 security standard framework. 
The information derived from the investigation of the comparative analysis, will 
be brought together to formulate a framework that will ensure regulatory 
compliance and at the same time ensure best practices are in use. This will help 
to reduce the security and privacy risks to a minimum level, while minimizing 
redundancy in the approach to complying with relevant legislations. 
The results of this study will be reported in the form of academic projects and a 
dissertation. 
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1.5 LAYOUT OF THE DISSERTATION 
The layout of the dissertation is depicted in Figure 3, and is divided into three 
parts: Background, Problem Analysis and Solution. 
Figure -3- Layout of the dissertation 
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Chapter 1 highlights that senior management in the organization has started to 
realize that Information Security Governance is becoming their direct 
responsibility, and that serious personal consequences, specifically legal, could 
flow from ignoring Information Security. The challenges to ensuring good 
corporate governance are discussed. There is a necessity to create an Information 
Security compliance program. This chapter includes the problem statement and 
the methodology that will be used in the thesis. 
Chapter 2 discusses the data flows within the healthcare industry and describes 
the general types of privacy and security concerns that must be addressed. These 
include the vulnerability and threats to data held by particular organizations and 
the privacy issues resulting from the widespread dissemination of data 
throughout the healthcare industry. 
Chapter 3 describes the currently available Information Security standards and 
the best practices.  
Chapter 4 describes the legal and regulation requirements pertaining to privacy 
and data protection. 
Chapter 5 makes a comparison between the International standard ISO 17799 
and HIPAA Security, Privacy, Transaction code sets standards, SANHA and ECTA. 
A comparison analysis between these laws and security standards is done to 
discover the convergence existing between them.  
In Chapter 6, the result of the comparative analysis done in chapter 5 helps to 
provide a model for Information Security Management and regulatory compliance 
that meets both regulatory and security standards requirements. 
Chapter 7 concludes by summarizing the concerns and the solutions provided in 
the thesis.   
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Chapter 2 PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
CONCERNS REGARDING HEALTH 
INFORMATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The longstanding friction between patient privacy and access to information 
has been heightened by the transition to electronic health information and a 
push toward integrated information in support of healthcare delivery and 
health data networks (SALC, 2003). While these developments are intended to 
improve healthcare, they raise many questions about the role of privacy and 
security of health information. 
The main objective of this chapter is to highlight that nowadays, there is a 
growing use of Information Technology (IT) within the healthcare industry to 
handle different sensitive healthcare transactions. Although, this provides 
numerous advantages, it may increase the inappropriate use of such critical 
information. This chapter provides an overview of the South African health 
Sector, to contextualize the discussion in terms of the focus of this research.  
A discussion of some breaches of patient privacy and the resultant 
consequences will be provided. The chapter concludes by emphasizing the 
need for healthcare organizations to protect the privacy and security of 
medical information, which is the main focus of chapters three and four.   
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The healthcare industry has continuously expanded from the single physician who 
treats a patient to multiple healthcare organizations that collect and analyze 
health information about patients (SALC, 2003). The confidentiality of health 
information is no longer a relationship solely between the healthcare provider and 
the patient (Oberholzer, 2001). Insurers, managed healthcare organizations, 
public health officials, researchers, and other parties with a legitimate need to 
access patient information must ensure they have protection mechanisms 
ensuring the privacy and security of such critical information. 
Privacy and confidentiality have long been recognized as essential elements of the 
doctor-patient relationship (Klinck, 2000). It is essential for the medical 
profession (medical practitioners, dentists, psychiatrists and psychologists) to 
collate the health information of their patients into a complete medical record for 
the optimal care of the patient. 
Each time a patient sees a doctor, is admitted to hospital, goes to a pharmacist or 
sends a claim to a health plan, a record is made of their confidential health 
information (HHS, 2001). This record is used for a wide variety of purpose 
including insurance functions, co-ordination of care, and research. Databases are 
established containing information about health and genetic materials enabling 
research on diseases and disorders with a genetic component. Generally cases, all 
these healthcare transactions are done without the knowledge of patient or 
consent for the use of his (her) health information (Sadan, 2001). 
The South African healthcare organizations, like other health sectors worldwide, 
face the same challenges of ensuring the privacy and security of medical 
information. 
2.2 OVERVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICAN HEALTH SECTOR 
Roemer (1991) states that “a health system is a combination of resources, 
organization, financing and administration that culminates in the health services 
offered to the population”. The South African health system is composed of both 
public and private sectors with a significant difference between the two (Bassett, 
2003). 
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Statistics obtained from safrica.info (2003) show that the public sector is under-
resourced and over-used while the growing private sector, run largely along 
commercial lines, caters to middle- and high-income earners, who tend to be 
members of medical schemes (18% of the population), and to foreigners seeking 
top-quality surgical procedures at relatively affordable prices. The private sector 
attracts the majority of the health professionals.  
The public health sector is under pressure to deliver services to about 80% of the 
population although the state contributes about 40% of all expenditure on health. 
However, most resources are concentrated in the private health sector, which 
maintains the health needs of the remaining 20% of the population. Figure 4 
illustrates this disparity comprising both public and private sectors. 
Figure -4- South African Health System  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The South African government has realized that the use of IT in handling medical 
records is a necessity not a choice (safrica.info, 2003), considering the increasing 
number of people in both sectors (35 million in the public sector and seven million 
in the private sector). 
The South African government depends on the State Information Technology 
Agency (SITA), which was established in 1999 with the objective of consolidating 
and coordinating its Information Technology. The objectives of the act, as stated 
in the SITA Act 38 of 2002 section 6 are (SITA Section 6, 2002): 
• “To improve service delivery to the public through the provision of information 
technology, information systems and related services in a maintained 
information systems security environment to departments and public bodies. 
South African Health System 
Public Sector
Private Sector
7 Millions 
35 Millions 
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• To promote the efficiency of departments and public bodies through the use of 
information technology”.  
The South African health system faces many challenges related to staff shortages, 
deteriorating infrastructure, increased centralization, equipment failures and 
shortages, and an increased influx of (especially HIV/AIDS) patients. The public 
and private healthcare sectors are, however, showing confidence in the ability of 
IT to transform the industry and improve healthcare services (EthicSA, 2000).  
The SA Health Review committee, in 1998, conducted a survey to discover which 
hospitals collect and utilize health information; respondents were asked whether 
they had Health Information Systems (HIS) in place, what format they used and 
whether information was collected within specific categories. Figure 5 provides 
the results found. 
Figure -5- Percentage of hospitals which collect key categories of 
information, District/Regional 
 
Source: South African Health Review 1998 Technical Report (Chapter 14) 
As shown in Figure 5, the results suggest that regional hospitals collect more 
information of each type compared with district hospitals (although the 
differences were not statistically significant). It is seen that in both district and 
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regional hospitals, there is a relatively high use of IT in handling medical 
transactions compared to traditional paper work. 
At a Health Informatics Association for Africa conference held in Johannesburg, 
delegates agreed that it was more prudent to increase investment in IT than in 
medical technology (Powe, 2003). “IT in healthcare is growing in popularity 
because of its ability to provide the medical industry with the information it needs 
to make informed decisions” (Powe, 2003).  
It is crucial to initially examine the content and advantages associated with 
medical information to underline the need for ensuring data privacy and security 
of health information.  
2.2.1 Contents of electronic health records 
Originally, the health record existed in an abbreviated form to remind the medical 
personnel, who may have known for sometime about the familiar risk of the 
patient factors and their history of diseases or conditions. Care is now provided 
by a variety of locations and the bills are settled by multiple payers, and the 
health record is used to facilitate familiarity with the following patient criteria: 
status, document care, plan for discharge, document the need for care, assess 
the quality of care, determine reimbursement rates, justify reimbursement claims, 
pursue clinical or epidemiological research, and measure outcomes of the care 
process (NRC, 1997). 
Currently, the content of electronic health records represents an attempt to 
translate the information from paper records into an electronic computerized 
format. Over time, it is anticipated that the content will significantly expand 
beyond that of paper records and potentially include on-line imagery (e.g., x-rays) 
and video such as telemedicine sessions (NRC, 1997). 
The medical information contains the following according to Zhang et al (2002): 
• Identifiable individual information: address, name, contact details…; 
• Health information: patients’ histories, family histories, risk factors, findings 
from physical examinations, vital signs, test results, known allergies, 
immunizations, health problems, therapeutic procedures and medications, and 
responses to therapy. They include the assessment from the provider and 
plans, advance directives, information on the assent and understanding of 
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therapy by the patient, and permission for disclosure of information for use by 
other care providers or bill payers. 
 
The concerns about health information are growing as health information contains 
sensitive information such as HIV status, genetic information and psychiatric 
records. All this information combined provide the “life blood” of any healthcare 
organization. Ensuring the protection of such critical information results in 
numerous advantages on the part of the healthcare organization and also to its 
customers.   
2.2.2 Advantages of electronic health records 
Briggs (2000) defines an electronic health record as an electronic longitudinal 
collection of personal health information, usually based on the individual, entered 
or accepted by healthcare providers which can be distributed over a number of 
sites or aggregated at a particular source. The information is organized primarily 
to support continuing, efficient and quality health care. The record is under the 
control of the consumer and is to be stored and transmitted securely. Having this 
definition in mind, it is unquestionable, using this definition, that the electronic 
health record offers many potential advantages over the traditional paper-based 
records. These will be discussed briefly.  
 
A. Improved access to health information: the primary benefit of using 
health records is access for authorized and authenticated users (NRC, 1997). 
Health information allows providers to access health information from a 
variety of locations and to share that information more easily with other 
potential users. Multiple users may access the information simultaneously.  
 
B. Accuracy of personal health records can be improved: The use of 
medical information, allows information from a variety of healthcare providers 
to be collected and stored in a single record, providing a more complete and 
more accurate record of the personal health history of an individual. It can 
reduce the number of redundant queries and diagnostic tests and improve the 
availability of health-related information at the point–of-care delivery when 
used to increase communication among providers (Romanow Report & 
Informatics, 2002).  
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C. Efficiency can be improved: The use of electronic medical information can 
reduce the amount of time compared to that spent in managing medical paper 
work. Increased access, better logical organization, and greater legibility are 
reason enough to justify the move toward electronic medical information. 
Electronic data can be used to accomplish tasks that were impossible in the 
paper format even if access were not a problem. For example, data stored in 
electronic records can be organized and displayed in a variety of different 
ways that are tailored to particular clinical needs. 
 
D. Effectiveness can be improved: Electronic health records hold the promise 
of improving clinical research. Currently, information about the effectiveness 
of tests or treatments, if stored, lies buried deep in paper files that cannot be 
analyzed economically. The search and retrieval capabilities of computerized 
record systems, in conjunction with automated analysis tools, enable faster 
and more accurate analysis of data (NRC, 1997). It improves the ability of the 
physician to access the latest information, select the best course of action and 
use evidence to guide their decisions (Romanow Report & Informatics, 2002).  
Health information, additionally allows all instances of access to be recorded in 
audit logs maintaining a record of who accessed what information, when and 
about which patients. This is often impossible in a paper-based medical 
information situation. Paper records, according to the Romanow Report & 
Informatics (2002), are increasingly becoming obsolete and inadequate. 
• They limit the flow of information; 
• insufficiently document patient care; 
• impede the integration of healthcare delivery 
• create barriers to research, and limit the information available for 
administration and decision making.  
It is obvious that the application of IT health environment provides numerous 
advantages comparing to paper records, and therefore prove the need that such 
critical information should be properly protected. 
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2.3 NEED OF DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY OF HEALTH 
INFORMATION 
Executive managers occasionally are in error when they believe that adopting 
security best practices to ensure security of information will equally ensure 
privacy protection. The two are related but pose separate challenges (KPMG, 
2001). It is possible to secure health information without making it private; 
however, it is not possible to protect privacy without having security (KPMG, 
2001). These two concepts must be considered as satisfying one does not mean 
the satisfaction of the other. Medical staff members must first understand clearly 
what is meant by these terms to show appropriate respect for patient privacy and 
security. 
2.3.1 Security of health information 
The security of medical information is a matter of great importance. The 
significant consequences resulting from the implementation of corrupted medical 
information or publishing private data about health condition information can be 
easily imagined. ISO 7799 states that Information Security can only be achieved 
if the organization has ensured that three key characteristics namely: 
Confidentiality, Integrity and the Availability of information are preserved. 
2.3.1.1 Confidentiality 
Humphreys et al (1998) states that confidentiality involves “protecting sensitive 
information from unauthorized disclosure or intelligible interception”. An 
organization must make sure that this information is kept secret. In healthcare 
interactions, patients communicate sensitive personal information to the 
caregivers assuring they understand the medical conditions and treat them 
appropriately. Such information is termed confidential and it is necessary that 
those receiving it have a duty to protect it from disclosure to others who have no 
right to the information. Caregivers can breach confidentiality intentionally by 
directly disclosing patient information to an authorized person or inadvertently by 
discussing patient information in a way that an unauthorized person can overhear 
it. 
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2.3.1.2 Integrity 
The ensuring of the integrity of information resources involves maintaining the 
correctness and comprehensiveness of that information (Humphreys et al., 1998). 
Information integrity plays an important role, particularly in a healthcare 
environment because it guides medical staff members in the decision making 
process. If such health information is not accurate or complete, this can result in 
unwanted situations which may even lead to death or cases of individuals being 
treated with inefficient medications. Systems that store, process or transmit 
electronic medical information must ensure that unauthorized modification to the 
information cannot be made without being detected. Any time information is used 
or electronically communicated; there needs to be a high confidence that such 
information is accurate (NEMA, 2001). Authorized modifications to health records 
must be tracked and mechanisms installed to protect the integrity of information 
while stored, processed or transmitted to other business healthcare partners.   
2.3.1.3 Availability 
An organization must guarantee that its information resources are accessible for 
use, by the relevant parties at the time needed to preserve the availability of 
health information. Gerber & von Solms (2001) state that ensuring the availability 
of information is crucial because without timely information, an organization 
would incapable of continuing normal operations.  NEMA (2001) suggests that 
organization must have in place mechanisms and procedures to ensure that 
health information is continuously available even in the light of predictable 
equipment faults or power outages. Organizations need to plan against disasters 
to achieve this. These plans against disaster recovery can vary from simple 
backup tapes, to the use of very comprehensive processes which might include 
off-site support and backup systems (NEMA, 2001).  
The preservation of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of health 
information demonstrates that the healthcare organization is trying all means 
possible to keep the risks at the minimum level. This ensures that the information 
retains its value to the organization and to its relevant stakeholders. However, 
Executive managers must realize that ensuring security does not guarantee 
privacy and vice-versa (KPMG, 2001).  
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2.3.2 Privacy of Health Information 
Several definitions of the term Privacy are found in the literature. They vary 
based on the context in which the term is used. In its broadest sense, privacy 
refers to the right of a person to keep anything about himself (herself) private to 
himself (herself) and not to reveal it to anyone else (SALC, 2003). Dobson et.al 
(1995) defines it as “the right of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine 
for themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others”. Privacy is often characterized as freedom from 
exposure to or intrusion by others. Allen (1995) distinguishes three major usages 
of the term privacy: “Physical privacy”,” Information privacy”, “Decisional 
privacy”. These are defined as follows: 
Physical privacy refers to freedom from contact with others or exposure of the 
physical body to others. Physical privacy is unavoidably limited in contemporary 
health care. Patients grant their caregivers access to their bodies for medical 
examination and treatment, but expect caregivers to protect them from any 
unnecessary or embarrassing bodily contact or exposure. 
Information privacy refers to the prevention of disclosure of personal 
information. Information privacy is limited in healthcare by the need to 
communicate information about particular conditions and medical history to other 
caregivers of the patients. In disclosing this information, however, patients expect 
that access to it will be carefully restricted. It is this type of information privacy 
that will be referred in this project.  
Decisional privacy refers to an ability to make and act on the personal choices 
of the individual without interference from others or the state. 
Several issues are involved in considering privacy. Clearly, health information 
should be kept private. It should be used for approved purposes and shared only 
among authorized people. However, privacy is equally about individuals knowing 
why information is collected about them, who has access to it, how it will be used 
and by whom.  
South African Law Commission (2003) argue that the concepts of privacy and 
security are closely related that they are often confusing. It is pertinent to look at 
the relationship that exists between them. 
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2.3.3 Relationship between Privacy and Security of Medical 
Information 
Security and Privacy are two terms related but not interchangeable (EPIC Report, 
2002). This distinction is obvious especially in the healthcare environment where 
the privacy of health information is of the utmost to any organization and its 
protection deserves a high priority. The relationship between privacy and security 
can be clarified by looking at different views from various authors: 
Luck (2000) states that the concepts of security and privacy in health information 
systems are distinct but inextricably linked, like Siamese twins. The distinction 
can be simply expressed as follows, “security is the protection of computers from 
people, and privacy is the protection of people from computers” (Luck, 2000). 
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) Report (2002) further confirms that 
security and privacy are distinct but related: “Privacy is the right of an individual 
to control the circumstances in which their personal information is used, disclosed 
or collected. It should not be divulged or used by others against his/her wishes. 
Security on the other hand refers to all the ability to control access and protect 
information from accidental disclosure to unauthorized persons and from 
alteration, destruction or loss”. 
Dobson et al (1995) distinguishes between Security and Privacy in terms of 
formal logic. They state that infrastructural definitions such as security can be 
the subject of mechanical interpretation whereas structural definitions such as 
privacy remain in the domain of policy and legislation. Security can be defined as 
who is supposed to know what or who has access to what. Mechanisms to 
implement security can be made part of the social or technical infrastructure 
underlying the institution. 
In conclusion on the distinction between Privacy and Security, it is apparent that 
Privacy and Security are two terms related but with different concepts. They are 
not interchangeable in the sense that the satisfaction of one does not mean that 
the other one is ensured. This proves that there is a necessity for a mechanism 
ensuring both the protection of Privacy and Security which constitutes the heart 
of this project.  
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These will be discussed comprehensively, especially in Chapter 6, which provides 
a compliance model combining both security controls and regulatory requirements 
ensuring the protection of Security and Privacy of health information.  
Although, the protection of security and privacy provides numerous advantages to 
any healthcare organization, the original source of information must be protected 
to ensure the healthcare organizations are collecting correct information. It can 
be impossible to gather accurate information from patients who are uncertain if 
their information will be kept private without a strong trust between patients and 
medical staff. 
2.3.4 Privacy is necessary to secure effective and high quality 
health care 
Privacy is one of the key values on which our society is built but, it is more than 
an end in itself. It is necessary for the effective delivery of healthcare, both to 
individuals and populations (DHHS, 2000). The entire healthcare system is built 
upon the willingness of individuals to share the most intimate details of their lives 
with their healthcare providers. The absence of a strong trust between the patient 
and medical staff can result in disparities of having accurate patient information 
and a lack of high-quality health care. 
The need for privacy of health information, in particular, has long been recognized 
as critical to the delivery of needed medical care (DHHS, 2000). The relationship 
between patient and clinician is based on trust. The clinician must trust the 
patient to give full and truthful information about their health, symptoms, and 
medical history. The patient must trust the clinician to use that information to 
improve his or her health and respect the need to keep such information private. 
Patients must provide healthcare professionals with accurate, detailed information 
about their personal health, behavior, and other aspects of their lives to receive 
accurate and reliable diagnosis and treatment. However, this is not easy to 
accomplish in some cases where such information is embarrassing and patients 
have a strong desire to keep it confidential. Such sensitive conditions include 
sexual assault, family violence, sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted 
pregnancy, suicide attempts, acute psychoses, drug overdoses and disfiguring 
trauma, to name but a few.  
Chapter 2 
A Model For Information Security Management and Regulatory Compliance in SA Health Sector 
  
28 
The provision of health information assists in the diagnosis of an illness or 
condition, in the development of a treatment plan, and in the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of that treatment. The absence of full and accurate information can 
mean a serious risk that the treatment plan will be inappropriate to the medical 
situation (DHHS, 2000). Patients benefit from the disclosure of this information to 
the health plans that fund and can help them gain access to needed care. Health 
plans and healthcare clearinghouses rely on the provision of this information to 
accurately and promptly process claims for payment and for other administrative 
functions that directly affect the ability of the patient to receive needed care, the 
quality of that care, and the efficiency with which it is delivered. 
Individuals cannot be expected to share the most intimate details of their lives 
unless they have confidence that such information will not be used or shared 
inappropriately. 
2.4 CONCERNS REGARDING PRIVACY AND SECURITY OF 
MEDICAL INFORMATION 
Patients reveal highly sensitive information to healthcare professionals. The 
inappropriate use of this information could have seriously adverse consequences 
for the individual. A prime example of the inappropriate use of health records is 
provided by a 1996 study that was conducted in United States of America. This 
study documented 206 cases of discrimination as a result of access to genetic 
information that resulted in a loss of employment and insurance cover or 
eligibility for benefits (Briggs, 2000).  
People provide information in one context and they often do not realize that this 
information is ultimately used for other purposes such as marketing and research 
and mostly without the patients consent (Sadan, 2000). This results in more 
concerns by the patients about the loss of privacy of their information. 
2.4.1 Increasing public concern about loss of privacy 
Today, it is virtually impossible for any person to be truly “left alone”. Individuals 
are overwhelmed with requests for information from potential employees, retail 
shops, telephone marketing firms, electronic marketers, banks, insurance 
companies, hospitals, physicians, health plans and others. The greatest concern 
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from consumers is how this information will be kept by healthcare organizations 
and that it will not be used to harm them in the future.  
In a 1998 national survey done in America, 88 percent of consumers said they 
were “concerned” by the amount of information being requested, including 55 
percent who said they were “very concerned”. These worries are not theoretical 
because the personal information provided to these organizations is sold to other 
companies after promising to consumers not to do so (DHHS, 2000). 
In 1993, a poll conducted by Lou Harris found that 75 percent of those surveyed 
worried that medical information from a computerized national health information 
system will be used for many non-health reasons, 38 percent are very concerned 
about the use of their information, 85 percent of respondents believed that 
protecting the confidentiality of medical records is “absolutely essential or very 
essential” in healthcare reform (Harris & Associates, 1995).  
A Wall street Journal/ABC poll on September 16, 1999 asked Americans what 
concerned them most in the coming century. Loss of personal privacy was the 
first choice of 29 percent of respondents. All other issues, such as terrorism, 
world war and global warming had scores of 23 percent or less. However, 
pertaining to concerns about terrorism, this result may have been quite different 
if the same poll were taken after the events of September 11th , 2001.   
Ernst & Young (2004) conducted a Global Information Security survey to examine 
the various dimensions of Information Security as practiced by global 
organizations. The question was posed: “What do the organizations perceive as 
their most pressing threats and how rationally are they addressing them?” Their 
top ten security concerns illustrated that loss of customer data privacy and 
confidentiality were among the first three that organizations perceive as their 
most threats. The result of this survey is shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure -6- Threat Matrix: Top Security Concerns  
 
  
Source: Global Information Security Survey, 2004 (ERNST & YOUNG) 
The concerns of the privacy and security of health information can be summarized 
into two categories according to the National Research Council (1997): 
 
1. Concerns about inappropriate release of health information within 
individual organizations: 
This can result either from authorized users who intentionally or 
unintentionally access or disseminate health information for their personal or 
economic gain. Authorized users may take advantage of their legitimate 
authority to access information for which they have no valid need (often 
regarding a friend, relative, or celebrity), or they may reveal patient 
information to others often without the consent of the patient. Outside 
attackers may break into computerized information to steal, destroy, or 
render the system dysfunctional, preventing legitimate users such as doctors 
and nurses from accessing information critical to care.  
 
2. Concerns about the systemic flows of information through the 
healthcare and related industries. 
This category involves systemic concerns which refer to the open disclosure of 
patient health information to parties who may act against the interests of the 
specific patient or may otherwise is perceived as invading their privacy. These 
Physical security 
Major virus, Trojan horse, or Internet 
Worm 
Employee misconduct involving 
information systems 
Spam 
Loss of customer data privacy and 
confidentiality 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack 
Financial fraud involving information 
systems 
Misconduct involving third parties with 
access to information systems 
Poor software quality 
Theft of proprietary information 
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concerns arise from the many flows of data across the healthcare system, 
between and among providers, payers, and secondary users, with or without 
the knowledge of patient. Figure 7 shows for example a data flow for health 
information system related to South Africa healthcare environment. 
Figure -7- The sharing of healthcare information  
 
Source: Smith & Eloff, 1999 
It becomes unarguable, as shown in Figure 7, that health information is being 
used by many parties for different purposes and this can result in an abundance 
of vulnerabilities and various threats. The following section provides a brief 
description of each of the different levels of threats that are the original sources 
of privacy and security breaches. 
2.4.2 Major threats to information in healthcare 
organizations   
Healthcare organizations are being endangered by different forms of threats, from 
employees who access data even though they have no legitimate access need, to 
outside attackers who infiltrate the IS of the healthcare organization to steal data 
or destroy the system. The following describes the major threats to medical 
information (NRC, 1997):   
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A. Insiders who make “innocent” mistakes and cause accidental 
disclosures 
Accidental disclosure of personal information is probably the most common source 
of breached privacy that happens in myriad ways, such as overheard 
conversations between health care providers in the corridor or elevator, a 
laboratory technician noticing test results for an acquaintance among tests being 
processed, information left on the screen of a computer in a nursing station so 
that a passer-by can see it, misaddressed e-mail or fax messages, or misfiled and 
misclassified data.  
B. Insiders who abuse their record access privileges 
Examples of this threat include individuals who have authorized access to health 
data (whether through on-site or off-site facilities) and who violate this trust. 
Healthcare workers are subject to curiosity in accessing information they have 
neither the need nor the access right. This includes accessing information about 
the health of fellow employees or family members out of concern for their well-
being. Healthcare workers, who access medical information to determine the 
possibility of sexually transmitted diseases in colleagues with whom they were 
having relationships. They are interested in potentially embarrassing health 
information (e.g., psychiatric care episodes, substance abuse, physical abuse, 
abortions, HIV status, and sexually transmitted diseases) about politicians, 
entertainers, sports figures and other prominent people which regularly finds its 
way into the media. 
C. Insiders who knowingly access information for spite or for profit  
This type of threat arises when an attacker has authorization to some part of the 
system but not to the desired data and through technical or other means gains 
unauthorized access. An example is a billing clerk who exploits a system 
vulnerability to obtain access to data on the medical condition of a patient. For 
example, the London Sunday Times reported in November 1995 that the contents 
of any individual’s electronic health record in Great Britain could be purchased on 
the street for about £150, approximately R1500.00 of the current exchange rate. 
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D. The unauthorized physical intruder 
The attacker, in this case, has physical entry to points of data access but does not 
possess authorization for system use or the desired data. An example of this 
threat is an individual who puts on a lab coat and a fake badge, walks into a 
facility and starts using a workstation or asking employees for health information. 
E. Vengeful employees and outsiders, such as vindictive patients or 
intruders, who mount attacks to access unauthorized information, 
damage systems, and disrupt operations. 
This is a very dangerous threat because the attacker has no authorization and no 
physical access which makes it difficult to mitigate the risks associated with this 
particular threat. An example is the intruder who breaks into a system from an 
external network and extracts patient records. It is evident that most providers 
are moving towards the use of networking and distributed computing technologies 
as they move toward electronic medical records. Therefore, this threat is a latent 
problem on the horizon.  
Most of these threats constitute the original cause of the increase in patient 
privacy breaches. 
2.5 BREACHES OF PATIENT PRIVACY 
The growing amount of patient privacy breaches stem from several trends, 
including the growing use of interconnected health information systems and the 
increasing need of different healthcare partners searching for health information 
to accomplish their daily tasks (CMMS, 1996). Until recently, medical information 
was recorded and maintained on paper and stored in the offices of community-
based physicians, nurses, hospitals and other healthcare professionals and 
institutions. This imperfect system of record keeping has in some ways created a 
false sense of privacy among patients, providers and others. The health 
information of patients has never remained completely confidential” (CMMS, 
1996). 
Some examples to illustrate different privacy breaches cases and the resulting 
consequences are discussed next. 
I. In Russia, a Surgeon of Boris Yeltsin acknowledged that Yeltsin had failed to 
disclose details about the status of his health during an election campaign. His 
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advisors felt that such disclosure would adversely affect the outcome of the 
election (CNN Interactive, 1996). This example demonstrates how the 
disclosure of health information can negatively impact the lifestyle of prominent 
people and why these people may opt not to disclose this information. Business 
leaders, voters and foreign governments are interested in the health of 
politicians, celebrities and prominent citizens. 
II. A breach of the health privacy of an individual can have significant implications 
well beyond the physical health of that person. These include the loss of a job; 
alienation of family and friends; the loss of health insurance and possible public 
humiliation. The following examples illustrate these possibilities: 
a. A banker who works as a country health board official gained access to 
the records of patients and identified several people with cancer and 
cancelled their mortgages (Medical Records, 1999); 
b. A physician was diagnosed with AIDS at the Hospital which he practiced 
medicine. His surgical privileges were suspended (Estate of Behringer -
Medical Center at Princeton, 1999); 
c. A candidate for Congress nearly saw her campaign derailed when 
newspapers published the fact that she had sought psychiatric treatment 
after a suicide attempt (New York Times, October 10, 1992); 
d. In July 2001, Eli Lilly mistakenly revealed the e-mail addresses of 600 
patients who were taking the antidepressant Prozac, resulting in charges 
by the Federal Trade Commission against the company (O’Harrow, 2001); 
e. In mid-February, 1999, the University of Michigan Center received a 
security-oriented wake-up call: several thousand patient records 
(including names, addresses, social security numbers, employment 
status, treatments and other information) were posted to the internet, 
via their web site, by accident. The information, used to schedule 
appointments, was not supposed to be available in such manner but an 
error in set-up caused the exposure. The records were quickly removed 
from Internet access but the damage was done. This serves to illustrate 
how an error can cause privacy breaches (Hancock, 1999). 
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III. The misuse of patient information can have equally severe consequences for the 
person who misuses the data. The HIV/AIDS Ministries Network cites the 
example of the mother of a 13-year old, an employee at a University Medical 
Centre, who took her daughter to work because she could not find a child 
minder. The girl retrieved confidential data of seven former hospital patients 
from the computer of the hospital. She called the former patients and informed 
them they were HIV-positive. The girl was sentenced to five years probation 
and psychiatric therapy (HIV/AIDS Ministries Network, 1995). 
These examples highlight that breaches of patient privacy can result in negative 
consequences for the patients and the individual responsible for the disclosure. 
The scenarios described in Example II illustrate how breaches of health privacy 
can harm our personal health status. 
The following section is aimed at determining the viewpoint of the patients with 
regard to the confidentiality of their medical data or how sensitive they are about 
their personal data. 
2.6 THE VIEWPOINT OF THE PATIENT WITH REGARDS TO 
THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THEIR MEDICAL INFORMATION 
Patients, in South Africa, have the right to submit their complaints to the Health 
Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) that deals with medical staff who 
violate the patient right of protection of their health information. This Council 
deals mostly with patients who were tested for HIV without their consent, 
breaches of doctor / patient confidentiality or doctors who refused to treat people 
living with HIV (HPCSA, 2002).  
A medical practitioner at Wendywood hospital, for example, admitted that he was 
guilty of testing a patient for HIV without counseling and disclosing her HIV status 
to her employer.  He paid a R 10 000 admission of guilt fine to the HPCSA 
(HIV/AIDS Law and Human Rights Update, 2004).  The HPCSA, in another case, 
investigated a doctor in Johannesburg, who allegedly withheld anti-retroviral 
medication from a patient who owed him money (HIV/AIDS Law and Human 
Rights Update, 2004). 
This increase of persons becoming more concerned about their information 
privacy has gained wide attention even in other sectors. A survey of more than 
1850 Americans conducted by California-based Impulse Research on behalf of 
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Chubb Group of Insurance Companies found that 65% of respondents would like 
to see organizations that fail to protect customer data fined and 63% want these 
companies criminally charged (finextra news, 2005). 
2.6.1 Types of sensitive information 
Lincoln & Essin identify four types of sensitive information from the perspective of 
the patient. These are discussed in the following sections. 
Firstly, although personal medical information of the patient is accurate, it can be 
sensitive because it could harm the individual (Lincoln & Essin). The medical 
status of a person can be damaged multiple ways. For example, if it known that a 
prominent person has a sexually-transmitted but treatable disease, like syphilis, 
the situation can be personally embarrassing. In the U.S.A, diagnosis of cancer is 
sufficient to deny a person both insurability and livelihood. Furthermore, the 
diagnosis of a person who is HIV positive or who has contracted AIDS can 
complicate further matters. People fear infection and may discriminate against 
such a person based on his/her lifestyle (Oberholzer, 2001). AIDS possibly 
presents the greatest challenge in terms of confidentiality and privacy. It is 
questionable whether employers would employ risk-taking workers. 
The second type of sensitive information is personal information that can be 
highly subjective (Lincoln & Essin). For example, psychiatric records may contain 
subjective judgments on the attitude, behaviour and potential placement of a 
patient.  
The third type of sensitive information is, for example, the prognosis of a medical 
condition, considered proper for the treatment of the patient but is not 
diagnostically confirmed (Lincoln & Essin). An elevated blood pressure, possibly 
caused by anxiety or disease or anger, may be diagnosed as hypertension. 
Although the diagnosis has to be done to bill the patient, it can mark the patient 
as hypersensitive (Oberholzer, 2001). 
The final type of sensitive information is the lists of patients that link their 
demographic data to some medical interest or condition (Lincoln & Essin). 
Healthcare institutions use these lists to promote proper healthcare but some use 
them for marketing purposes. Some lists can be used to raise money. The 
potential for misuse is evident and present safeguards may be inadequate to 
prevent possible gross violations of privacy. 
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2.6.2 Privacy and Confidentiality Research and U.S. Census 
Bureau Survey 
The American Statistical Association (1979) reported that issues of privacy and 
confidentiality were gaining more attention and were contributing to respondent 
suspicion and their reluctance to participate in surveys. The general idea is that 
people are becoming increasingly concerned that they are losing control over 
their personal information and they fear that if they divulge certain information it 
may be used against them (DHHS, 2000). The Census Bureau has a sound record 
for maintaining confidentiality but people still believe their confidentiality pledge 
and think that some census and survey requests invade their privacy (Mayer, 
2002). This is demonstrated in the following surveys: 
During the early to mid nineties, Louis Harris and Associates (1990; 1991; 1992; 
1993; 1994; 1995), reported the results of a series of national public opinion 
surveys regarding privacy issues in general. This investigation did not specifically 
address attitudes about the Census Bureau. It is interesting, however, to note 
that the results suggest that public concerns about privacy remained consistently 
high over that period of time. The question “How concerned are you about threats 
to your personal privacy in America today – very concerned, somewhat concerned, 
not very concerned, or not concerned at all?” 46% and 33% were very concerned 
and somewhat concerned, respectively, in 1990 (HARRIS, L. and Associates, 
1995).  
Results were similar in the following years with 48% and 31% (1991), 47% and 
31% (1992), 49% and 30% (1993) 51% and 33% (1994), and 47% and 35% 
(1995) of participants reporting that they were very concerned and somewhat 
concerned, respectively. These result indicate that a large majority of the 
population are, at least “somewhat concerned” about threats to their personal 
privacy, and that there has been no reduction by the public with their concern 
about their personal privacy from 1990 through 1995. There is possibly a slightly 
increasing trend as shown in Figure 8 (HARRIS & Associates, 1995). 
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Figure -8- Concerns about personal privacy threats 
 
 
Source: Louis Harris and Associates (1990; 1991; 1992; 1993; 1994; 1995) 
It can be summarized as shown figure 8, that concerns about the personal 
privacy threats has remained a pertinent issue in the six years of the survey. 
These concerns become even more critical when dealing with medical information 
because it contains sensitive information that patients will find objectionable if 
disclosed to unauthorized users. 
2.6.3 The Fisher Medical Centre Patient Confidentiality 
Survey 
In May 1996, a questionnaire was given to 330 patients at the Fisher Medical 
Centre in North Yorkshire, United Kingdom. Its principal objective was to give the 
patients information about the security and confidentiality of their medical records 
and at same time poll the views and concerns of the patients. The survey was 
carried out jointly by the Centre and Professor Mike Wells of the University of 
Leeds (Anderson, 1996).  
A leaflet that elucidated the right to privacy of the patient accompanied the 
questionnaire. The leaflet stated the limits of the actions the hospital had with 
regards to the privacy and confidentiality of the record of the patient. It explained 
who will see the records; where the information will be sent and how the patient 
can ascertain what is contained in his/her records. 
Year 
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The authors further compare the results of this survey with those of the 15th 
Annual Symposium of Computers in Medicare Care, Panel on Patient Privacy and 
Confidentiality. 44.5 % of the questionnaires were returned to the practice; 57 % 
felt that they should explicitly give approval to keep their medical records on 
computer, although 61 % felt that it was more important to have their records 
accessible than to protect their privacy (Anderson, 1996). 
This study reached the following conclusions (Anderson, 1996): 
• Records can be made available to hospitals doctors; 
• Records should not be shared with other agencies; 
• Records should only be computerized if the patient consented; 
• Records should be confidential between the doctor and the patient;  
• Records should only be accessible to the doctors and the nurses within the 
practice. 
Martin (2000) further argues that, as time has progressed, additional factors such 
as the use of administrative records, the advent of new data dissemination media 
and advances in technology (e.g., computers and data linking capabilities) have 
been added to the privacy and confidentiality equation. It is likely that new 
factors will continue to be added in the future. This makes more complex efforts 
to ensure protection of privacy and security of patient information. 
It is clear from both scenarios discussed, that concerns about privacy and 
confidentiality have remained a pertinent issue in the opinion of the general 
population. Currently, it can be generalized that people worldwide are becoming 
increasingly concerned about the protection of personal information. Therefore, 
they are demanding their governments to force organizations to ensure that they 
have proper mechanisms in place ensuring the protection of such critical 
information. 
2.7 PROTECTING PRIVACY AND SECURITY OF HEALTH 
INFORMATION 
“In the last few years, the protection of computerized medical records and of 
other personal health information has become the subject of both technical 
research and political dispute in a number of countries” (Anderson, 1996).  
Healthcare organizations must decide who has access to health information 
systems and whose needs for access are legitimate. A patient has a fundamental 
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right to his/her medical information. Third parties who may have a “need to 
know” must acknowledge the rights of the patient and request explicit permission 
or consent for each instance of collecting, processing, or other uses related to 
such sensitive information (NRC, 1997).  
Security and privacy are not interchangeable issues as previously discussed. 
There is a necessity for healthcare organizations to have in place protection 
mechanisms ensuring the protection of both security and privacy.  It can be 
generally confirmed that the protection of security of health information can be 
assured by the existence of a reasonable or adequate security standard 
framework; while privacy protection includes limits of a legal nature to the 
collection, handling, storage or transmission of personally identifiable or 
aggregate data collected from individual users.  
Policies must be established to determine who can have access to what 
information. Healthcare organization must implement mechanisms preventing 
those without legitimate needs from gaining access to information. They must try 
to develop mechanisms to keep those who are granted access from divulging 
information to others (NRC, 1997). These mechanisms must balance the need for 
health information while ensuring that healthcare will not suffer because someone 
has been unable to gain access to important information (Fitzmaurice, 1998). 
Individuals desire to keep their health information private but they agree that 
medical professionals should have access to their information as proved by the 
following survey:  
Lincoln & Essin record the following statistics made at the 15th Annual 
Symposium of Computers in Medical Care, Panel on Patient Privacy and 
Confidentiality. 14000 University personnel, sharing a common university hospital 
facility, were reasonably well-informed and briefed on the risks of employees and 
colleagues who can pry into their medical records. They were asked whether they 
would want their healthcare records made particularly secure and more difficult 
for legitimate professionals to reach. Only 3% requested such added protection. 
This small percentage can be justified by numerous benefits on the behalf of the 
patients and the organization that results from such disclosure of health 
information.  
Healthcare providers need access to health information to provide advice and 
make decisions which are in the interest of the health of the individual. Clinical 
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researchers need health information to answer questions about the effectiveness 
of specific therapies, patterns of health risks, behavioral risks or a genetic 
predisposition for a disease or condition (e.g., birth defects). Health insurers seek 
to combat rising costs of care by using large amounts of patient data in order to 
judge the appropriateness of medical procedures. Life insurance companies need 
medical information to improve their underwriting process and help detect 
possible instances of fraud in the use of health information. 
Healthcare organizations will suffer as patients become less willing to seek care, 
or they withhold sensitive information unless proper ways can be found to 
balance the privacy rights of individuals against the legitimate needs of such 
organizations for patient information (U.S Senate, 1997). This will in turn impact 
their health status as they will be not receiving enough healthcare services. 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
Electronic Medical information provides numerous advantages over traditional 
paper-based records. It allows more accurate and reliable information available to 
healthcare providers, researchers, insurers, and administrators. It helps improve 
the quality of medical transactions processing and communication between 
different business partners. However, the increase sharing of medical information 
between various business partners raises privacy and security breaches problems. 
People reveal information organizations to healthcare of the utmost sensitivity, 
for example their HIV status. This information is only useful to the patient when 
shared with his/her healthcare professionals. However, this information is 
sometimes used without their knowledge or consent (Sadan, 2001). The use of 
personal medical information for medical research with consent might be 
acceptable, but its use to cancel loans and similar for cancer and HIV positive 
patients, because they pose a credit risk, is unacceptable. It becomes necessary 
to ensure that any system of electronic health information must protect against 
this type of misuse of information to ensure the rights of patients to privacy and 
security are safeguarded. However, patients recognize that their information 
should not be difficult for legitimate medical professionals to access. 
The dilemma of obtaining, using and sharing health information to provide care, 
while not breaching patient privacy, is a serious concern (Smith & Eloff, 1999). 
According to Dash (2000), the challenge for IT leaders is to strike a balance 
between safeguarding privacy and ensuring that security measures are flexible 
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enough so that caregivers are not denied access to information in an emergency 
situation. It may be that what the public desires is not absolute privacy but 
reasonable assurances that when personal information is collected, the healthcare 
providers, managed care organizations, and insurers will treat it with respect, 
store it in an orderly and secure manner and disclose it only for public health 
purposes and in accordance with publicly accountable principles of fairness 
(Gostin, 1997). 
This chapter has shown that there are a growing number of patient privacy 
breaches resulting in public concern about the loss of privacy of their health 
information. It is indisputable that there is a need to protect the privacy and 
security of health information. This protection is complicated because ensuring 
privacy protection does not guarantee security protection and vice-versa. It is the 
combination of a framework with regulatory requirements that such protection 
can be satisfied. The U.S. Public Policy Committee of the Association for 
Computing (USACM) further believes that inadequate or poorly designed security 
standards, regulations, and legislation can have a negative impact on the privacy 
of medical records (SIMONS). In addition, the King Report (2001) on the Code of 
Corporate Practices and Conduct, states that the Board should ensure that the 
company complies with all relevant laws, regulations and codes of business 
practices to increase business enterprise value. 
Chapter 3 deals with security standards frameworks and best practices that can 
be used to secure health information. Chapter 4 is dedicated to the discussion 
of the legal and regulatory frameworks at national and international levels aiming 
at protecting privacy and the security of information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
A Model For Information Security Management and Regulatory Compliance in SA Health Sector 
  
43 
 
Chapter 3 INFORMATION SECURITY 
STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The principal aim of Chapter 3 is to assist healthcare management in the 
interpretation, application and understanding of the benefits and limits of 
internationally accepted approaches to information security standards 
frameworks and best practices. This will help healthcare organizations in 
making a best choice on which best practice approach should be implemented 
to ensure a comprehensive and complete Information Security program.  
Chapter 4 is devoted to a discussion of legal and regulatory requirements 
pertaining to South African health sector.  
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Information has grown to become arguably the most important asset in most 
organizations today. It is crucial, for this reason, to ensure that information and 
its associated information resources are well-protected. The introduction, 
management and maintenance of a high level of Information Security in an 
organization require a proper management methodology (von Solms, 1998).  The 
task of protecting information in a satisfactory manner is difficult due to the 
increased interlinking of healthcare information systems with the IT systems of 
other business partners. 
The Information Security is no longer only a domestic issue because it affects 
external parties (von Solms, 1999). It is important to realize that once healthcare 
organizations are trading electronically with other business partners, the direct 
control over information resources is no longer in the hands of that organization. 
The poor security practices of a business partner may threaten the security of 
that organization (von Solms, 1997). Therefore, it is evident that there is a need 
for a mutual trust between business partners and the best way to establish such 
trust is through a comprehensive IT security program. This is achieved through 
the implementation of well-recognized security standards or guidelines.  
Von Solms (1999) makes a business case for the need of security standard in an 
interconnected eBusiness environment using the metaphor of driving a car. 
“Driving the only motor vehicle on the farm requires very little safety and traffic 
regulations and it is fairly easy to drive safely around the farm. The only 
requirements would be some technical safety mechanisms to be in place and 
working satisfactory. When a driver drives on a public road, a totally different 
approach to road safety is introduced. One reckless driver poses a big threat to 
other vehicles and drivers. Any motor vehicle on a public road requires a valid 
“The central truth is that information security is a means, not an end. 
Information security serves the end of trust. Trust is efficient, both in 
business and in life; and misplaced trust ruinous both in business and in 
life “. 
- Dan Geer (2005) - 
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roadworthy certificate that will indicate that all technical safety and security 
mechanisms and features on the vehicle are present and functioning properly. 
The driver needs a driving license that will indicate that he/she has learned how 
to drive the vehicle in a secure way by using the technical safety features 
correctly and effectively. Further, a third party, i.e traffic officers will continuously 
ensure that the vehicle is functioning technically well and also that the driver 
obeys all road usage regulations. He concluded that BS 7799-2 can certainly 
provide the basis to ensure safe driving on the information super highway” (von 
Solms, 1999). 
It is critical to highlight, using this business case, that if all the drivers on public 
road adhered to all the rules and regulations, there would be mutual trust 
between them which would ensure a safe driving environment. The same 
principle applies when healthcare organizations enter into inter-company trading 
between health providers, health plans, health clearinghouses and business 
associates.  In accord with this metaphor of driving a car, Figure 7 illustrates an 
example of a complex healthcare transaction environment between various 
healthcare business partners. 
A Medical practitioner working on his (her) own conducts his (her) business 
transactions requires a less effort for security issues because the system is not 
linked to other external ones. Hence, it is easy to control most of the business 
transactions and ensure their security. On the other hand, when there is an 
interlinking between various healthcare systems, as shown in Figure 7, then a 
holistic approach to Information Security and privacy becomes necessary. If one 
of the business partners does not properly implement an effective Information 
Security program, it can result in the assets of the other being at risk. This 
scenario is comparable to the previously mentioned business case of driving the 
motor vehicle on a public road, which necessitates more severe requirements 
than driving one motor vehicle around the farm. This is comparable to the 
medical practitioner business activities. 
The information exchange and other relations between businesses, organizations 
and administrations, both at national and international levels, create a need for 
the use of recognized standards in the management of Information Security 
(Saliba & Saint-Germain, 2004). Healthcare organizations, as already mentioned, 
wanting to demonstrate good corporate governance, have a duty to their 
stakeholders to ensure they have effective Information Security ensuring integrity, 
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safekeeping, availability and privacy of sensitive and personal data. This will in 
turn increase trust and confidence to both customers and different business 
partners (von Solms, 2005). Mutual trust, according to Barnard & von Solms 
(1998), can optimally be obtained through a scheme where an IT environment is 
evaluated and certified according to a generally accepted set of standards.  
It is important to note that having agreed to incorporate a security standard as a 
means to Information Security Governance efforts does not imply the end of the 
tasks for the Executives and the Board of Directors. It marks the beginning of 
their duties. The growing number of security standards and guidelines that 
require healthcare organizations to provide security controls and demonstrate 
compliance assurance necessitates healthcare executives and others responsible 
for ensuring compliance with the applicable security requirements pose the 
following questions: 
• Where to begin on the road towards security compliance? 
• What security standards or guidelines are better practices than others? 
• Should an Information Security standard, a code of practice, or guidelines be 
used?  
• Should one security standard or a combination be used to ensure a more 
balanced Information Security Management approach? 
The following sub-problems areas are revealed from these questions:  
• Terminology definition – for example, what is the difference between an 
“Information Security Standard” and a “Code of practice”? 
• Confusion regarding the various internationally accepted approaches to 
Information Security Management, for e.g., should ISO17799 be deemed a 
standard or guideline? 
The main focus of this chapter is to provide answers to these questions. The rest 
of this chapter is organized as follows: the next section is devoted to describing 
the various Information Security Management concepts and terminology, followed 
by a description of numerous security standards, guidelines and approaches that 
play an important role in ensuring best practice in general. ISO 17799, the only 
international security management standard, is discussed in detail as it 
constitutes the “heart” of this project. Nevertheless, it is necessary to emphasize 
that although ISO 17799 provides many advantages to security management and 
provides general guidance on a wide variety of topics, but it typically does not go 
into depth (NIST, 2002). It needs to be complemented by other existing 
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standards which result in a more balanced Information Security approach (IT 
Governance Institute, 2005). 
The next section is devoted to the formulation of broad definitions for certain 
terms and concepts used generally to describe the management aspects of 
safeguarding IT resources to clarify these various Information Security 
Management terms and concepts generally related to this area. This will create a 
strong basis understanding for the various people involved in the process of 
managing Information Security. It has been previously mentioned that although 
Information Security is considered a technical view side, it needs to be regarded 
as a corporate issue (Entrust, 2004). It requires a common understanding of the 
terminology used from upper management to lower level employees.   
3.2 ELUCIDATION OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
The following terms need to be refined and clarified because the main objective of 
this chapter is to formulate a formal and comprehensive approach to IS 
management. The following “general” definitions from the “American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language”, Third Edition are used (DICT, 1992). 
3.2.1 Standards 
“An acknowledged measure of comparison for quantitative or qualitative value; or 
a criterion. A degree or level of requirement, excellence or attainment” (DICT, 
1992).  Standards enable people in all walks of life to communicate at a level 
where all parties can understand one another. The result is that standards not 
only serve to eliminate confusion but serve to level the playing fields (Eloff & von 
Solms, 2000).  The law does not, for example, enforce standards that are not 
supported by criminal or civil legislation, with the result that no offence would be 
committed should the standard be ignored or not followed (Gray, 1991). On the 
other hand, when organizations fail to adhere to certain standards, it can result in 
huge financial loss, owing to the loss of business opportunities and trust by 
customers. It is important to highlight that standards should be considered in 
terms of their approval which could be organizationally, nationally and 
internationally. 
International standards can be defined as documented agreements containing 
exact criteria that must be followed consistently as rules, guidelines or definitions 
of characteristics to ensure that any materials, products, processes or services 
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are fit for their purpose (Oppliger, 1996). The International Standards 
Organization (ISO) and International Telecommunications Union (ITU-T) are good 
examples of international standards organizations that are accepted worldwide 
(Gray, 1991). On the other hand, at the national or public level, each country has 
its own standards body, for example, British standards Institution (BSI), the 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the South African Bureau of 
Standards (SABS) are nationally accepted in the USA and in South Africa. At the 
organizational level, the term “standards” can be used to refer to a specific set of 
rules and requirements adopted in or prescribed for the company internally. 
3.2.2 Guidelines 
A statement or other indication of policy or procedure which determines a course 
of action (DICT, 1992). In terms of ISAC (1999) definition of the term “guideline”, 
a guideline should consider certain guidelines in determining how to implement a 
standard. In the Information Security context, the term “guidelines” refers to the 
set of recommended actions or policy statements that can be performed or 
adhered to achieve a specific objective. Guidelines are laid down to remind users 
not to overlook or ignore specific security measures, even though the latter can 
be implemented in multiple ways (NIST, 1995). It is crucial to note that even 
though a guideline may form an integral part of a standard, the terms “standard” 
and “guideline” are not interchangeable. A standard shall be said to comprise a 
number of guidelines that should be followed to adhere to that standard. However, 
the reverse is not true as because not all guidelines form part of national or 
international standards. 
3.2.3 Code of practice 
A code of practice generally constitutes the result of years of experience. 
Organizations will, often by trial and error, chance upon certain practices, or 
actions that are certain to yield positive results. These practices are made 
available to other organizations. This ensures that, other organizations can 
benefit from their experience because they have tried and tested certain practices. 
Guidelines and code of practice are, to a certain extent, the same, with the main 
difference between them being that a code of practice is based purely on practical 
experience, whilst a guideline may not have had the experience (Eloff & von 
Solms, 2000).  
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3.2.4 Controls 
A Control is an instrument or a set of instruments used to operate, regulate or 
guide a machine or vehicle (DICT, 1992). According to the ISAC (1999) definition, 
the concept “general controls” refers to the environment within which computer-
based application systems are developed and maintained. These general controls, 
are used to ensure that applications are properly developed and implemented to 
ensure they operate securely. For example, a control implemented to realize the 
objective of a strong authentication is that set of measured steps to be effected in 
order to implement a mutual authentication protocol such as Kerberos (Eloff & 
von Solms, 2000). 
3.2.5 Compliance 
Compliance is a self-assessment carried out by an organization to verify whether 
a system that has been implemented complies with a standard (Bisson & Saint-
Germain, 2003). This standard may be required for a national or international 
standard frameworks or regulatory requirements.   
3.2.6 Certification 
The term “certification” describes the method whereby an organization, a product 
or a process is tested and evaluated to determine whether or not it complies with 
a specific standard. It is conferred by an accredited certification body when an 
organization successfully completes an independent audit, thus certifying that the 
management system meets the requirements of a specific standard, for example, 
BS 7799-2.  
3.2.7 Accreditation 
Accreditation means attesting to and proving as having met a prescribed standard 
(DICT, 1992). It consists of the means by which an authorized organization (the 
accreditation body) officially recognizes the authority of a certification body to 
evaluate, certify and register an Information Security Management System (ISMS) 
of the organization with regards to published standards. 
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3.2.8 Benchmarking 
Benchmarking means to measure according to specified standards to compare 
with and improve the measured product (DICT, 1992). The main objective of 
benchmarking is for management to check how well other organizations are doing. 
This informs them to where they should increase their efforts. Whitman & 
Mattford (2003) further states that benchmarking involves the process of seeking 
out and studying best practices used in other organizations that produce the 
results they desire in their organization. 
3.2.9 Self-assessment 
The term “self-assessment” describes the process which is carried out to 
determine the effectiveness of the IS controls implemented in an organization. 
This process is performed internally within the organization. 
3.2.10 Legislation 
The term “legislation” in the discipline of Information Technology, pertains to any 
legal requirements contained in a specifically Information systems-related law, 
which law enacts that such requirement be satisfied. The Electronic 
Communication Transaction Act (ECTA) constitutes an excellent example of the 
legal requirements pertaining to e-commerce in South Africa. 
Healthcare management find it easier in choosing a more comprehensive and 
efficient security practices by having a good understanding of these critical terms 
and concepts used generally to describe the management aspects of safeguarding 
IT resources. It is very easy for a driver to make a decision of which roadmap to 
follow before starting the journey instead of driving by guessing during the 
journey.  
3.3 ENSURING BEST PRACTICES IN MANAGING 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
Several standards and collections of best practices are currently available, which 
prescribe how to manage the function of various organizations. Several private or 
partly private organizations have published suggested guidance in addition to the 
international standardization organizations. However, each of these standards 
addresses specifically a certain IT aspect: IT governance, Information Security 
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Management or just only technical aspect. Von Solms (2005) suggests that 
because of the convergences that exist between these standard frameworks, 
using them together can provide a synergy which can be beneficial to companies.  
The main objective of this chapter is not to compare these standards frameworks 
but rather to discuss the possibility of combining them and whether this produces 
synergy. The choice of sets of these recommended best practices and standards 
is based on their level of popularity of acceptance by many organizations.  
3.3.1 ISO 17799/BS 7799-2 Security Standard Framework 
The business community has, for years, been searching for a practical 
Information Security standard – one that can provide organization with best 
practices and be universally or generally accepted internationally. Organizations 
like NIST, ANSI, ISO and others have been producing computer security 
standards and best practices for decades, most were technical and many 
academic and impractical in terms of meeting business needs (Gordan, 2005). 
The trend in Information Security has recently changed from technical security 
controls to a concern for overall risk management. This shifts Information 
Security from a strict IT focus to a business practice issue (Gordan, 2005). Out of 
this change, one set of standards has emerged that allows business to establish 
and successful mitigate risk to an acceptable level.  The BS7799 standards - the 
ISO/IEC 17799:2000 Code of Practice for Information Security Management and 
BS 7799:2002 Information Security Management System specification have 
gained worldwide acceptance in recent years and are almost universally 
recognized as quality information management. The acceptance and adoption of 
these standards is recognized and for certain industries is required by state and 
federal governments in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, Canada, South America 
and some African countries.  
The ISO 17799 recognizes that information exists in many forms. It can be 
printed or written on paper, stored electronically, stored electronically, shown on 
films, or spoken in conversation. ISO 17799 recommends that whatever form the 
information takes or the means by which it is shared or stored, it should always 
be protected (ISO 17799, 2000). Information Security consists of preserving the 
following elements (ISO 17799, 2000): 
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• Confidentiality: ensuring that information can only be accessed by those 
with proper authorization; 
• Integrity: safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of information and 
the ways in which it is processed; 
• Availability: ensuring that authorized users have access to the information 
and the associated assets whenever required. 
3.3.1.1 The History of ISO 17799 and BS 7799-2 Security Standard 
The British Standards Institution (BSI) has, for over a hundred years, carried out 
studies for the purpose of establishing effective, high-quality industry standards. 
BS 7799 was developed at the beginning of the nineties in response to industry, 
government and business requests for the creation of a common Information 
Security structure. In 1995, the BS7799 standard was officially adopted. 
Four years passed before the publication in May 1999 of a second major version 
of the BS 7799 standard, which incorporated numerous improvements. It was 
during this period that the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
began to take an interest in the work published by the British institute. 
In December 2000, ISO took over the first part of BS 7799, re-baptizing it ISO 
17799. In September 2002, a revision of the second part of the BS7799 standard 
“Information Security management systems – Specification with guidance for 
use” was carried out  to make it consistent with other management standards 
such as ISO 9001:2000 and ISO14001:1996 and with the principles of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It must be 
clarified that as of February 2005, BS7799-2:2002 [BS7799-2] has not yet been 
adopted by ISO. It has been accepted by many national standards’ organizations, 
among which, is the South African National Standards (SANS) organization. A 
new version was published in November 2005 and it will be discussed in this 
section. 
The BS 7799 security standard consists of: 
• Part 1: Information Technology – Code of Practice for Information Security 
Management (ISO 17799) 
• Part 2: Information Security Management Systems – Specification with 
guidance for use (BS 7799-2) 
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It is important  to note that ISO/IEC has released a new edition of ISO 17799, 
officially called ISO/IEC 17799:2005 on 20 June 2005, to address some of the 
weakness in ISO 17799 (Rasmussen, 2005). Ted Humphreys (2005), Chair of the 
ISO/IEC JTC1/SC 27 Working group responsible for ISO/IEC 17799 and ISMS 
standards stated, “this new version of ISO 17799 will place Information Security 
on a truly international footing, addressing issues such as: security of external 
service delivery and the provision of outsourcing; addressing today’s 
vulnerabilities, such as the management of patches; security prior to, during and 
termination of employment; greater focus on handling risks and incidents; dealing 
with mobiles, remote and distributed communications and processing of 
information; and keeping up–to-date with emerging business threats and 
requirements”. ISO/IEC 17799-2005, in terms of controls area, contains 134 
controls divided in 11 domains.  
Additionally, ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27 (the standards committee that deals with 
ISO/IEC 17799) is in the process of preparing an ISMS requirement standard. The 
BS 7799 part-2:2002 will be withdrawn and replaced by the ISO/IEC 27001 
standard when this work is finished and published by ISO/IEC (estimated 
publication date towards the end of 2005) (Humphreys, 2005). The BS7799-
2:2002 will continue to be in force as the standard against which an ISMS will be 
certified until the final version of ISO/IEC 27001 is issued (itGovernace, 2005).  
In this project, the new version of the ISO 17799 was not used for the 
comparison to the effect that the detailed comparison between ISO 17799 and 
these laws had already been concluded at the time of the release of the new 
version of ISO 177999. Therefore, the new version was studied only for the 
purpose of determining whether there are major changes (and not for detailed 
comparison).  
The question that is raised is, what are the distinctions between Part 1 and Part 2 
of the BS 7799 Security Standard? 
3.3.1.2 BS 7799 Part 1 (ISO 17799) versus BS 7799 Part 2 
The BS7799 Part 1 is an implementation guide, based on suggestions. It is used 
as a means to evaluate and build sound and comprehensive Information Security 
infrastructure. It details Information Security concepts an organization “should” 
do. BS 7799 Part 2 is an auditing guide based on requirements. Organizations are 
audited against Part 2 to be certified as BS 7799 compliant. It details   
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Information Security concepts an organization “shall” do. This rigidity precluded 
widespread acceptance and support (Carlson, 2001). This research focuses on 
ISO 17799, the Code of Practice regarded as a detailed comprehensive catalogue 
of guidance on what constitutes good security practice (ISO 17799, 2000).   
Both ISO 17799 and BS 7799-2 In terms of controls areas address the same 10 
control areas that cover 36 control objectives and 127 controls.  
• In ISO 17799, each control is illustrated with “best practice” advice; 
• In BS 7799-2, each control is formulated into an auditable requirement. 
Appendix B is devoted to giving a brief overview of each of its ten main domains 
to gain a depth understanding of the BS 7799 / ISO 17799 security standards 
It is evident that ISO 17799 touches on all the Information Security aspects 
ranging from the organizational, physical and technical. Figure 9 illustrates a 
structure for the ten domains of the ISO 17799 standard. Each domain deals with 
a separate topic built around Administrative, Technical and Physical measures 
and are driven from the top down. The impact of ISO 17799 is felt from the 
management level all the way to the operational level. 
Figure -9- ISO17799 domain structure 
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Source: Bisson & Saint-Rene, 2003. 
3.3.1.3 Benefits of the ISO 17799/BS 7799-2 security standard 
Obviously, complying with ISO 17799 standard or obtaining BS 7799-2 
certification does not prove that an organization is totally 100% secure. The truth 
is, barring the cessation of all activity, there is no such thing as complete security. 
It is rare to guarantee a complete security while doing eBusines transactions 
(Bisson & Saint-Rene, 2003). Unexpected and unintentional mistakes by 
employees are still possible.  Nevertheless, adopting ISO 17799 international 
standards confer certain advantages that security managers should take into 
account. These benefits can be generally noticeable at the organizational, legal, 
operating and commercial levels. 
A. Organizational level benefits 
Commitment - certification serves as a guarantee of the effectiveness of the 
effort put into rendering the organization secure at all levels and demonstrates 
the due diligence of its administrators. This in turn increases the trust of both 
business partners and the customers. 
B. Legal level benefits 
Compliance - certification demonstrates to competent authorities that the 
organization observes all applicable laws and regulations. This is where the 
standard complements other existing standards and legislation (for example 
HIPAA, SANHA, ECTA). A good security management includes effective 
mechanisms to maintain legality. This can only be accomplished when the 
regulatory requirements have been proven to be implemented based on the 
security standard framework. For example, BS 7799 has been recommended by 
the UK Data Protection Commissioner  as means by which organizations can 
demonstrate they meet the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 (Callio 
Technologies, 2001). 
C. Operating level benefits 
Risk management - leads to a better knowledge of Information Systems, their 
weaknesses and how to protect them. Equally, it ensures a more dependable 
availability of both hardware and data because risks are well managed and kept 
at a minimum level.  
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D. Commercial level benefits 
Credibility and confidence - means partners, shareholders and customers are 
reassured when they see the importance afforded by the organization to 
protecting information. Certification can help set a company apart from its 
competitors and in the marketplace. International invitations to tender are 
starting to require ISO 17799 compliance. Business partners increasingly want to 
know the security status of their partners.  Companies see certification to BS 
7799 as a prerequisite for doing business (Callio Technologies, 2001). This in turn 
increases the competitive advantage of the enterprise. 
E. Financial level benefits 
Reduced costs - are related to security breaches and the possible reduction in 
insurance premiums. The following of a well-established Information Security 
program has numerous advantages for the organization because it ensures that 
security controls are in place preventing threats and attacks that can prove costly 
to the organization.  
F. Personnel level benefits 
It helps improve employee awareness of security issues and their 
responsibilities within the organization. ISO 17799 requires organizations to have 
in place policies that everyone in the organization should follow. Additionally 
imposes disciplinary actions on those who take these policies and procedures 
negligently.   
G. Minimizing business risk  
It ensures controls are in place to reduce the risk of security threats and to 
avoid system weaknesses being exploited. It helps the organization develop a 
business continuity plan that will minimize the impact of any security breaches 
(Ashton, 2002). 
The ISO 17799 and BS 7799-2 provide organizations with the assurance of 
knowing that they are protecting their information assets using criteria in 
harmony with an internationally recognized standard. Laws and regulations 
continue to change and BS 7799 incorporates a requirement for identifying which 
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laws are relevant and assures that compliance is addressed. Benefits are 
applicable to organizations of all size and all ISMS maturity levels. 
The ISO 17799 Security Standard received a lot of acclamation since its approval; 
some organizations which were not impressed by its adoption advanced some 
criticisms related to this international standard. The following section discusses 
some of the criticisms from different authors. 
3.3.1.4 The critics of the ISO 17799/BS 7799-2 security standard 
Lawrence (2002) states that there was little consensus when the ISO adopted 
ISO 17799 in August 2000. “A carbon copy of the first half of the much-aligned 
BS 7799, the document drew sharp criticism from major IT nations, which 
charged it didn’t meet the criteria of an international standard” (Lawrence, 2002).  
A. A technical report but a not a standard 
It was fast-tracked through the approval process in August 2000, and ISO 17799 
had the support of many small countries but only one of the large G7 nations—
the United Kingdom, where it was born as BS 7799. Canada and Germany have 
their own competing standard. The United States has the NIST publications. None 
of the large countries wanted to support a competing standard. Critics charged 
that ISO 17799 was passed too hastily, written unevenly and lacked sufficient 
guidance - that it told managers what to do without telling them how to do it 
(Sarah, 2003). They said it would have been fine as a set of recommendations 
but not as a standard (Lawrence, 2002). 
Troy states "There are several different approaches to IT security out there; It 
was our feeling that in order to have a truly acceptable international standard, all 
of this had to be taken into consideration rather than taking it on a fast track 
from one source, the main security standard was presented as a fait accompli, 
and there was no significant opportunity for import from other work that had 
been done in the area"  
Opponents said that the document made it seem that security were just a list of 
activities, rather than an ongoing process. All the check-list type material was 
placed in an appendix at the back of the document. This did not address the most 
fundamental criticism that ISO 17799 should not be classified a standard but 
rather a technical report (Sarah, 2003). 
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"When the U.K. brought BS 7799 to ISO, many international bodies would have 
been very agreeable to having that document become a technical report as 
opposed to a standard," says Alicia Clay, program manager for Information 
Security outreach with NIST, who is a representative on the committee that edits 
ISO 17799. "The expectation of a technical report is that it's more of a guideline. 
ISO 17799 reads more like a technical report, but technical reports tend not to 
carry the same kind of weight. People don't generally talk about conformance to 
reports" (Sarah, 2003). 
B. In the Neutral Zone 
ISO 17799 requires organizations to protect their information assets but does not 
specify how. The standard by staying technology neutral, has the ability to grow 
with the rapidly changing technology landscape. Nevertheless, it rarely attempts 
to provide guidance in evaluating or understanding existing security measures. 
This is a big drawback in the minds of the adopters. For instance, the standard 
recommends the use of adequate access control protection and defines many of 
the different technologies for access control-tokens, certificates and smart cards. 
However, it does not discuss the pros and cons of these technologies in different 
operational contexts. Likewise, it recognizes the need for firewalls but does not 
offer an explanation on the different types of firewalls packet filters, proxy 
servers and stateful inspection and how each is used. Equally absent is common 
sense advice, such as, only enabling necessary services (Lawrence, 2002). 
Baumrucker (2000) states that “The ISO 17799 contains a good shell of 
information, yet lacks depth in new technologies (VPN, remote access, wireless) 
and recently focused-upon needs such as business continuity/disaster recovery. 
Such criticisms roll off the backs of ISO 17799 supporters”. 
C. Not for everyone 
The ISO 17799 is open-ended in assessing the value of information resources. It 
requires adopters to inventory systems and assign values to all digital resources 
but does not say how this should be done. The Conducting of self-assessments 
leaves a lot of room for interpretation and mistakes, which is why BSI and other 
standard auditors recommend having a professional risk assessment conducted 
before starting an ISO 17799 compliance effort. "It needs to be in conjunction or 
partnered with outside professional services," says Darwin L. Martinez, Vice 
President of technology services for National Business Group. "In a large 
Chapter 3 
A Model For Information Security Management and Regulatory Compliance in SA Health Sector 
  
59 
organization, it can be a large engagement, an expensive engagement that only 
leads to having another long engagement and the likelihood of getting that kind 
of support in this economy is slim" (Sarah, 2003). This leads to cost. A copy of 
ISO 17799 is available through the ISO Web site (http://www.iso.org/) for 164 
Swiss francs (roughly $95, depending on the exchange rate which is R665 on the 
current exchange rate). This initial investment is only a fraction of the cost of 
security assessments, penetration testing, auditors and consultants, which can 
run into the hundreds of thousands if not millions of Rand. This is why 
organizations with a solid working knowledge of their security threats have a 
better chance at using the standard. 
The ISO 17799, even after implementation, is short on methodologies for 
measuring its effectiveness when put into practice. Each section contains 
language on the need for periodic policy reviews and regular compliance checks. 
It is silent on the mechanisms for these checks. Critics say that without such 
matrices, the standard has no way of proving its value to management. 
It is necessary for the security managers to consider using other existing 
standards to complement the ISO 17799 and therefore fill the gap to overcome 
some of these criticisms. The next section will describe the complementarities 
between ISO17799 with various security standards. 
3.3.2 Complementarity of ISO17799 and BS7799-2 with other 
existing Security Standard Publications 
The ISO17799 is self-described as “a starting point for developing organization 
specific guidance.” This implies that ISO17799 is not self-sufficient to provide a 
total security solution. Consequently, the need for additional guidance in some 
aspects appears conclusive. 
3.3.2.1 ISO 15408:1999/ Common Criteria/ ITSEC 
The ISO17799 and BS7799-2 were never meant to be  technical standards, in the 
sense that they do not relate to the particularities of various technologies of the 
security requirements they address, therefore  other standards need to come and 
fill the void. 
One such standard is the international standard ISO/IEC 15408:1999 “Evaluation 
criteria for Information Technology Security” known as “Common Criteria (CC) for 
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Information Technology Security Evaluation”. ISO 15408 was produced by a 
consortium of North American and European Union government bodies. It was 
published by the ISO/IEC JTC 1 working group in collaboration with the Common 
Criteria Project Sponsoring Organization, which published the Common Criteria. 
After its publication, it effectively evolved from, encompassed and replaced The 
ITSEC in Europe, Federal Criteria o USA, known as “Orange Book”, and the 
Canadian Criteria. It has been accepted as a working standard by many other 
countries including Russia, Japan and Australia. 
The standard was issued to define criteria as the basis for a common and 
comparable evaluation of IT security, focusing on the security of systems and 
products (ISO/IEC 15408). It provides the framework for testing the effectiveness 
of most security systems and individual security solutions. However, it is not 
intended to measure the effectiveness of the overall security program of an 
organization. 
There are strong linkages between ISO 17799 and ISO 15408. The latter, certifies 
the levels of defences conferred by the security measures in IS (Bisson & Saint-
Germain, 2003). It covers technical aspects which can be compared to ISO 
technical aspect of ISO17799. The combination of the use of the two standards 
where non -IT- security controls are handled by ISO 17799/BS7799-2 and 
security requirements of the system components are evaluated according to ISO 
15408, may provide the best solution in designing and evaluating a system for 
security (Eloff & Frangopoulos, 2004). 
3.3.2.2 ISO 13335 Guidelines for the Management of Information 
Technology Security (GMITS)  
The ISO/IEC TR 13335 Information Technology—Guidelines for the Management 
of IT Security is a technical report subdivided into five parts. The report was 
published by ISO/IEC, which have established a joint technical committee, the 
ISO/IEC JTC1, Subcommittee SC 27 (IT Security Techniques), which is tasked to 
publish international standards e.g., ISO/IEC 17799:2000. 
The report provides guidance on aspects of IT security management and is 
divided into five parts (ISO/IEC TR 13335): 
a. Concepts and IT Models: The management tasks of IT security are outlined, 
providing an introduction to security concepts and models; 
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b. Managing and Planning IT Security: It contains guidelines that address 
essential topics on the management of IT security. These topics are useful for 
identifying and managing IT security; 
c. Techniques for the Management of IT Security: Management Techniques are 
described and recommended in detail; 
d. Selection of Controls: It provides guidance on the selection of safeguards 
considering the type of IT systems and the security concerns and threats; 
e. Management Guidance on Network Security: it contains information on 
identifying and analyzing communication-related factors that should be taken 
into account when introducing network security. 
The ISO 17799 sets out the best practices for managing Information Security and 
creating Security Policies, ISO 13335, called GMITS - Guidelines for the 
Management of IT Security - is its big brother. This standard deals more with the 
technological aspects of information and brings value-added content to risk 
assessment. The protective measures proposed in the fourth of GMITS guides 
(Part 4: Selection of safeguards based on high-level risk analysis) can be 
compared to the controls offered in ISO 17799 (Bisson & Saint-Germain, 2003).  
3.3.2.3 NIST 800-14: Generally Accepted System/Information 
Security Principles (GASSP / GAISP) 
The Computer Security Resource Center (CSRC) of the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), a department of the US Department of 
Commerce, published this document. It is part of the 800 series of NIST 
(computer security). The publication Generally Accepted Principles and Practices 
for Security Information Technology Systems is a collection of principles and 
practices to establish and maintain system security. It is labeled as a special 
publication (NIST-14).  
The goal of the standard is to provide a baseline for establishing or reviewing IT 
security programs. It aims to gain an understanding of basic security 
requirements of IT systems. It focuses on security practices and describes the 
intrinsic expectations of security provisions from a high viewpoint in the form of 
the principles (ITGI, 2004). 
GASSP is not a technical document. Furthermore, it deals with the complete 
picture of Information Security in an organization, not just its IT aspect (Eloff & 
Frangopoulos, 2004). Therefore, it is predictable that it shares a lot in character 
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with ISO 17799, a standard addressing the broader spectrum of Information 
Security threats within the organization. 
3.3.2.4 IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) 
The IT Infrastructure Library is a collection of best practices in IT service 
management. It is focused on the service processes of IT and considers the 
central role of the user. The first versions of the ITIL collection were published by 
the British Office of Government Commerce (OCG), which still holds the ITIL 
trademark. The OCG was commissioned to develop a methodology for the 
efficient and effective use of IT resources within the British government. 
The goal of the Standard or Guidance Publication is the development of a vendor-
independent approach for service management. The ethos behind the 
development was the recognition of increased dependence on IT, which has to be 
managed by high quality IT services (ITGI, 2004). The major reasons for 
implementing the guidance are as follow (ITGI, 2004): 
• The definition of service processes within the IT organization; 
• The definition and improvement of the quality of services; 
• The need to focus on the customer of the IT; 
• The implementation of a central help desk function. 
The ITIL focuses on organizations of varying size. It targets those responsible for 
IT service management (Wallhoff, 2005). However, a major drawback of this 
standard is that it is only available as an English version although it supposed to 
be used internationally (ITGI, 2004). 
3.3.2.5 COBIT  
The first edition of Control Objectives for Information and related Technology 
(COBIT) was issued by Information Systems Audit and Control Foundation (ISACF) 
in 1996. The second edition was published in 1998, with additional control 
objectives and an Implementation Tool Set. The third edition currently available 
by the IT Governance Institute in 2000 has added the management guidelines, 
and several other detailed controls objectives. 
(COBIT, 2000) maintain “The COBIT Mission: To research, develop, publicize and 
promote an authoritative, up-to-date, international set of generally accepted 
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information technology control objectives for day-to-day use by business 
managers, IT professionals and assurance professionals”. 
It was developed by IT auditors and made available through the Information 
Systems Audit and Control Association and COBIT provides a framework for 
assessing a security program and developing a performance baseline and 
measuring performance over time (ISACA, 2005). COBIT targets various 
organizations, public and private companies and external assurance professionals 
from the relevant target group. Three organizational levels are addressed: 
management, IT users and professionals. 
The COBIT standard positions itself as “the tool for information technology 
governance” (COBIT, 2000). COBIT is therefore not exclusive to Information 
Security – it addresses IT governance, and refers amongst many other issues, to 
information security.  An advantage of using COBIT is that it positions 
Information Security Governance framework, which is good because it provides 
an integrated structure for wider corporate governance (von Solms, 2005). The 
disadvantage, however, is that the Information Security Governance component 
of COBIT provides good guidance on the ‘what’ of Information Security 
governance but is not very detailed as far as the “how” is concerned. 
The ISO 17799 is exclusively for Information Security and only address that issue. 
Its advantage are is that it is detailed in security controls but  provides less 
guidelines on the methodology.  The ISO 13335 and ISO 15408 standards deals 
more with the technological aspects of information which can be mapped to ISO 
17799 technical standards.  
It is evident, considering the brief overview of these security standards that 
although, the various worldwide guidance publications reviewed in this research 
project does focus on specific issues of the corporate governance, there are both 
similarities and differences between them. What is missing in one may be well 
addressed in the other; hence the importance of combining them to obtain a 
more balanced information technology infrastructure is revealed. 
 Table 1 illustrates a summarized comparison between these standards to prove 
the necessity of combining these standards based on the above discussion. 
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Table -1- Summarized Security standards comparison 
ISO 17799 ITIL COBIT NIST 800-14 ISO 13335 ISO 15408 
Provides 
security 
controls but 
does not 
define “how” 
Provides IT 
processes, but is 
not strong in 
security  
Provides IT 
controls and IT 
metrics, but is  
not strong in 
security 
Provides IT 
security 
management 
but is not strong 
in the 
technology 
aspect  
Provides IT 
Technical 
security 
controls but 
is not strong 
in “how” 
Provides IT 
Technical 
security but 
does not 
address the 
whole IT 
infrastructure 
To be used to 
improve 
security 
processes and 
controls 
To be used as the 
delivery 
mechanism, 
where it describes 
“how” 
To be used as 
the delivery 
where it 
describes “what” 
To be used to 
improve security 
processes 
To be used 
for the 
guidance of 
IT security 
management 
To be used 
to improve 
the 
technology 
aspect 
Source: Bisson & Saint-Rene, 2003. 
It can be concluded that to implement sound IT governance which is subset of 
corporate governance, it is necessary to consider other standards publications. 
These provide more stringent specifications for a particular IT security area in 
order to fulfill the gap left by ISO 17799. The synergy of combining these 
frameworks can be substantial (Von Solms, 2005). The popularity of BS 7799-2 / 
ISO 17799 is due in part to its flexibility and its intersection with other 
information and IT security standards (Bisson, & Saint-Rene, 2003). Figure 10 
illustrates ISO 17799 complementarity with other existing security standards. 
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Figure -10- Complementarity of ISO 17799 with other security 
standards 
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Executive Management as shown in Figure 10 can choose a combination of 
security standards based on the needed IT goals. At this stage, it is important to 
highlight that when using more than one standard, a mapping between the 
chosen standards is critical to ensure no duplication of efforts occurs. A recent 
report by the IT Governance Institute solves this problem, by providing a detailed 
mapping between the Detailed Controls Objectives of COBIT and ISO 17799 
(COBIT Mapping: Mapping of ISO 17799 with COBIT) (ITGI, 2004). 
The necessity of combination of security practices can be critical especially in a 
healthcare environment where healthcare organizations have more stringent 
security and privacy requirements that are not covered by ISO 17799. It is stated 
in ISO/IEC 17799, “this code of practice may be used as a starting point for 
developing organization-specific guidance, with particular emphasis on the fact 
that not all the guidance and controls in the code may be applicable to each 
organization. Conversely, additional controls not included in the code of practice 
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document may be required” (ISO17799, 2000). Additionally, it is crucial to 
mention that ISO 17799 as a code of practice for Information Security 
Management has a limited coverage for privacy of health information which is one 
the main targets of this project. This confirms the need for complementing the 
ISO 17799 standard with other practices specifically dealing with ensuring the 
security and privacy of health information. 
It can be concluded that using ISO 17799 in managing Information Security can 
not stand alone and needs to be supported by other security standards and 
practices. The increase of stringent healthcare security standard means the need 
of complementing ISO 17799 in a healthcare environment becomes a necessity 
but not a choice.  
The next section will describe the various security practices that healthcare 
Executive Management should take into account in addition to ISO 17799 to 
create a  balanced healthcare Information Security program. 
3.4 HEALTHCARE INFORMATION SECURITY STANDARDS AND 
BEST PRACTICES 
The healthcare industry is as competitive and multifaceted as any industry in the 
world today. The healthcare information system provides many advantages when 
used for improved access, collaboration and data sharing among healthcare 
providers, patients, and researchers (Zhang et all, 2002). Therefore, it is obvious 
that there is a need of ensuring that such information is kept secure. 
The recent trends of a rapid implementation of the enterprise-wide information 
and communication technology in healthcare and wide-area health information 
sharing around the world requires an increased interoperability among different 
information systems (Yun Sik Kwak, 2004). This increase of sharing electronic 
health information means a lot of attention has been directed in this arena to 
ensure that health information is kept secure and private during normal daily 
transactions. 
The assurance of an appropriate and consistent level of Information Security for 
computer-based patient records, both within individual healthcare organizations 
and throughout the entire healthcare delivery system, requires organizations 
entrusted with healthcare information to establish formal Information Security 
programs (CPRI toolkit, 1995).  
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The importance of Information Security in managing computer-based patient 
records is recognized. There are numerous healthcare standards, some 
recognized at the international level, others developed by government agencies, 
public and private security practitioners. Nevertheless, it is not the intention of 
this project to review all of them as it is beyond the scope of this project. The 
main intention is to inform healthcare executives of their existence and thus, 
provide them with more choice for achieving best business practices in managing 
healthcare information systems. 
The next section briefly discusses the health informatics international standards 
namely ISO TC 215, CEN/TC 215 activities and other security practices developed 
by different governmental bodies and other public and private organizations. 
3.4.1 International Standards 
Healthcare informatics is a dynamic area characterized by changing business and 
clinical processes, functions, and technologies. The effort to create healthcare 
informatics standards is equally dynamic (Blair). There are an increasing number 
of international healthcare standards but most of them are not security related. 
Some deal with Identifiers standards; Communications standards developed by 
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) and Digital Imaging and 
Communications in Medicine (DICOM); and Content and Structure standards 
developed by Health Level 7 (HL7). Those which deal with ensuring the privacy 
and security of health information are ISO/TC 215 and CEN/TC 215. These are 
discussed in this project.  
3.4.1.1 ISO/TC 215- Health informatics 
The International Organization of Standardization (ISO) Technical Committee (TC) 
215, Health Informatics was established to develop and harmonize International 
Standards (IS) for health informatics in 1998. The ISO TC 215 consists of 25 ‘P’ 
(Participating: Europe-15, Asia-4, N. America-2, Oceania-2, Africa-2) and 14 ‘O’ 
(Observer: Europe-6, Asia-5, S America-1, C. America-1, Africa-1) member 
bodies. The P-member body must provide experts in developing IS. It is 
important to note that South Africa is one of the two Participating African 
countries members. 
The scope of TC 215 deals with the standardization in the field of information for 
health and health ICT to achieve compatibility and interoperability between 
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independent systems. Its purpose is to ensure compatibility of data for 
comparative statistical purpose (e.g. classifications), and to reduce duplication of 
effort and redundancies (ISO TC 215). The TC has published eight standards to 
date. Currently, there are approximately 75 standards under development in 
which a broad representation of current paradigm and multi-culture requirements 
have been met by the development processes. ISO TC 215 comprises five 
working groups: 
a. ISO/TC 215 WG 1: Health Informatics - Health Records and Modelling 
Coordination 
The scope of this workgroup is to develop standards to facilitate the capturing, 
safe communications, and trusted management of information concerning the 
total health process applied to one subject of care for individual and public health 
purposes. It coordinates the modeling of other relevant standards efforts such as 
those regarding terminology, messaging, and security (ISO/TC 215 Working 
group 1). 
b. ISO/TC 215 WG 2: Health Informatics - Messaging and 
communication 
This workgroup is concerned with a means of implementing the interchange in 
one or more syntax or communication modalities in clinical messaging, Medical 
device communication and business financial messaging (ISO/TC 215 Working 
group 2). 
c. ISO/TC 215 WG 3: : Health Informatics - Health Concept and 
Representation 
This workgroup focuses on the development of standards for representation of 
health concepts. These standards include formal models of representation and the 
description of health concepts; the principles of their organization within 
terminologies and their related systems (including controlled clinical terminologies 
and classifications); and issues concerning the context of their use in electronic 
health records (ISO/TC 215 Working group 3). 
d. ISO/TC 215 WG 4: Health Informatics - Security 
This workgroup focuses on defining standards for technical measures to protect 
and enhance the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of health information, 
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and the accountability of users, and the guidelines for security management in 
healthcare (ISO/TC 215 Working group 4). 
e. ISO/TC 215 WG 5: Health Informatics – Health Cards 
The scope of this workgroup is to develop standards in the field of healthcare 
usage of machine readable cards compliant with physical characteristics, including 
the dimensions defined in ISO/IEC 7810, Identification cards – Physical 
characteristics. The WG shall place special emphasis on standards of technology- 
independent data structures leading to interoperability and compatibility including 
the communication of data (ISO/TC 215 Working group 5). 
The standards or guides published by ISO/TC 215 as found on the ISO general 
web site (www.iso.ch) or ISO/TC 215 home page (www.iso.ch/sdis) include the 
following: 
• TS 17090-1:2002 Health Informatics – PKI framework and overview; 
• TS 17090-2:2002 Health Informatics – PKI certificate profile; 
• TS 17090-3:2002 Health Informatics – PKI management of certificate 
authority; 
• TS 17117 :2002 Health Informatics – Controlled health term structure and 
high-level indicators; 
• ISO/DIS 22857- Health informatics: Guidelines on data protection to facilitate 
trans-border flows of personal health information; 
• TR 18307: 2001- Health informatics interoperability and common messaging 
and communication standards – Key characteristics; 
• TS 18308:2004 Health informatics requirements for an electronic medical 
record architecture; 
• ISO 18812 :2003 Health Informatics – Clinical analyser interfacing information 
system. 
The ISO/TC 215 publication standards, is most interesting because it deals with 
security management is the ISO/DIS 22857 - Health informatics: Guidelines on 
data protection to facilitate trans-border flows of personal health information. It 
will be examined in the following section. 
 
Chapter 3 
A Model For Information Security Management and Regulatory Compliance in SA Health Sector 
  
70 
3.4.1.2 ISO 22857 - Health informatics: Guidelines on data 
protection to facilitate trans-border flows of personal health 
information  
The ISO 22857:2004 provides guidance on data protection requirements to 
facilitate the transfer of personal health data across national borders. This 
standard was developed by ISO/TC 215 WG4 and published 2004. It does not 
require the harmonization of existing national standards, legislation or regulations. 
It is normative only in respect of international exchange of personal health data. 
However, it may be informative with respect to the protection of health 
information within national boundaries and provide assistance to national bodies 
involved in the development and implementation of data protection principles. 
The standard covers both the data protection principles that should apply to 
international transfers and the security policy which an organization should adopt 
to ensure compliance with those principles (ISO 22857).  
This International standard aims to facilitate international health-related 
applications involving the transfer of personal health data. It seeks to provide the 
means by which data subjects, such as patients, may be assured that their health 
data will be adequately protected when sent to, and processed in, another 
country.  
This International standard does not provide definitive legal advice but comprises 
guidance. Legal advice appropriate to the application should be sought when 
applying the guidance to it. National privacy and data protection requirements 
vary substantially and can change relatively quickly. The standard in general 
encompasses the more stringent of international and national requirements, it 
nevertheless comprises a minimum. Some countries may have more stringent 
and particular requirements, and this should be checked (ISO 22857).  
The ISO/TC 215 is currently busy developing ISO/NP 27799 Health Informatics – 
Security management in health using ISO/IEC 17799 with the prediction of 
publication date of 2007. It can be assumed that once this standard is available, 
it will receive much acclaim especially for healthcare organizations using ISO 
17799 who are willing to incorporate more stringent security management. 
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3.4.1.3 CEN/TC 251 Health Informatics 
The Comitté Europeen de Normalisation (CEN) is a European standards 
organization with 16 TCs. Two TCs are specifically involved in health care: TC 251 
(Medical Informatics) and TC 224 WG12 (Patient Data Cards). The Technical 
Board of the European Standardization Committee (CEN/BT) approved the 
establishment of a Technical Committee for Medical Informatics (TC251) in March 
1990. CEN/TC 215 is responsible for organizing and coordinating standards 
development in healthcare environment informatics and telematics at the 
European level (Waegemann, 1995). The CEN TC 251 on Medical Informatics 
includes work groups on: Modeling of Medical Records; Terminology, Coding, 
Semantics, and Knowledge Bases; Communications and Messages; Imaging and 
Multimedia; Medical Devices; and Security, Privacy, Quality, and Safety. The CEN 
TC 251 has established coordination with healthcare standards development in 
the United States through ANSI.  
The scope of this standard deals with the standardization in the field of Health 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and is aimed at achieving 
compatibility and interoperability between independent systems. This includes 
requirements on the structure of health information to support clinical and 
administrative procedures, technical methods to support interoperable systems 
and requirements regarding safety, security and quality of health information 
(Klein, 2002).  Its scope is very similar to that of the more recently formed 
ISO/TC 215 committee, which largely covers the same ground, but has 
emphasized the objective to not always develop new specifications but rather to 
endorse solutions developed by other bodies (Klein, 2002). 
3.4.2 Government Agencies and other organizations 
The development of computer-based patient record systems and healthcare 
information networks has created the need for more definitive confidentiality, 
data security, and authentication guidelines and standards (Blair, 2002). In 
addition to the international healthcare security standard, many organizations and 
other public or private organizations have developed numerous healthcare 
standards. It is not the intention of this project to mention all these standards as 
it is beyond the scope of this project. 
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The next section gives an overview of some of the more recognized security 
standards developed by various government and other competent bodies. 
3.4.2.1 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
NIST was founded in 1901. It is a non-regulatory federal agency within the 
Technology Administration of the Commerce Department of the US. Its mission is 
to develop and promote measurement, standards, and technology to enhance 
productivity, facilitate trade and improve the quality of life. Numerous guidance 
can be freely downloaded at the NIST website (NIST, 1901). Among these 
documents are the NIST special publication 800-series, which can be particularly 
useful for organizations implementing Information Security Management.  
NIST has shown interest in the health sector, which confirmed by the publication 
of NIST Special Publication 800-66 document. This Special Publication (SP) 
summarizes the HIPAA security standards and explains some of the structure and 
organization of the Security Rule. This SP helps educate readers about security 
terms used in the HIPAA Security Rule and to improve understanding of the 
meaning of the security safeguards set out in the Rule. It is designed to direct 
readers to helpful information in other National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST 800-66) publications on individual topics the HIPAA Security 
Rule addresses. Readers can draw upon these publications for consideration while 
implementing the Security Rule. Nevertheless, it is explained that this publication 
is intended as an aid to understanding security concepts discussed in the HIPAA 
Security Rule and does not supplement, replace or supersede the HIPAA Security 
Rule itself (NIST, 800-66). 
3.4.2.2 Center for Medicare and Medical Services (CMMS) 
The Center for Medicare and Medical Services (CMMS) published HIPAA 
regulations standards for the security of electronic health information. It specifies 
a series of administrative, technical and physical security procedures for covered 
entities to use to assure the confidentiality of electronic protected health 
information (CMMS). The regulatory requirements are delineated into either 
required or addressable implementation specifications. These requirements are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 which describes the legal and regulation 
requirements related to the healthcare environment. 
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3.4.2.3 Computer-based Patient Record Institute (CPRI) 
The Computer-based Patient Record Institute (CPRI) is an organization of public 
and private entities that promotes the use of electronic health records. CPRI has 
recognized the importance of providing for Information Security in the 
implementation of computer-based patient records and has established the Work 
Group on Confidentiality, Privacy and Security. The Work Group was chartered to 
encourage the creation of policies and mechanisms to protect patient and 
caregiver privacy and to ensure information security. The Work Group is 
developing a series of security guidelines for organizations implementing 
electronic medical record systems as part of its efforts.  
Products issued to date include guidelines for establishing Information Security 
policies, establishing Information Security education programs, managing 
Information Security programs, and establishing confidentiality statements and 
agreements. It has also developed a guide to security features for health 
information systems (CPRI toolkit, 1995).  
CPRI has performed extensive work in the area of security for organizations using 
computer-based patient records such as: 
• CPRI- Guidelines for Establishing healthcare Information Security Policies; 
• CPRI- Guidelines for Information Security Education Programs; 
• CPRI- Sample Confidentiality Statements and Agreements; 
• CPRI- Security Features for Computer-based Patient Record Systems.  
3.4.2.4 National Research Council (NRC) 
The National Library of Medicine, as the one of the leading agencies within the 
United States government for facilitating healthcare applications of the national 
information infrastructure, identified in 1995 privacy and security as primary 
issues that needed to be addressed to facilitate greater use of IT within 
healthcare (CPRI toolkit, 1995).  The National Research Council (NRC) initiated a 
study to observe and assess existing technical and non technical mechanisms for 
protecting the privacy and maintaining the security of healthcare information 
systems. The report of the findings and several security procedures were 
published by the National Research Council in 1997 in the book entitled “For the 
Record: Protecting Electronic Health Information”. 
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The book contains an analysis of the state of healthcare security in place at 
several leading healthcare organizations. Chapter six provided recommendations 
for current and future healthcare security practices, which served as the 
foundation for the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) which 
proposed substantial efforts in the development of HIPAA Security Standard (NRC, 
1997). 
3.4.2.5 American Health Information Management Association 
(AHIMA)  
The American Health Information Management Association (AHIMA) is the 
organization of health information management professionals. Health information 
management professionals have long focused on protecting the confidentiality of 
patient information (AHIMA) as the official custodians of medical records and 
health information within healthcare providers. AHIMA has developed a number of 
practices on (NRC, 1997): 
• Authentication of Medical Record Entries; 
• Confidential Health Information and the Internet; 
• Destruction of Patient Health Information; 
• Disaster Planning for Health Information; 
• Disclosure of Health Information; 
• Electronic Signatures; 
• E-Mail Security; 
• Facsimile Transmission of Health Information; 
• Managing Health Information Relating to Infection with HIV; 
• Managing Multimedia Medical Records; 
• Patient Anonymity; 
• Patient Photography, Videotaping, and Other Imaging; 
• Protecting Patient Information after a Closure; 
• Release of Information Laws and Regulations (by State); 
• Release of Information for Marketing Purposes. 
3.4.2.6 American Society for Testing and Materials  (ASTM 
committee E31 - Healthcare Informatics)   
The American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), organized in 1898, has 
grown into one of the largest voluntary standards development systems in the 
world. ASTM is a non-profit organization that provides a forum for producers, 
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users, ultimate consumers and those having a general interest (representatives of 
government and academia) to meet on common ground and write standards for 
materials, products, systems and services.  
The ASTM, Committee E31 - Healthcare Informatics includes subcommittees 
addressing privacy (E31.17) and data and system security (E31.20). These 
committees have produced the following standards (CPRI toolkit, 1995):  
• ASTM E1762 - Standard Guide for Electronic Authentication of healthcare 
Information; 
• ASTM E1869 - Standard Guide for Confidentiality, Privacy, Access and Data 
Security Principles for Health Information Including Computer-Based Patient 
Records; 
• ASTM E1902 - Standard Guide for the Management of the Confidentiality and 
Security of Dictation, Transcription, and Transcribed Health Records; 
• ASTM PS100-97 - Provisional Standard Specification for Authentication of 
Healthcare Information Using Digital Signatures; 
• ASTM PS101-97 - Provisional Standard Guidelines for a Technical Security 
Framework for Transmission and Storage of Healthcare Information; 
• ASTM E2017-99 —Standard Guide for Amendments to Health Information 
• ASTM PS115-99 - Provisional Standard Specification for Security Audit and 
Disclosure Logs for Use in Health Information Systems; 
• ASTM E1986-98 - Standard for Information Access Privileges to Health 
Information; 
• ASTM E1987-98 - Standard Guide for Individual Rights Regarding Health 
Information; 
• ASTM E1988-98 - Standard Guide for the Training of Persons Who Have 
Access to Health Information; 
• ASTM Draft Standard Specification for Transmission of Healthcare Information 
Using Secure Messaging Protocols. 
It can be summarized that currently, there is an increasing number of healthcare 
organization bodies ranging from international, governmental and private bodies. 
An awareness of the activities of these organizations can have incredible benefits. 
This can be noticeable, for example, in benchmarking. The organization typically 
benchmarks by selecting a measure with which to compare itself against the 
other organization in its market. It helps to highlight the gaps where more efforts 
are needed by measuring the difference between the ways the organization 
conducts its business in relation with the others. 
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It is necessary to ensure that should the organization decide to use the practices 
adopted by others, they should make sure that they face the same challenges of 
security requirements. What worked well from one organization might not work 
the same for the other and vice-versa. Therefore, the conducting of a risk 
analysis specifically drives the whole process of implementing the security 
solution.  
3.5 CONCLUSION 
Information is recognized as the “life blood” of any business and destroying this 
information is the same as killing the business. Hence, information needs to be 
protected and kept secure. Technical approaches are not sufficient. There can be 
not effective protection without a systematic management of information. ISO 
17799 is an international standard that can serve as basis for Information 
Security Management best practice in any organization and can globally be 
communicated.  
Certification with BS7799-2 will especially help those healthcare organizations 
who want to demonstrate to customers and other stakeholders that confidentiality; 
integrity and availability are always ensured. This in turn increases trust between 
business partners. 
It is crucial to emphasize that ISO 17799 can not stand alone and it may be 
necessary to support it by more stringent and specific standards.  
This chapter has shown that Healthcare Executives are required to incorporate 
healthcare security standard and practices as part of ensuring trust between their 
business partners and customers. However, proper Information Security 
Management practices alone do not necessarily ensure regulatory compliance and 
vice versa (Tuyikeze & Pottas, 2005).  Healthcare Executive Management must be 
alert to reduce possible losses from any legal action. They must understand the 
current legal environment, stay abreast of new laws and regulations, and observe 
new issues as they emerge. Chapter 4 clearly discusses the legal and regulatory 
requirements pertaining to the South African health sector. 
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Chapter 4 LEGAL AND REGULATION 
REQUIREMENTS PERTAINING TO PRIVACY AND 
DATA PROTECTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The issue of information privacy is becoming part of the public debate and it is 
important to understand the substantial body of legal requirements already in 
place and evaluate the extent to which these rules address consumer concerns 
regarding the protection of their information. 
The main objective of Chapter 4 is to discuss data and privacy protection 
legislation on an international and national level to set the requirements 
needed to protect the personal privacy and health information of an individual. 
This is narrowed down to look at privacy protection in the Republic of South 
Africa and specifically in the health sector which constitutes the main objective 
of this project. 
Chapter 5 is dedicated to the comparison between an ISM framework (ISO 
17799) and the HIPAA, SANHA and ECTA regulations requirements. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The growing value of information about individuals held by companies has 
become such a powerful and commercial asset that is doubtful whether 
companies still respect the privacy of the individual. The problem is that the 
processing of the information of individuals may occur without their knowledge 
and even without their being able to control what is stored, processed, sold or 
distributed. This truly questions the right of the individual to protect their 
personal privacy. 
Privacy is a valuable aspect of personality (SALC, 2003). Sociologists and 
psychologists agree that a person has a fundamental need for privacy. It is clear 
that the individual has an interest in the protection of his or her privacy. The right 
of a person to privacy according to Neethling (1996), entails that such person 
should have control over their personal information and should be able to conduct 
their personal information affairs relatively free from unwanted intrusions. This is 
not easy with the expansion in the use of electronic commerce and technological 
environment that enables such information to be available to various business 
partners. 
The keepers of the information of an individual can argue that they maintain tight 
security and privacy over this data. However, most often these controls benefit 
the keepers and provide little protection to the individual (Oberholzer, 2001). 
Therefore, there is a need to enhance such privacy protection to increase the 
trust between customers and the organizations dealing with their information.  
“Privacy is not a solely a risk issue. Nor is it only an operational issue. It has 
become a strategic business issue that is holistic. And one that needs to be 
“Privacy isn’t a technology issue; it’s a social issue. And there is a need for   
companies to really help consumers protect information – not just because it’s 
the right thing to do, but because it’s also good business. If a company 
doesn’t earn the respect of its customers by respecting their privacy, those 
customers won’t come back.”  
-HARRIET PEARSON, CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER IBM CORPORATION- 
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applied enterprise-wide. If you do it right, its impact on customer trust can be 
enormous, and trust is ultimately the catalyst for trade“ (KPMG, 2001). There is a 
need to ensure protection of such critical organization asset namely privacy. 
Since antiquity, respect for patient privacy has been affirmed as professional 
responsibility of physicians (Smith, 2004). In the famous oath attributed to 
Hippocrates, ancient Greek physicians pledged to respect confidentiality in these 
words: “What I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of 
the treatment in the regard to the life of men, which on no account one must 
spread aboard, I will keep to my self, holding such things shameful to be spoken 
about” (Oath of Hippocrates, 1995). The Declaration of Geneva of the World 
Medical Association (1995) goes further in ensuring privacy of patient information. 
It contains the statement “I will respect the secrets which are confided in me, 
even when the patient has died”.  Today, the Oath by itself is no longer sufficient 
and is extended by international and national laws. 
Countries have started to develop various data protection laws with the main 
objective of regulating these practices to ensure data and privacy protection. The 
first law was enacted in the Land of Hesse in Germany in 1970 (SALC, 2003). This 
was followed by national standards in Sweden in 1973, the United States in 1974, 
Germany in 1977, and France in 1978 (Flaherty, 1989). Currently, the adoption of 
these laws has increased in most countries. It was recognized early that 
information privacy could not simply be regarded as a domestic policy problem 
(SALC, 2003). The increasing ease with which personal data could be transmitted 
outside the borders of its country of origin produced an interesting history of 
international harmonization efforts and concomitant effort to regulate trans-
border data flows (SALC, 2003). Therefore, it was necessary to have international 
laws governing such information. 
4.2 INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY LEGISLATION 
The information privacy movement from the early eighties saw the release of two 
crucial international documents: 
• The 1981 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) Guidelines governing the protection of Privacy and Trans-border Data 
Flows of Personal Data; 
• The Council of Europe’s 1981 Convention for the protection of individuals 
with regard to the automatic processing of personal data. 
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4.2.1 Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development Guidelines on privacy and trans-border flows of 
personal data 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), during the 
late seventies, perceived "a danger that disparities in national legislation could 
hamper the free flow of personal data across frontiers… Restrictions on these 
flows could cause serious disruption in important sectors of the economy, such as 
banking and medical health transactions" (OECD, 1981). In 1980 the OECD 
approved and started applying some guidelines concerning the privacy of personal 
data.  
The OECD guidelines, although broad, set up important standards for future 
government privacy rules. These guidelines support most current international 
agreements, national laws and self-regulatory policies. The guidelines were 
voluntary, however roughly half of OECD member-nations had already passed or 
proposed privacy-protecting legislation by 1980. 182 Americans companies 
claimed, by 1982, to have adopted the guidelines, although very few ever 
implemented practices that directly matched the standards. 
The objectives of the OECD guidelines are as follows: 
i. OECD member countries will accept certain minimum standards on the 
protection of privacy and individual liberties with regard to personal data; 
ii. OECD member countries will reduce differences between relevant domestic 
rules and practices of member countries to a minimum; 
iii. OECD member countries will take into consideration the interests of other 
member countries and the need to avoid undue interference with flows of 
personal data between member countries in protecting personal data;  
iv. OECD member countries will restrict trans-border flows of personal data due 
to the possible risks associated with such flows. 
The OECD (1980) has set up principles that should be followed to enforce these 
guidelines. The OECD (1980) defines personal data as “data conveying 
information which by direct (e.g. a civil registration number) or indirect linkages 
(e.g. an address) may be connected to a particular physical person”. 
It is important however to note that the OECD guidelines do not set out 
requirements as to how these principles are to be enforced by member nations. 
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Resultantly, OECD member countries have chosen a range of differing measures 
to implement the privacy principles. These principles provide basic ideas to other 
countries which are not OECD member into setting national laws aimed at 
protecting personal information. It can be argued that they are considered as 
universal best practices principles. 
4.2.2 COE Convention on automatic processing of personal 
data 
The Council of Europe came into being in on 1 October 1985. The main purpose of 
this convention was to ensure the protection of individuals with regard to 
automatic processing of personal data. The key principles are based on the OECD 
guidelines. Member countries were required to approve the convention by passing 
their own legislation, which has since been done by many Europeans countries. 
The Convention defines personal data as “data that reveals racial origin, political 
or religious opinions or other beliefs, as well as personal data concerning health 
or sexual life” (COE, 1985). Additionally, it states that such personal data should 
be (COE, 1985): 
1. Obtained fairly and processed lawfully; 
2. Used only for the specified purpose for which it was originally obtained;  
3. Adequate, relevant and not excessive to the purpose; 
4. Accurate and up to date; 
5. Accessible to the subject; 
6. Kept secure;  
7. Destroyed after its purpose is completed. 
These principles are known as the Principles of Data Protection and form the 
basis of both legislative regulations and self-regulating control.  
The COE and OECD instruments cover the same basic areas of activities but they 
represent differing philosophies as to the nature of the problem and the 
appropriate legal response. The European model, in particular, sees the 
establishment of a specialized supervisory agency as critical, while the OECD 
guidelines have been strongly influenced by the United States which tends to rely 
upon the courts as the primary mechanisms of enforcement of legal rights (SALC, 
2003). 
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These crucial international instruments have had a profound effect on the 
enactment of national laws around the world, even outside the OECD member 
countries. They incorporate technologically neutral principles relating to the 
collection, retention and use of personal information. 
There is an increase in the interconnection of computer systems and 
communication technology, and the Trans-border Data Flow (TDF) allows the free 
flow of information between different countries (Oberholzer, 2001). These TDF 
provide a framework to protect the privacy of the individual while advancing the 
free flow of data internationally. An OECD member country can refuse to transfer 
personal data internationally to another receiving country that does not have 
comparable protection laws (OECD, 1980). Such refusal will impact the country 
the economic sector of the country because of interruptions to the international 
flow of data (Caroline, 2004). Privacy is therefore an important trade issue, as 
data privacy concerns can create a barrier to international trade (Caroline, 2004). 
It becomes necessary to understand the various models aimed at the protection 
of personal information. 
4.3 DATA PROTECTION MODELS 
Depending on the application of these data protection models, they can be 
complementary or contradictory. Several are used simultaneously in most 
countries. All the models are used together to ensure data protection in the 
countries that are willing to protect privacy most effectively.  
The models are described in the Electronic Privacy Information Center Report 
2002 (EPIC, 2002). The Electronic Privacy Information Center is a public interest 
research centre in Washington, DC., established in 1994. EPIC focuses public 
attention on the protection of privacy besides other issues. Some of the valuable 
services offered by EPIC are its On-line Guide to Practical Privacy Tools, On-line 
Guide to Privacy Resources and a dictionary on Privacy. These data protection 
models are described by the South African Law Commission (SALC, 2003) with 
the objective of conducting an investigation into privacy and data protection in 
South Africa. These models are examined next: 
4.3.1 Comprehensive laws 
There is a general law that governs the collection, use and dissemination of 
personal information by both the public and private sectors in many countries 
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around the world. An oversight body ensures compliance. This is the preferred 
model for most countries adopting data protecting laws and was adopted by the 
European Union to ensure compliance with its data protection regime. A variation 
of these laws, which is described as a co-regulatory model, was adopted in 
Canada and Australia. This approach requires industry to develop rules for the 
protection of privacy that are enforced by the industry and overseen by the 
private agency (EPIC, 2002). 
4.3.2 Sectoral laws 
Some countries, such as the United States, have avoided enacting general data 
protection rules in favor of specific sectoral laws governing for example, video 
rental records and financial privacy. In such cases, enforcement is achieved 
through a range of mechanisms. A major drawback with this approach is that it 
requires the new legislation to be introduced with each new technology - 
protection frequently lags behind. The lack of legal protection for individual 
privacy on the Internet in the USA is a striking example of its limitations. There is 
the problem of the absence of an oversight agency. In many countries, sectoral 
laws are used to complement comprehensive legislation by providing more 
detailed protection for certain categories of information, such as 
telecommunications, police files or consumer credit records (SALC, 2003). 
4.3.3 Self-regulation 
Data protection can be achieved - at least in theory - through various forms of 
self-regulation, in which companies and industry bodies establish codes of 
practice and engage in self-policing. However, in many countries, especially the 
United States, these efforts have been disappointing, with little evidence that the 
aims of the codes are regularly fulfilled. Adequacy and enforcement are the major 
problem with these approaches. Industry codes in many countries have tended to 
provide only weak protection and lack enforcement. This is currently the policy 
promoted by the governments of the United States and Singapore (EPIC, 2002). 
4.3.4 Technology 
Data protection has moved into the hands of individual users with the recent 
development of commercially available technology-based systems. Users of the 
Internet and some physical applications can employ a range of programs and 
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systems that provide varying degrees of privacy and security of communications. 
These include encryption, anonymous remailers, proxy servers and digital cash.52 
Users should be aware that not all tools are effective in protecting data privacy. 
Some are poorly designed while others are designed to facilitate law enforcement 
access (SALC, 2003). 
4.4 PRIVACY LEGISLATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH 
AFRICA 
Privacy legislation in the Republic of South Africa is still in its early stages. The 
following is a time frame indicating the progress made on privacy legislation in 
RSA: 
1. October     1994 - Initiate the establishment of the Open Democracy Act 
2. December 1996 - South African Constitution 
(referencing privacy very briefly) 
3. July 1998  - Open Democracy Bill, No 67 
4. November  1999 - Data protection provisions from Open 
Democracy Bill 
5. January 2000 - Green Paper on Electronic Commerce for  
                                         South Africa 
6. July 2002  - Electronic Communication Transaction Act 
                                        (referencing privacy very briefly) 
7. July 2004  - South African National Health Act  
                                        (referencing  privacy very briefly)            
The right to privacy in South Africa is protected in terms of both the common law 
and the South African Constitution of 1996. The Constitution states in the Bill of 
Rights (Section 14 on privacy): 
“Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have: 
a) their person or home searched; 
b) their property searched; 
c) their possession seized; or 
d) their privacy of their communication infringed” 
Section 32 on Access to Information states that: 
I. “Everyone has the right of access to: 
a. any information held by state, and; 
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b. any information that is held by another person and that is required for 
the exercise or protection of any rights; 
II. National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right, and may 
provide for reasonable measures to alleviate the administrative and financial 
burden on the state” (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). 
It is important to note that in RSA, apart from the Constitution itself, there is no 
legislation which deals specifically and fully with data protection. In view of the 
extent and seriousness of the threat to the  personality of the individual, it is 
surprising to find that in South African legal system – unlike many other Western 
legal systems – measures for the protection of the individual (data protection) 
have not yet been enacted (SALC, 2003). 
It should be noted that privacy and data protection are briefly referred to in some 
of the South Africa laws: 
a. The Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA): recognizes the data 
protection principle that personal information should be accessible to the 
subject (PAIA, 2000); 
b. The South African National Health Act (SANHA): provides that every 
patient is entitled to confidentiality of all health information, including health 
status, treatment or stay in a private or public establishment. This information 
is only to be disclosed if the user consents in writing or if a law or a court 
order authorizes the disclosure (SANHA, 2004); 
c. The Electronic Communication Transaction Act (ECTA): ensures that 
protection of personal information that has been obtained through electronic 
transactions (ECTA, 2002). 
 
The ECTA and PAIA have interim provisions dealing, respectively, with the 
correction of data and voluntary adherence to data protection principles. These 
sections are regarded as interim measures until specific data privacy legislation 
has been finalised (SALC, 2003). The above mentioned laws are further discussed 
in the next section. 
 
Information privacy or data legislation will ensure the future participation of 
South Africa in the information market considering the international trends and 
expectations, if the country is regarded as providing adequate data protection by 
international standards (SALC, 2003). 
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The privacy and data protection becomes more important when dealing with 
medical information. The importance of health information is realized, and many 
countries have adopted different legislations and regulation frameworks ensuring 
its protection. The following section provides a discussion of those legal 
frameworks related to the South African health sector. 
4.5 LEGAL AND LEGISLATION PERTAINING TO SOUTH 
AFRICAN HEALTH SECTOR 
The healthcare industry is undergoing a radical revolution through the rapid 
adoption of IT solutions to meet the challenges of regulatory burdens, cost 
reduction and patient care. Some of these IT solutions include computerized 
physician order-entry initiatives, electronic medical records and electronic claims 
processing. 
Medical data are considered to be amongst the most sensitive data for civil use 
because they contain detailed, personal information about patients and their 
health information. For centuries, the Hippocratic Oath has expressed the duty of 
the physicians to respect privacy of the patients. Today, this is no longer 
sufficient and is extended by legal and regulatory requirements of governments.  
South African healthcare organizations must ensure that they comply with the 
South African National Health Act (SANHA), the Electronic Communication 
Transaction Act (ECTA) requirements, and Promotion of Access to Information Act 
(PAIA) to ensure due care and due diligence practices.  
It is arguably necessary to consider adopting the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) to incorporate best practices for protecting privacy and 
security of health information in addition of meeting with these laws frameworks 
requirements. This will ensure that healthcare organizations are meeting 
regulatory requirements while ensuring customers receive best practices for the 
security and privacy of health information. The following sections provide a 
discussion of these legislation frameworks. 
4.5.1 South African National Health Act (SANHA) 
The South Africa National Health Act (SANHA) or Act 61 of 2003 was signed into 
Act by the South African President Thabo Mbeki on 18 July 2004. SANHA provides 
a framework for a structured, uniform health system to unite the various 
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elements of the national health system, in a common goal, to improve universal 
access to quality health services (SANHA). A briefing media on the National 
Health Act by the Minister of Health Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, highlighted 
that this act rests heavily on the Constitution with 50 sections of it relating 
directly to what is covered in this act. Section 27(2) of the Constitution, asserts 
that the State must take reasonable legislative and other measures to 
progressively achieve the right of access to healthcare services and reproductive 
health care, within its available resources.  
The South African National Health Act is composed of 12 chapters. The following 
provides a brief description of those chapters: 
I. Chapter 1. “Objects of Act, responsibility for health and eligibility for free 
health services” It gives the Minister of Health stewardship over the National 
Health System and the responsibility to protect, promote and maintain the 
health of the population; 
II. Chapter 2. “Rights and duties of users and healthcare personnel” gives 
emphasis to some rights of every citizen;  
III. Chapter 3. “National Health” describes the general functions of the national 
Department of Health and the Director General; 
IV. Chapter 4. “Provincial Health” establishes provincial health services and 
outlines the general functions of provincial health departments; 
V. Chapter 5. “District Health System for Republic” establishes the District 
Health System based on the principles of primary health care, promoting 
universal access to quality, equitable, responsive and efficient healthcare 
services that are accountable to the communities they serve; 
VI. Chapter 6. “Health establishment” deals with one of the most interesting and 
innovative elements of the Act. The classification of health establishments, the 
certificate of need, the establishment of boards for hospitals, clinics and 
community health centres, the relationship between the public and private 
health establishments; 
VII. Chapter 7. “Humans resources planning and academic health complexes” The 
Act mandates the National Department to develop a human resources policy 
and guidelines to ensure adequate distribution of health personnel; to provide 
for trained staff at all levels of the health system and to ensure the effective 
utilisation of health personnel; 
Chapter 4 
A Model For Information Security Management and Regulatory Compliance in SA Health Sector 
  
88 
VIII. Chapter 8. “Control of use of blood, blood products, tissue and gametes in 
humans” deals with complex issues such as the control and use of blood, 
blood products, tissue and gametes in humans; 
IX. Chapter 9. “National Health Research and Information”. The Act provides for 
the establishment of a National Health Research Ethics Council and Health 
Research Ethics Committees at every institution, health agency and health 
establishment at which health research is conducted; 
X. Chapter 10. “Health officers and compliance procedures” requires the 
establishment of health officers responsible for the inspection of standards of 
compliance; 
XI. Chapter 11. “Regulations” empowers the minister to make regulations on 
various issues covered in this Act;  
XII. Chapter 12. “General provisions” empowers the Minister to appoint advisory 
and technical committees, to assign duties and delegate powers and to 
prescribe transitional arrangements as may be necessary. 
This project will only deal with Chapter 2 section 17 (“Protection of health 
records”) of this Act because it highlights the right to confidentiality and access to 
health records related issues.   
4.5.2 Electronic Communication and Transaction Act (ECTA) 
The Electronic Communication and Transaction Act (ECTA), or Act No.25 of 2002 
was signed into Act by the South African President Thabo Mbeki on 31 July 2002 
and came into effect on Friday, 30 August 2002. This marked the end of a 
process initiated by the South African Government in 1999 to establish a formal 
structure to define, develop, regulate and govern e-commerce in South Africa. 
It is the first South African law governing cyber activity and the ECTA facilitates 
the development and propagation of electronic communications and transactions 
within South Africa and aims to promote consumer confidence in electronic 
transacting and online privacy (ECTA, 2002). 
The main objectives of the ECTA (2002) include: 
• “To provide the facilitation and regulation of electronic communications 
and transactions; 
• To provide for the development of a national e-strategy for the Republic; 
• To promote universal access to electronic communications and 
transactions and the use of electronic transactions by SMMEs; 
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• To provide for human resource development in electronic transactions; 
• To prevent the abuse of information systems; 
• To encourage the use of e-government services; 
• And to provide for matters connected therewith”. 
With the increased use of electronic communication transactions in healthcare 
business transactions, the ECTA places a heavy burden on medical providers, 
insurers and claims clearinghouses and other healthcare services partners who 
need to communicate electronically on daily basis to accomplish their tasks. The 
ECTA is expected to facilitate electronic interchange relating to healthcare 
business transactions, for example, order-placement and processing, shipping 
and receiving, invoicing, payment, cash application data, insurance transactions, 
and other data associated with the provision of products and health services. 
The ECTA is composed of 14 chapters with 95 sections. The following is a brief 
description of each chapter: 
I. Chapter 1. “Interpretation, Objects and Application” defines critical words 
and phrases and sets out the main objects of the Act; 
II. Chapter 2. “Maximising Benefits and policy frameworks” maximises the 
benefits the Internet offers by promoting universal access in under-serviced 
areas and ensuring that the special needs of particular communities, areas 
and the disabled are duly taken into account; 
III. Chapter 3. “Facilitating Electronic Transactions” deals with the removal of 
legal barriers to electronic transacting;  
IV. Chapter 4. “E-Government Services” facilitates electronic filling. It lists the 
requirements for the production of electronic documents and integrity of 
information; 
V. Chapter 5. “Cryptography Providers” requires the suppliers of “cryptography” 
services or products to register names and addresses, the names of their 
products with a brief description in a register maintained by the Department 
of Communications. 
VI. Chapter 6. “Authentication Service Providers” aims to provide the 
establishment of an Accreditation Authority within the Department, allowing 
voluntary accreditation of electronic signature technology. 
VII. Chapter 7. “Consumer Protection” requires vendors to provide consumers 
with a minimum set of information, including the price of the product or 
service, contact details and the right to withdraw an electronic transaction 
before its completion. 
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VIII. Chapter 8. “Protection of Personal Information” establishes a voluntary 
regime of protecting any information capable of identifying an individual. 
Collectors of personal information may subscribe to a set of universally 
accepted data protection principles. 
IX. Chapter 9. “Protection of Critical databases” requires the registration of 
critical databases and ensure certain procedures and technological methods to 
be used in their storage and archiving. 
X. Chapter 10. “Domain Name Authority and Administration” establishes a 
Domain Name Authority to assume responsibility for the .za domain name 
space, which must be incorporated as section 21(1) of the Companies Act, 
1973 (Act No.61 of 1973). 
XI. Chapter 11. “Limitation of Liability of Service Providers” deals with limitation 
of the liability of service providers or so-called “intermediaries” and creates a 
safe harbour for service providers who are currently exposed to a wide variety 
of potential liability by virtue of merely fulfilling their basic technical functions. 
XII. Chapter 12. “Cyber Inspectors” seeks to provide for the Department of 
Communications cyber inspectors responsible of monitoring Internet websites 
in the public domain and investigate whether cryptography service providers 
and authentication service providers comply with the relevant provisions. 
XIII. Chapter 13. “Cyber Crime” seeks to make the first statutory provisions on 
cyber crime in South African jurisprudence. 
XIV. Chapter 14. “General Provisions” contains certain provisions which give 
jurisdiction of courts trying an offence in terms of this Act. 
 
The ECTA comprises 14 chapters and 95 sections but only certain sections impact 
the IT business. Michalson (2004), who was a member of the team responsible 
for drafting the ECTA on the instructions of the Department of Communications, 
confirms that: “You do not need to comply with the entire Act, when one 
scrutinizes the ECTA, only six chapters make mention of a fine or imprisonment 
for those convicted of an offence under the Act”. These chapters are: 
• Cryptography Providers (Sec 29-32);  
• Authentication Service Providers (Sec 33-40);  
• Consumer Protection (Sec 42-49);  
• Protection of Critical databases (Sec 52-58);  
• Cyber Inspectors (Sec 80-84); Cyber Crime (Sec 85-89);  
• This project will in addition look at Chapter 8 Protection of personal 
information which constitutes one of the major objectives of this project. 
Chapter 4 
A Model For Information Security Management and Regulatory Compliance in SA Health Sector 
  
91 
4.5.3 Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) 
 
The Promotion of Access to Information Act (Act No. 2 of 2000) was enacted in 
accordance with Section 32(2) of the South African Constitution. The Open 
Democracy Bill of 1998 included comprehensive data protection provisions but the 
parliamentary committee removed these provisions from the Open Democracy Bill 
in November 1999. The committee realized that access to information should be 
dealt with in a separate bill and therefore, came the idea of the enactment of the 
PAIA in 2000. 
 
The PAIA gives effect to the constitutional right of access to any information held 
by the State and any information that is held by another person required for the 
exercise or protection of any rights (PAIA, 2000). The PAIA brings into effect the 
right to access information as laid down in the Bill of Rights of the Open 
Democracy Bill. Procedures are laid down for accessing information from 
government as well as from private bodies subject to limitations that are spelled 
out. South Africa does not have a privacy commission; therefore, the Human 
Rights Commission was constituted to enforce the bill.  
 
The Promotion of Access to Information Act (2000) covers the following: 
a. Gives effect to constitutional right of access to any information held by the 
state; 
b. Makes available information about functions of governmental bodies to the 
public; 
c. Provides persons with access to their personal information held by private 
bodies; 
d. Provides for the correction of personal information held by governmental 
or private bodies and to regulate the use and disclosure of that 
information; 
e. Provides for protection of persons disclosing evidence of contravention of 
the law; 
f. Provides for measures against serious misadministration or corruption in 
governmental bodies; 
g. Provides for matters in connection herewith.  
 
The main objective of this Act is to give the right of access to information needed 
to promote or protect individual rights. This right aims to assist people in 
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obtaining the necessary information to enforce and protect their rights. 
Information is requested from a person or private institution and the requester 
has to show that he/she is doing so pursuant to a specific right. The person or 
private institution, from which the information is requested, may refuse access on 
a number of grounds, one of which is the protection of private/confident 
information (PAIA, 2000). 
 
The PAIA does not contain a general prohibition on the disclosure of certain 
information. Only information considered as personal information described below 
should be restricted. It merely provides for mandatory grounds of non-disclosure 
in relation to requests under the Act. The role of privacy in the PAIA is merely a 
restriction on the right of access to information.  
 
Personal information means according to the PAIA (2000): 
a. Information relating to the race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, 
national, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, physical or 
mental health, well-being, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
language and birth of the individual; 
b. Information relating to the education or the medical, criminal or 
employment history of the individual or information relating to financial 
transactions in which the individual has been involved; 
c. Any identifying number, symbol or other particular assigned to the 
individual; 
d. The address, fingerprints or blood type of the individual; 
e. Personal opinions views or preferences of the individual, except where 
they are about another individual or about a proposal for a grant, an 
award or a prize to be made to another individual; 
f. Correspondence sent by the individual that is implicitly or explicitly of a 
private or confidential nature or further correspondence that would reveal 
the contents of the original correspondence;  
g. The views or opinions of another individual about the individual; 
h. The views or opinions of another individual about a proposal for a grant, 
an award or a prize to be made to the individual, but excluding the name  
of the other individual where it appears with the views or opinions of the 
other individual;  
i. The name of the individual where it appears with other personal 
information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name 
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itself would reveal information about the individual, but excludes 
information about an individual who has been dead for more than 20 
years.   
 
This means that information requested and that is not in any respect personally 
identifiable may be provided if the requester shows a right to such information. 
This implies that the mechanism for de-identification must be secure to such an 
extent that identification is not possible at all. A person who complies with the 
procedures set out in the Act is entitled to access to the records of both public 
and private bodies should there be no ground upon which access can be refused 
in terms of the Act (Sec 11(1)). Where public bodies are concerned, a requester 
is entitled to the information irrespective of his or her reason for seeking it (Sec 
11(3)), but when private bodies are concerned, the record has to be required for 
the exercise or protection of any rights.  It is possible that disclosures to third 
parties (i.e. anyone outside of the doctor patient relationship) relating to personal 
information made in the absence of consent may amount to unreasonable 
disclosure as envisaged in the Act where it is requested by a third party from a 
doctor or a medical scheme. 
 
The Section 30 of this Act is interesting. It asserts “Access to health or other 
records related”. This section aims to ensure that provisions are taken into 
account regarding access to health records and the disclosure of such critical 
information. 
4.5.4 Traditional Health Bill 
 
The Traditional Health Bill was introduced in the Assembly as a Section 76; and 
published in the Government Gazette No 24751 of 14 April 2003. The main 
objective of this bill is “To establish the Interim Traditional Health Practitioners 
Council of South Africa; to provide for a regulatory framework to ensure the 
efficacy, safety and quality of traditional healthcare services; to provide for the 
management and control over the registration, training and conduct of 
practitioners, students and specified categories in the traditional health 
practitioners profession; and to provide for matters connected therewith” 
(Traditional Health Bill,2003). This bill is composed of the following five chapters: 
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A. Chapter 1. Definitions 
B. Chapter 2. Establishment and Governance of Interim Traditional Health 
Practitioners Council of South Africa 
C. Chapter 3. Registrar, Staff of Registration Procedures 
D. Chapter 4. Disciplinary Inquiries and Investigation by Council 
E. Chapter 5. General and Supplementary Provisions 
 
In the speech on the bill of the Traditional Health Practitioners by Deputy Minister 
of health, Mrs Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, she highlights that the idea of the 
recognition and regulation of health practitioners by law is to bring together 
elements of the cultures of developed world and those of Africa into the practice 
of medicine. She added that the intention of the Bill is to bring all traditional 
healers under one regulatory body. This would help prevent any harmful practices 
and would be no different to the criteria set for modern doctors (Nozizwe, 2004). 
 
The notion of traditional health practice is known but, it is not easy to define it in 
legal terms. One of the definitions supplied for “African Traditional Medicine” by 
the World Health Organization Centre for Health Development is “The sum total of 
all knowledge and practices, whether explicable or not, used in diagnosis, 
prevention and elimination of physical, mental, or societal imbalance, and relying 
exclusively on practical experience and observation handed down from generation 
to generation, whether verbally or in writing“ (WHO). 
 
This definition acknowledges that there are aspects of traditional health practice 
that cannot always be explained in terms of medical science but that this does not 
necessarily detract from their validity or value in caring for the health and 
wellbeing of people. 
 
It can be difficult to estimate how many South Africans make use of traditional 
healers and how many traditional healers practice their trade as some are not 
officially recognized and some do not possess the technology facilities to register 
their patients. However, it is important to note that, there have been an 
increasing number of people interested in traditional medicine. 
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that up to 80% of the population 
in Africa makes use of traditional medicine. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the ratio of 
traditional healers to the population is approximately 1:500, while medical 
Chapter 4 
A Model For Information Security Management and Regulatory Compliance in SA Health Sector 
  
95 
doctors have a 1:40 000 ratio to the rest of the population. According to Deputy 
Minister of Health Nozizwe Madlala, statistics indicate that more people in SA 
consult traditional health practitioners than they do medical doctors and other 
practitioners of allopathic medicine. A reason for this is because they do not have 
access to any kind healthcare and others have a strong cultural belief that 
traditional healers are capable of curing any disease and most of the diseases are 
believed to be caused by witchcraft.  
 
Traditional healers play an influential role in the lives of African people and have 
the potential to serve as crucial components of a comprehensive healthcare 
strategy. It is vital to note that one should hesitate before making the decision to 
consult them as some of them have a lack of such knowledge, expertise, reality 
and use this profession to survive by getting income from patients. According to 
Steinglass (2002), “traditional healers tend to take a holistic approach to illness, 
treating the patient’s spiritual and physical well-being together. With a terminal 
disease like AIDS, the spiritual side becomes very important”.  
 
For example, a traditional healer in Kwazulu-Natal argues that some traditional 
healers view HIV/AIDS as a “development of an old disease that can be treated 
by traditional healers only” Munk (1998). The interpretation of this statement can 
be confirmed false until today because there is no medication available for this 
epidemic disease.  
 
It can be concluded that in order to ensure that traditional health practice 
continues to have currency and value and make a meaningful contribution to the 
national health system, it is necessary to systematise and regularize it. This can 
hold responsible traditional healers who practice false medications. The 
Traditional Health Bill allows patients to lay complaints if they feel that they have 
been mistreated by health practitioners. 
 
The enactment of a law provides a lot of advantages, such as the protection of 
privacy and information from misuse. It is important to note that the whole 
process of compiling and implementing its regulatory requirements can demand a 
great effort from the government and it makes sense to look at other laws 
already implemented from other countries and customize them to solve related 
issues. 
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4.5.5 Healthcare Information Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) 
 
The South African Council for Medical Schemes committee in 2000, held separate 
meetings with providers and funders in an effort to address problems experienced 
by healthcare providers with regard to the payment of claims. The two parties 
identified as important the need for greater standardization of data collection, IT 
systems and billing practices as a key to resolving the many problems afflicting 
the industry (Council Medical Schemes, 2002). 
 
There was a need to refer to other work accomplished by other organizations 
such as the use of Health Level Seven (HL7) which was already adopted by HIPAA 
(Health Insurance and Accountability Act) regulations in America to achieve this 
objective. This application standard requires all healthcare players to use HL7 v.2 
in conjunction with X12 for passing data between providers and payers. It can be 
seen that the recommendations finally drawn were mostly related to HIPAA 
standards requirement such as the use of security and accountability safeguards 
found in HIPAA security standard; Written consent of the patient prior to the 
disclosure of health information; Notice about the use and disclosure of health 
information and Minimum necessary standard found in HIPAA privacy standard. 
Most of these standards have been incorporated in the South African National 
Health Act (SANHA). Therefore, it becomes obvious that the incorporation of 
HIPAA standards requirements into South African health sector is an undisputable 
issue. This ensures best practices for ensuring the security and privacy of health 
information in the South African healthcare organizations. 
 
The Healthcare Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Public Law 
104-191 was signed into law by the President Bill Clinton on August 21, 1996. 
The primary focus of HIPAA is to mandate that healthcare information become 
“portable” and “available” by legislating the use of uniform electronic transactions 
and other administrative measures. The forcing of the healthcare industry to 
adopt uniform electronic transaction standards for healthcare information meant, 
it is necessary to protect that same information by including standards for how 
the information would be secured and safeguarded (CMMS, 1996).  
The main objectives of HIPAA (1996) include: 
• To improve the portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the 
group and individual markets; 
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• To combat waste, fraud and abuse in health insurance and healthcare 
delivery; 
• To simplify the administration of health insurance and for other purposes; 
• To standardize healthcare transaction processing and communication; 
• To ensure the privacy and security of health information. 
 
The portion of the HIPAA law that most impacts IT technology interests is the 
section on Administrative Simplification (Title II, Subtitle F). This section seeks to 
force uniform standards in the electronic interchange of health information 
(through the Transaction standard) and mandates guidelines for the security 
(Security standard) and privacy (Privacy standard) of that information whether in 
transit or stored. These standards are discussed in more detail. Figure 11 
illustrates the five titles of HIPAA law.  
Figure -11- HIPAA Law 
 
Source: Swindom, 2004 
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The US Department of Human Health and Services (HHS) has issued three rules 
(Security, Privacy and Transaction and Code Set) that covered entities should 
follow to implement the HIPAA law. HIPAA defines covered entities as: 
 
a. Health plan means any individual or group plan that provides or pays the 
cost of medical care, including public and private health insurance issuers, 
healthcare management organizations or other managed care organizations, 
employee benefit plans, the Medicare and Medicaid programs, 
military/veterans plans and any other "policy, plan or program" for which a 
principal purpose is to provide or pay for healthcare services; 
b. Healthcare provider means a provider of medical or health services and any 
other person or organization who furnishes, bills or is paid for healthcare in 
the normal course of business;  
c. Healthcare clearinghouse means a public or private entity, including a 
billing service, re-pricing company, community health information system and 
“value-added” networks and switches that either processes or facilitates the 
processing of health information. 
 
The following section is dedicated to the description of the HIPAA rules 
requirements namely Security, Privacy and Transaction and Code Set rules. 
4.5.5.1 HIPAA Security Rule  
 
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) made HIPAA a top priority 
for CIOs in publishing the HIPAA Security Rule on April 21, 2003 (Chell, 2005). 
The Security Rule establishes required and addressable specifications for the 
protection of electronic health information. The storage and/or transmission of 
this personal health information through electronic means must meet certain 
security protocols as required by the Security Rule. Generally, the Security Rule 
mandates the protection of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
electronic personal health information (HIPAA Administrative Simplification – 
HIPAA Security Rule, 2003). 
 
The HIPAA Security Rule is divided into three broad areas of safeguards namely; 
Administrative, Physical and Technical and contains 42 security measures 
specifications that covered entities must implement to assure the confidentiality, 
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availability and integrity of electronic health information. The federal government, 
in each of these areas, has created a set of standards that healthcare 
organizations must meet to be compliant with this rule which is fixed by April 21, 
2005 final compliance date.  
 
Administrative safeguards are requirements designed to guard health 
information integrity, confidentiality, and availability. These are documented, 
formal practices to manage the selection and execution of security measures to 
protect data and the conduct of personnel in relation to the protection of health 
information. 
 
The Administrative security area is often referred to as the envelope that wraps 
around the entire Information Security program (Anderson, 2005). It 
communicates direction, establishes expectations and outlines disciplinary actions 
for non-compliance. This is an area where significant effort should be focussed 
since it provides the fundamental principles upon which the entire Information 
Security program is based. It serves as the central source of documentation for 
HIPAA compliance reviews.  
 
It is crucial to note that for every standard, the Security Rule provides a number 
of implementation specifications. The HHS makes a distinction between 
implementation specifications that are required and those that are addressable. If 
a standard that is marked Required (R), means the covered entities must 
implement policies and/or procedures that meet the implementation specification; 
on the other hand, for Addressable (A) specifications, covered entities must 
assess whether each implementation specification is a reasonable and appropriate 
safeguard in their environment based on the likely contribution it would make the 
protection of health information. Should it be appropriate they must implement as 
written else they must document why it is inappropriate and implement an 
equivalent alternative measure that is reasonable and appropriate.  
 
Table 2 outlines the required and addressable measures of the Administrative 
Safeguards requirements. 
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Table -2- Administrative Safeguards Standards 
Administrative Safeguards (164.308) 
Standards Section Implementation specifications R 
Risk Analysis R 
Risk Management R 
Sanction Policy R 
Security Management 
Process 
164.308(a)(1) 
Information System Activity Review R 
Assigned Security 
Responsibility 
164.308(a)(2) Assigned security responsibility R 
Authorization and/or Supervision A 
Workforce Clearance Procedure A 
Workforce Security  164.308(a)(3) 
Termination Procedures A 
Isolating healthcare clearinghouse 
function 
R 
Access authorization A 
Information Access 
Management 
164.308(a)(4) 
Access establishment and 
modification 
A 
Security reminders A 
Protection from malicious software A 
Log-in monitoring A 
Security awareness 
and training  
164.308(a)(5) 
Password management A 
Security Incident 
Procedures 
164.308(a)(6) Response and reporting R 
Data backup plan R 
Disaster recovery plan R 
Emergency mode operation plan R 
Testing and revision procedure A 
Contingency plan 164.308(a)(7) 
Applications and data criticality 
analysis 
A 
Evaluation 164.308(a)(8) Systems evaluations R 
Business Associates 
contracts and other 
arrangements 
164.308(b)(1) Written contract or other 
arrangement 
R 
Source: Swindom, 2004 
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Physical safeguards are requirements designed for the protection of physical 
computer systems and related buildings and equipment from fire and other 
natural and environmental hazards and intrusion. Physical safeguards cover the 
use of locks, keys and administrative measures used to control access to 
computer systems and facilities. Physical security measures play a large role in 
the assurance of Information Security for electronic storage and transmission 
media. The old Information Security axiom holds true “Anything I can touch, I 
can own”. The lack of control for physical access to information assets, implies 
not whether information assets will be compromised, but more a question of 
when (Anderson, 2005). Table 3 shows the standards, section and 
implementation specifications of physical safeguards. These are marked Required 
(R) or Addressable (A).  
Table -3- Physical Safeguards Standards 
Physical Safeguards (164.310) 
Standards Section Implementation specifications  
Contingency operation A 
Facility Access Plan A 
Access Controls & Validation Procedures A 
Facility Access 
Controls 
164.310(a)(1) 
Maintenance Records A 
Workstation Use 164.310(b) Workstation use R 
Workforce Security  164.310(c) Workforce security R 
Disposal R 
Media Re-use R 
Accountability A 
Device and Media 
Controls 
164.310(d)(1) 
Data Backup and Storage A 
Source: Swindom, 2004 
 
Technical safeguards are requirements designed for the protection, controlling 
and monitoring to access of health information. These safeguards ensure the 
prevention of unauthorized access to medical information that is transmitted over 
a communication network. Table 4 shows the Technical Safeguards Standards.   
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Table -4- Technical Safeguards Standards 
Technical Safeguards (164.312) 
Standards Section Implementation specifications  
Unique User Identification R 
Emergency Access Procedure R 
Automatic Logoff A 
Access Controls 164.312(a)(1) 
Encryption and Decryption A 
Audit Controls 164.312(b) Audit controls R 
Integrity 164.312(c)(1) Mechanisms to Authenticate electronic health 
information 
A 
Person or Entity 
Authentication 
164.312(d) Person or entity authentication R 
 
Integrity Controls A Transmission 
Security 
164.312(e)(1) 
Encryption A 
Source: Swindom, 2004 
4.5.5.2 HIPAA Transaction and Code Set Rule  
HIPAA directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to adopt 
standards for the electronic exchange of administrative and financial healthcare 
transactions to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the healthcare system. 
These are commonly referred to as the Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) 
standards, and include defined and numbered transactions, formats and data 
elements. These standards were established to eliminate redundant tasks, lower 
administrative costs associated with paper-based processes and identify new 
opportunities to use EDI to streamline information flows and improve overall data 
quality (HIPAA Administrative Simplification - Transaction and Code Set Rule, 
2000). 
The Transaction and Code Set rule addresses both the content of the information 
to be exchanged and the specific formats in which information is to be exchanged. 
Healthcare providers and health plans will be required to accept only transactions 
submitted in standard form in accordance with the adopted HIPAA transaction 
standards. These provisions were to be effective October 2002, but a subsequent 
act signed by President Bush in December 2001 extended the deadline by one 
year by filing for an extension. All medical offices that submit electronic 
transactions must comply with the Transaction and Code Set rule by October 16, 
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2003 (HIPAA Administrative Simplification - Transaction and Code Set Rule, 
2000). 
Section 1173 lists the transactions and sets out requirements for the specific 
standards to adopt: unique health identifiers, code sets, security standards, 
electronic signatures, and transfer of information among health plans. 
At present, this rule encompasses the following standard electronic transaction 
formats preponderantly derived from the American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI) Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) X12. ANSI X12 subcommittee N 
covers standards in the insurance industry, including health insurance; hence 
these are X12N standards. X12N standards include transactions for 
claims/encounters, attachments, enrolment, disenrolment, eligibility, 
payment/remittance advice, premium payments, first report of injury, claim 
status, referral certification/authorization, and coordination of benefits. They 
include (HIPAA Administrative Simplification - Transaction and Code Set Rule, 
2000): 
• X12N 837 - Healthcare Claim for Dental, Professional and Institutional; 
• X12N 835 - Healthcare Claim Payment/Advice; 
• X12N 834 - Benefit Enrolment and Maintenance; 
• X12N 820 - Payroll Deducted and Other Group Premium Payment for 
Insurance Products; 
• X12N 278 - Healthcare Services Request for Review and Response; 
• X12N 276 - Healthcare Claim Status Request; 
• X12N 277 - Healthcare Claim Status Response; 
• X12N 270 - Healthcare Claim Eligibility Inquiry; 
• X12N 271 - Healthcare Claim Eligibility Response; 
• X12N 148 - Report of Injury or Illness; 
• X12N 186 - Life and Annuity Lab Report; 
• X12N 275 - Patient Information.  
It is important to note that this list of transactions is expected to increase over 
time as other transactions are adopted (HIPAA Administrative Simplification - 
Transaction and Code Set Rule, 2000). The Transaction and Code Set rule also 
requires the use of Code Sets which are values that are used in the data fields to 
identity conditions, procedures and entities in addition to the standardization of 
healthcare transaction standards. Under HIPAA, local procedure codes will be 
eliminated and replaced with National Standard HCPCS Level II and CPT codes.  
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4.5.5.3 HIPAA Privacy Rule  
The final Rule for privacy was published on December 28, 2000 and compliance 
was required by April 14, 2003. The Privacy Rule standards addresses the use 
and disclosure of the health information of an individual — called “protected 
health information” by organizations subject to the Privacy Rule — called “covered 
entities,” and standards for their privacy rights to understand and control how 
their health information is used. The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) within HHS has 
the responsibility for implementing and enforcing the Privacy Rule with respect to 
voluntary compliance activities and civil money penalties (HIPAA Administrative 
Simplification – Privacy Final Rule, 2002). 
A major goal of the Privacy Rule is to assure that the health information of 
individuals is properly protected while allowing the flow of health information 
needed to provide and promote high quality healthcare and to protect the health 
and well being of the public. The Rule strikes a balance that permits important 
uses of information while protecting the privacy of people who seek care and 
healing. The Rule is designed to be flexible and comprehensive, given that the 
healthcare marketplace is diverse to cover the variety of uses and disclosures 
that need to be addressed (HIPAA Administrative Simplification – Privacy Final 
Rule, 2002). 
The final privacy rule entails that covered entities must protect individually 
identifiable health information against deliberate or inadvertent misuse or 
disclosure. Consequently, health plans and providers must maintain 
administrative and physical safeguards to protect the confidentiality of health 
information and protect it against unauthorized access. These entities must 
inform individuals about how their health information is used and disclosed and 
ensure them access to their information. Written authorization from patients for 
the use and disclosure of health information for most purposes is required with 
the exception of healthcare treatment, payment and operations (and for certain 
national priority purposes). Table 5 provides the standards and implementation 
specifications addressed in the HIPAA Privacy Rule. 
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Table -5- Privacy Rule Standards 
Privacy Rule Standards (45 CFR Parts 160 - 164) 
Standards Section Implementation specifications 
164.524 Right to inspect and copy Patient Access 
164.526 Right to amend 
164.502(a) Permitted Uses and Disclosures 
164.502(a)(b) Permissive not Mandatory 
164.502(b), 164.514(d) Minimum Necessary 
164.502(a) Incidental Uses and Disclosures 
160.103, 164.502(e), 
164.532(d)(e) 
Business Associates 
General Rules 
for Use and 
Disclosure 
164.502(a), 164.508 Authorization 
164.501, 164.506, 
164.520(c), 164.522 
Treatment, Payment, and Healthcare 
Operations 
164.510(a) Facility Directories 
164.510(b), 164.522 Those involved in Providing Care (Next of 
Kin) 
164.501, 164.508(a)(3) Marketing  
164.501, 164.514(f), 
164.522 
Fundraising 
164.512(j) Averting a Serious Threat to Health or 
Safety 
164.512(d) Health Oversight Activities 
164.512(e) Judicial and Administrative Proceedings 
164.512(f) Law Enforcement 
164.512(b), 164.514(e) Public Health Activities 
164.512(a) Required by Law 
164.512(i), 164.514(e) Research 
164.512(c) Victims of Abuse, Neglect, or Domestic 
Violence 
Specific Rules 
for Use and 
Disclosure 
164.512(l) Workers’ compensation 
164.500, 164.520 Notice of Privacy Practices 
164.530 (c) Safeguards 
164.530 (b) Training 
Administrative 
Requirements 
of Covered 
Entities 164.530 (a) Privacy Officer 
Chapter 4 
A Model For Information Security Management and Regulatory Compliance in SA Health Sector 
  
106 
164.528 Accounting for Disclosures 
164.504(a)(c) Hybrid Entity 
164.504 (d) Affiliated Covered Entity 
164.504(g) Multiple Covered Function Entity 
164.504 (f) Group Health Plan 
Special Rules 
for Certain 
Types of 
Entities 
164.501, 164.520 Organized Healthcare Arrangement 
160.306, 160.312 Complaints 
160.308, 160.310, 
160.312 
Compliance Reviews 
Enforcement 
and 
Compliance 
160.201 Penalties 
Source: HIPAA Administrative Simplification - Transaction and Code Set Rule, 
2000 
4.6 CONLUSION 
Currently, privacy has become an asset and like any significant asset, it will 
become even scarcer with the inter-trading of various companies. Resultantly, the 
protection of privacy is becoming an important competitive differentiator for 
leading organizations worldwide, in industries from financial services to health 
care, to consumer and technology markets (KPMG, 2001).  
Organizations are viewing privacy protection as a way to increase stakeholder 
trust as well as mitigate risks, improve customer satisfaction and potentially 
generate new revenues (Vericept Corporation, 2004). Consumers are particularly 
concerned about privacy of their information, especially whether they can trust 
organizations to safeguard their information. Trust is not the only reason people 
buy from a company, but without it they will go elsewhere (KPMG, 2001). 
Many countries, realizing the importance of privacy and the data of patients, have 
adopted different legal and regulations at national and international level to 
ensure the protection of such information.  
It is vital to emphasize that complying with regulatory requirements is mandatory 
for any organization and ignorance of the law is not an excuse. Ignorance of the 
law can result in the loss of credibility, heavy punishment and the loss of business 
opportunities (Tuyikeze & Pottas, 2005). However, organizations should strive to 
balance the challenges of meeting data protection requirements with clear 
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business interest in using customer information to identify potential business 
opportunities, both inside and outside of the organization (KPMG, 2001). 
Chapter 4 has demonstrated that there are a growing number of regulations 
that include requirements for organizations to provide security controls and 
demonstrate compliance assurance. The challenge encountered by most 
organizations is what compliance strategy should be followed to meet regulatory 
requirements while ensuring that the existing efforts already implemented are 
maintained (Tuyikeze & Pottas, 2005). Therefore, a comparative analysis of 
compliance requirements is required, which in this paper is focused on the ISO 
17799, HIPAA, SANHA and ECTA. The result of this comparison will help to ensure 
that security controls are not being duplicated in endeavors to satisfy 
requirements from the various standards and laws. This is the main focus of 
Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 COMPARISON BETWEEN ISO 
17799, HIPAA, SANHA AND ECTA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The main objective of this Chapter 5 is to compare an Information Security 
Management standard (ISO 17799) with the laws applicable to typical South 
African healthcare organizations. These are not only applicable laws in the 
South African context but have been selected as defined by the scope of this 
research project. The comparison shows that there can exist an overlap 
between them and therefore, there is a need for a comparative analysis of 
compliance requirements. The result of such comparison will help ensure that 
security controls are not being duplicated in the endeavours to satisfy the 
requirements for the various security standards and laws.  
This chapter concludes by emphasizing the need for a framework which 
ensures full compliance with regulatory requirement while ensuring patients 
that best practices for Information Security Management are being used 
concomitantly ensuring the privacy and security of their medical information. 
Chapter 6 is dedicated to a discussion of the phases that constitute this 
compliance model.  
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Information Security and privacy regulatory environments grow more 
stringent and complicated every day. The enactment of new laws and regulations 
is forcing organizations to re-evaluate their Information Security practices in 
order to ensure they comply with these new law requirements (Teller-Kanzler, 
2005). The challenge that faces most organizations is how to find easy ways to 
meet these regulations while spending less money with least effort. 
Total compliance with existing, emerging and anticipated government regulations 
is a daunting goal (ITCI, 2005). Organizations in fact, are often seesawed 
between overlapping, over-focussed and uncoordinated regulations which are laid 
down along geographic, industry, and situation-specific lines (Accenture, 2004). 
The issue of compliance is further confused by the existence of a multitude of 
non-mandatory security standards that where used by organizations where 
adequate regulations have not yet existed. The proliferation of legislation 
together with existing standards has made the compliance challenge an 
undeniable fact for example, the overlapping between laws themselves and/or 
with security standards. It, therefore, is necessary to identify what security 
controls are already implemented and those which are lacking to meet with the 
new regulatory requirements. 
5.2 OVERLAP BETWEEN SECURITY STANDARDS AND 
REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 
Regulatory overlap, according to Lineman (2005), is the crux of the problem that 
many organizations face today. He further added that there is a tendency to treat 
each incoming regulation as a discrete project to minimize its impact on 
production systems and allow project teams to focus on meeting the regulatory 
deadlines. The downside to this approach, however, is redundant development 
“Multiple regulations and standards coupled with regulatory overlap leads to 
redundancy in compliance effort at high cost”. 
-  Teller-Kanzler, 2005 - 
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and ill-placed investment in incompatible solutions with, the increased likelihood 
of error and integration problems later (Brewer, 2005). 
In many cases, the requirements addressed by the government laws involve 
different terms which words but have same meaning themselves and with the 
security standards as illustrated in Table 6.  
Table -6- Security Standard and Regulatory requirements meaning 
overlap 
Standard Section  Subsection Specification 
ISO 17799 9.1.1. 
Access 
controls  
9.1.1.1 Policy 
and business 
requirements 
 
Organizations should implement policies for 
information dissemination and authorization, e.g. 
the need-to-know principle and security levels 
and classification of information. 
SANHA II. Rights 
and Duties 
of Users and 
Healthcare 
Personnel 
15(1) Access 
to health 
records 
A health worker or any healthcare provider that 
has access to the health records of a user may 
disclose such personal information to any other 
person, healthcare provider or health 
establishment as is necessary for any legitimate 
purpose within the ordinary course and scope of 
his or her duties where such access or disclosure 
is in the interests of the user. 
HIPAA 
Privacy 
Rule 
IV. Limiting  
Uses and 
Disclosures 
to the 
Minimum 
Necessary 
164.502(b) 
&164.514(d) 
Minimum 
necessary 
A covered entity must make reasonable efforts to 
use, disclose and request only the minimum 
amount of health information to accomplish the 
intended purpose of the use or disclosure. A 
covered entity must implement policies and 
procedures to reasonably limit uses and 
disclosures to the minimum necessary. 
Please refer to the Appendix A for a complete detailed comparison. The 
designations for the comparison are provided in Table 7. 
This redundancy is equally found in other security standards and regulatory 
requirements not covered by this project. A recent research conducted by 
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Network Frontiers (2005), for example proves some interesting similarities of the 
control objectives found in more than one security standard and regulatory 
requirements as described in the following example. The control objective that 
states that “Organization must have auditing and monitoring procedures” is found 
the following eight regulatory requirements: SOX 404; 12 CFR Series, Appendix 
III.C.3; 17 CFR 240.15d-15; 17 CFR 240.17a-4.(f)(3)(v); Sec 17 CFR 240.17Ad-
7.(f)(4); MasterCard SDP 1.7; IRS Rev Proc. 98-25 & 6.03; ESIGN 101 (e)  and 
the following four security standards: (ISO 15489-2.5.2; COBIT M2; PCAOB Audit 
#2 & 49; FFIEC Management Handbook, pge35 (Teller-Kanzler, 2005). 
An important consequence of any redundancy is the high-costs uncured due to 
duplication of the existing controls with the new regulatory requirements (ITCI, 
2005). For example, in 2005, public companies in America reported that of the IT 
costs of companies between 30 to 50 percent of the total compliance bill was due 
to redundant development and manual processing (Brewer, 2005). Organizations, 
according to CEO Network Frontiers Cougias (2005) must identify similar controls 
objectives found in multiple security standards and regulatory requirements in 
order to reduce compliance efforts and increase their return on investment. 
One of the largest difficulties that face most organization is that laws are typically 
written for what must be implemented but not the implementation method 
(Jendrey, 2005). Additionally, there is flexibility that is built around the regulatory 
requirements, government does not limit entities to a specific technology to meet 
with these government laws; but, the trade-off is that there is little guidance 
regarding technology given to entities that do not already have a robust security 
program (McLaughlin, 2005). There is a need for “crosswalks” to bridge this gap 
that compares existing industry security standards and regulatory s requirements 
to reveal similarities and differences between the various laws and standards. 
5.3 THE CROSSWALK BETWEEN SECURITY STANDARDS AND 
REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 
The Meridian dictionary (1992) defines a crosswalk as a “specially paved or 
marked patch for a pedestrian crossing a street or road.” There is unfortunately, 
no specially paved road or marked path to walk on toward compliance with 
security standards and regulatory requirements. Following this analogy, there are 
in fact, many security regulations (roads) and security standards (paths) and 
there is no one map leading from point A to point B. There are, interestingly some 
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similarities (lanes) between these roads and paths that can be used to join them. 
A pedestrian wants to cross from point A to B quickly and it becomes simple for 
him to pass these lanes through a shortcut instead of going the long way around. 
The same scenario applies to the current compliance dilemma with multiple 
security standards and regulatory requirements. The major challenge that faces 
executive managers responsible for ensuring compliance is how easily they can 
cross from one security standard or government regulatory requirement to 
another without spending significant effort. It therefore is necessary to conduct 
an IT controls mapping which will reveal any similarities and disparities between 
them. 
The realization of the importance of crosswalks or the mapping of security 
controls between the various security standards and/or regulatory requirements, 
has received much attention from different organizations, such as WEDI, ISACA, 
ITCI, etc… 
The Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange (WEDI), a healthcare industry 
group with a formal consultative role under the HIPAA legislation defines 
crosswalk or data mapping as “the process of matching one set of data elements 
or individual code values to their closest equivalents in another set of them”. 
Typical examples that illustrate similarities and differences between various 
regulations and security standards are available at the WEDI website Workgroup 
for WEDI’s web site (WEDI). Each document identifies best practices extracted 
from a range of existing security rules and standards, including HIPAA Security 
Rule, ISO 17799, the Cryptographic Message Syntax Core Security Requirements 
(CMSCSR), the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) 
and the Operational Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) 
for HIPAA (Schwartz, 2005).  
The Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) on COBIT 
Mapping solve the same problem. This organization provides mapping between 
COBIT and ITIL, ISO/IEC 17799:2000, ISO/IEC TR 13335, ISO/IEC 15408:1999 
Common Criteria/ITSEC, TickIT, NIST 800-14 and COSO. A complete description 
is available on the website of the IT Governance publication’s (ITGI). 
Another example is the Unified Compliance Project (UCP), which was launched by 
Information Technology Compliance Institute (ITCi) on July 11, 2005. The Unified 
Compliance Project represents a cooperative research and development effort by 
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the IT Compliance Institute and Network Frontiers, a compliance and consultancy 
organization. Network Frontiers engaged in a massive investigation to reveal the 
overlap in standards and regulations. ITCI (2005) argues that the UCP is the first 
independent initiative to exclusively support IT compliance management by 
revealing the overlap between complex regulatory requirements. The UCP most 
importantly supports, a strategic approach to IT compliance that reduces cost, 
limits liability and leverages the value of compliance-related technologies and 
services across the enterprise by focusing on commonalities across regulations, 
standards-based development, and simplified architectures, (Cougias, 2005).  
Cass Brewer, editorial and research director at the IT Compliance Institute, 
maintains “To reduce IT costs and make smart investments in sustainable 
compliance efforts, companies need to gain a unified view of their total 
compliance burdens,”  
The 2005 Unified Compliance Project of ITCI deals with: 
• Various Regulatory requirements sources: Namely Sarbanes-Oxley, PCAOB, 
Canada’s Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
(PIPEDA), California SB 1386, the European Union Data Protection Directive, 
the UK Data Privacy Directive, Turnbull guidance, HIPAA, and GLB; 
• IT frameworks: COBIT, HIPAA standards, SAS 94, and others; 
• IT impact zones: IT security, physical security, business security, staff 
management, leadership and operational management, auditing and other 
zones. 
 
The UCP divides the regulatory and standards requirements into twelve critical IT 
Impact Zones. These include: Leadership and High Level Objectives; Audit and 
Risk Management; Design and Implementation; Systems Acquisition; Operational 
Management; IT Staff Management and Outsourcing; Records Management; 
Technical Security; Physical Security; Systems Continuity; Monitoring, 
Measurement and Reporting; and Privacy (ITCI, 2005). However, Cougias (2005) 
confirms that this project is still at an early stage of development. 
 
These crosswalks should, according to Lineman (2005), address common 
elements once for multiple uses and therefore can save both of time and efforts 
for the organization which would otherwise be wasted on duplicate security 
controls already implemented. It can be argued that, in order to accomplish this 
target, the organization should use an already established framework, such as 
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ISO 17799, to create a security benchmark perform a gap analysis and work to 
close the gap. The identification of this gap between the security standards and 
regulatory requirements definitely entails performing a comparison which will 
reveal existing efforts already implemented and gap that needs to be applied to 
meet the new regulatory requirements. 
5.4 COMPARISON BETWEEN ISO 17799, HIPAA, SANHA AND 
ECTA 
The regulatory requirements of the government as examined with a deeper 
insight and discussed in Chapter four show that there is little doubt that some 
sections address the security and privacy issues and therefore have some overlap 
sections with the Information Security Management framework. This can result in 
a duplication of efforts and resources when healthcare organizations are 
implementing controls to comply with the new regulations requirements. 
Therefore, a comparison is needed to reveal any similarities and differences 
between them. 
A comparison of each of the 127 ISO 17799 controls against SANHA, ECTA and 
HIPAA regulation requirements were made and the result of the comparison is 
provided in Appendix A. The ISO 17799, which covers the broad area of 
Information Security Management, serves well as a basis for this comparison. The 
comparison between ISO 17799 and HIPAA security standards has been done by 
URAC (2004), an independent and non-profit organization which is well-known as 
a leader in promoting healthcare quality through its accreditation and certification 
programs and it will be  referred to again in this project. The comparison gauged 
the HIPAA Security standards requirements as being similar partially covered, Not 
covered, and Exceeding the ISO 17799. The previous comparison was taken 
further to include HIPAA Privacy standards, Transaction and Code Set standards, 
SANHA and ECTA. The designations for the comparison and their meanings are 
provided in Table 7. 
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Table -7- Designation of the comparison 
Designation  Meaning 
HIPAA_SSMp HIPAA Security Standards mapping 
HIPAA_SSEq HIPAA Security Standards equation 
HIPAA_PSMp HIPAA Privacy Standards mapping 
HIPAA_PSEq HIPAA Privacy Standards equation 
HIPAA_TCSMp HIPAA Transaction and Code Sets Standards mapping 
HIPAA_TCSEq HIPAA Transaction and Code Sets Standards equation 
SANHA_Mp SANHA Standards mapping 
SANHA_Eq SANHA Standards equation 
ECTA_Mp ECTA Standards mapping 
ECTA_Eq ECTA Standards equation 
# Not covered: For the topic of concern, the ISO 17799 
control is not covered at all in regulation requirements 
< Partially covered: For the topic of concern, the ISO 17799 
control exceeds the regulation requirements.  
~ Similar coverage: For the topic of concern, the regulation 
requirements and ISO 17799 are approximately the same 
> Exceed: For the topic of concern, the regulation includes at 
least one requirement not included in ISO 17799. The goal 
with this is to point out areas where ISO 177999 does not 
fully contain the regulation requirements.  
Table 8 provides the percentage values of the result of the comparison performed 
in Appendix A. 
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Table -8- Comparison result summary 
Laws versus ISO 17799 Matching sum Percentage 
HIPAA_Sec ~ ISO 17799 77 55 % 
HIPAA_Sec > ISO 17799 19 14 % 
HIPAA_Sec # ISO 17799 26 18 % 
HIPAA_Sec < ISO 17799 18 13 % 
HIPAA_Priv ~ ISO 17799 5 3 % 
HIPAA_Priv > ISO 17799 28 19 % 
HIPAA_Priv # ISO 17799 107 71 % 
HIPAA_Priv < ISO 17799 10 7 % 
HIPAA_Trans ~ ISO 17799 1 1 % 
HIPAA_Trans > ISO 17799 20 14 % 
HIPAA_Trans < ISO 17799 2 2 % 
HIPAA_Trans # ISO 17799 121 83 % 
SANHA ~ ISO 17799 7 5 % 
SANHA > ISO 17799 15 11 % 
SANHA # ISO 17799 104 74 % 
SANHA < ISO 17799 14 10 % 
ECTA ~ ISO 17799 5 3 % 
ECTA > ISO 17799 32 21 % 
ECTA < ISO 17799 16 11 % 
ECTA # ISO 17799 99 65 % 
Additionally, a graphical representation is used which depicts the particular 127 
ISO 17799 controls relating to their coverage in HIPAA Security, Privacy, 
Transaction and code set standards, SANHA and the ECTA. Each graph shows the 
extent to which the ISO 17799 security controls are covered by these regulations. 
These graphs are illustrated respectively in the following Figures 12, 13, 14, 15 
and 16. 
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5.5 ANALYSIS OF THE COMPARISON RESULT 
The main objective of this comparative analysis is to deduce how much effort is 
required by healthcare organizations to meet regulatory compliance requirements 
when there already exists a well-established Information Security program, which 
in this case is assumed to be the ISO 17799 security standard. It is shown in the 
comparison results provided in Appendix A, that there are some cases where 
HIPAA Security, Privacy, Transaction and code set standards, SANHA and ECTA 
requirements exceed the ISO 17799 requirements.  These are regulatory 
requirements covered in ISO 17799 but entail more requirements for a particular 
ISO 17799 control. The term Exceed is equally used for regulatory requirements 
not totally covered by ISO 17799. These are presented in Appendix A following 
the last ISO 17799 control 12.3.2 Protection of system audit tools. Both 
requirements are shown respectively in Table 9, Table 10, Table 11, Table 12, 
and Table 13 with a brief explanation for each item is provided. 
Table -9- Requirements of HIPAA Security Rule not fully present in 
ISO 17799 
HIPAA Security requirement Explanation 
Administrative:(a)(2) Assigned Security 
Responsibility (required)  
HIPAA requires a single person responsible for 
both information and physical security  
Administrative:(a)(3)ii(C) Termination 
Procedures (addressable) 
ISO 17799  has no mention of termination 
procedures anywhere in the document 
Administrative:(a)(4)ii(A) Isolating 
Healthcare Clearinghouse Functions 
(required) 
Unique requirement of the HIPAA legislation 
Administrative:(a)(5)ii(C) Log-in 
Monitoring (addressable) 
ISO 17799  does not have a specific training 
requirement with respect to log-in monitoring  
Administrative:(a)(7)ii(C) Emergency 
Mode Operation Plan (required)   
ISO 17799  does not specifically address 
security for contingency operations 
Physical:(a)(2)(i) Contingency  
Operations (required)  
ISO 17799  does not specifically address 
physical security for contingency operations 
Physical:(a)(2)(ii) Facility Security Plan 
(required) 
Documentation not required by ISO 17799 
Physical:(a)(2)(iv) Maintenance Records 
(addressable)  
Documentation not required by ISO 17799 
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Physical:(a)(2)(iv) Data Backup and 
storage (addressable) 
ISO 17799  does not specifically require data 
back-up before moving storage units 
Technical:(a)(2)(i) Unique User 
Identification (required)  
ISO 17799 allows group user ids in some 
cases but does not address entity 
authentication  
Technical:(a)(2)(ii) Emergency Access 
Procedure (required)  
ISO 17799  does not specifically address 
access controls for contingency operations 
 
Source: Borkin, S. 2003. As part of Information Security reading room. SANS 
Institute 2003 
Table -10- Requirements of HIPAA Privacy Rule not fully present in 
ISO 17799  
HIPAA Privacy requirement Explanation 
Who is covered by the Privacy 
Rule? 
ISO does not specifically highlight who must ensure 
compliance.  
What information is protected; De-
Identified health information 
ISO 17799 is for the protection of all types of information. 
General principle for uses and 
disclosures (Basic and required 
disclosures)  
HIPAA privacy rule requires stringent requirements about 
the circumstances in which health information is used and 
disclosed. 
Permitted uses and disclosures HIPAA privacy rule permits covered entities to use and 
disclose health information only as required for the 
purposes specified in the law. 
Authorized uses and disclosures 
(use of consent) 
HIPAA privacy rule requires the patient’s authorization 
before his (her) health information is released unless 
specified in the legislation. 
Administrative requirements HIPAA privacy rule requires a privacy personnel, 
procedures for implementation of complaints that are not 
specifically required in ISO 17799   
Notice and other individual rights Unique requirement of the HIPAA privacy rule legislation 
Organizational options(hybrid 
entity, affiliated covered entity, 
Organized healthcare arrangement) 
Unique requirement of the HIPAA privacy rule legislation 
Other provisions: personal 
representatives and minors 
Unique requirement of the HIPAA privacy rule legislation 
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Table -11- Requirements of HIPAA Transaction and Code Set Rule 
not fully present in ISO 17799  
HIPAA Transaction and Code 
Set requirement 
Explanation 
Use of Electronic Transactions 
standards 
Unique requirement of the HIPAA Transaction and 
Code Set rule  
Use of Medical Code Sets 
standards 
Unique requirement of the HIPAA Transaction and 
Code Set rule  
Use of Identifiers standards Unique requirement of the HIPAA Transaction and 
Code Set rule  
 
Table -12- Requirements of SANHA not fully present in ISO 17799  
SANHA requirement Explanation 
Users to have a full knowledge. Consent of 
users for disclosure of health information 
SANHA provides stringent requirement 
about the use and disclosure of 
patient’s information.  
Participation in decision. Health service without 
consent. Health service for experimental or 
research reports disclosures 
Unique requirement of the SANHA 
legislation. It provides rights to patients 
concerning his (her) information.  
Access to health records by a health worker or 
healthcare provider, duty and procedures to 
disseminate information by National health 
department 
Unique requirement of the SANHA 
legislation 
Disclosure of health information only if the user 
provides consent in writing, a court order or 
any law requires that disclosure, non-
disclosure of the information represents a 
serious threat to public health. Rights of 
healthcare personnel 
Unique requirement of the SANHA 
legislation. SANHA provides stringent 
requirement about the use and 
disclosure of patient’s information that 
are not all specified in ISO 17799. 
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Table -13- Requirements of ECTA not fully present in ISO 17799   
ECTA requirement Explanation 
Admissibility and evidential weight of data 
messages, Retention, Notarization, 
Acknowledgement and Certification of data 
messages 
Not specifically covered by ISO 17799 
Registration of cryptography providers ISO 17799  does not specifically 
require registering cryptography 
providers 
Accreditation, criteria of accreditation of 
authentication products and services 
Unique requirement of the ECTA 
legislation 
Identification, Registration, and Inspection of 
critical databases  
ECTA provides stringent requirements 
related to protection of critical 
database which are not specifically 
covered by ISO 17799 
Liability of Service Providers: Hosting, Caching, 
Mere conduit, Information Location tool  
Unique requirement of the ECTA 
legislation 
Appointment of Cyber Inspector and their 
power to inspect, search, seize, and obtaining 
warrant 
Unique requirement of the ECTA 
legislation 
The results of the comparison are further analyzed and briefly discussed in the 
next section. 
5.5.1 ISO 17799 and HIPAA standards 
The HIPAA is only about the protection of one kind of information namely “health 
information” and ISO 17799 deals with the protection of all types of information. 
The HIPAA security standards meet the ISO 17799 controls for 77 (or 55%) of 
the implementation requirements (quantified as a percentage of 127 ISO 17799 
controls). The HIPAA security standards include 19 (or 14%) regulatory 
requirement for which it has a more stringent requirement than ISO 17799. Table 
9 details those requirements and provides more information about various other 
HIPAA control measures that are not included in the ISO 17799. The ISO 17799 
includes 26 (or 18%) controls that are not covered at all by HIPAA security 
standards; with 18 (or 13%) exceeding the HIPAA security standards 
requirements. This result demonstrated quite an overlap between the HIPAA 
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security standards and ISO 17799. This is not surprising because all three 
categories of HIPAA security standards (administrative, physical and technical) 
aim at ensuring the protection of  the confidentiality, availability and integrity of 
health information which is exactly the same objective of ISO 17799, on the other 
hand, which however deals with all types of information. 
The HIPAA privacy standards meet the ISO 17799 controls for 5 (or 3%) of the 
implementation requirements (quantified as a percentage of 127 ISO 17799 
controls); with 28 (or 19%) of HIPAA regulatory requirements exceeding ISO 
17799. These are explained in Table 10. There are 107 (or 71%) controls of ISO 
17799 that are not covered by the HIPAA privacy standards; with 10 (or 7%) of 
ISO 17799 exceeding the privacy standards requirements. The main reason is 
because the privacy standards address the use and disclosure of the health 
information of individuals and control how it is used while the main objective of 
ISO 17799 is to ensure the security of all types of information. This is a major 
difference in focus between them. 
The HIPAA Transaction and Code Set standards and ISO 17799 meets 1 (or 1%) 
control requirement; with 20 (or 14%) for which it has a more stringent 
requirement than ISO 17799. Table 11 details this requirement and provides 
more information about various other HIPAA Transaction and Code Set control 
measures that are not included in the ISO 17799.  On the other hand, ISO 17799 
contains 121 (or 83%) controls that are not covered by the HIPAA Transaction 
and Code Set standards; with 2 (or 2%) exceeding the HIPAA Transaction and 
Code Set standards. The raison d'être is because HIPAA Transaction and Code Set 
standards delves deeply into electronic data interchange which permits providers, 
carriers, payers and other entities to electronically exchange business data such 
as eligibility verification, enrollment, claim acceptance and claim status inquiries. 
ISO 17799 mentions fewer requirements on security of the media in transit in 
only one subsection, ISO 17799 (8.7 Exchange of information and software). 
5.5.2 ISO 17799 and SANHA 
The ISO 17799 meets SANHA with 7 (or 5%) control requirement; with 15 (or 
11%) of SANHA regulatory requirements that exceed the corresponding 
requirements in the ISO 17799. This is detailed in Table 12 together with 
requirements included in SANHA but omitted from ISO 17799. On the other hand, 
ISO 17799 controls contain 14 (or 10%) exceeding SANHA; with 104 (or 74%) 
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requirements not covered at all in SANHA implementation regulatory 
requirements. These controls are not covered in SANHA at all. These results are 
not surprising because they have different objectives and coverage scope. The 
scope of ISO 17799 states: “This standard gives recommendations for 
Information Security Management for use by those who are responsible for 
initiating, implementing or maintaining security in their organization. It is 
intended to provide a common basis for developing organizational security 
standards and effective security management practice and to provide confidence 
in inter-organizational dealings” (ISO 17799); whereas the main objective of 
SANHA is to provide a framework for a structured, uniform health systems uniting 
the various elements of the national health system in a common goal to improve 
universal access to quality health services (SANHA). 
5.5.3 ISO 17799 and ECTA  
The ISO 17799 controls meet the ECTA for 5 (or 3%) and 99 (or 65%) of ISO 
17799 security controls not covered by ECTA implementation regulatory 
requirements. ECTA contains 32 (or 21%) regulatory requirements that are not 
covered by ISO 17799, while ISO 17799 exceed 16 (or 11%) of the ECTA 
regulation requirements. Further requirements of the ECTA that are not covered 
in the ISO 17799 are expanded on in Table 13. The ISO 17799 specifies controls 
that should be in place to ensure the security of the information assets while the 
main focus of ECTA is to provide a framework for the facilitation and regulation of 
electronic communications and transactions. This is an over-arching difference in 
focus between the two. The reason is because the ECTA puts more focus on E-
commerce issues, including the validity of electronically concluded agreements, 
the legal validity of electronic data, the admissibility of electronic documents in 
courts of law and the legal status given to electronic signatures which are not 
specifically covered in detail in ISO 17799.  
It is evident in all these comparisons, that most of these laws exceed ISO 17799 
in one area specifically in Section 12.1.4 Data protection and privacy of personal 
information which requires those who collect, process and disseminate personal 
information to put in place controls for the protection of such information. This is 
because ISO 17799 is more security directed ensuring confidentiality, integrity 
and availability protection while the main objective of the laws investigated in this 
research is ensuring the privacy protection of the information of the customer. 
They therefore, delve deeply into disclosures and access to such information. This 
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further confirms the main objective of this research which requires convergence 
between the security standards and legal requirements as meeting one does not 
mean satisfying the other one. It can be inferred that a security and privacy 
model is needed based on the comparison result. 
5.6 SECURITY AND PRIVACY PROTECTION MODEL 
It was argued in Section 2.7 of Chapter two that the adequate protection of 
health information can only be achieved when an ISM standard framework is 
combined with regulatory requirements. Figure 17, illustrates the Security and 
Privacy protection model and highlights the three layers that must be in place to 
ensure the security and privacy of health information. Each of the three layers will 
be discussed next. 
Figure -17- Security and Privacy protection model 
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there is no limitation to using this framework because an organization can choose 
from other frameworks such as the NIST standards or others. Moreover, because 
these security standards offer recommendations beyond the defined needs of an 
organization, they essentially comprise a “reservoir” of controls that compliance 
managers can tap as the need arises. Layer one contains controls that are unique 
to the ISM framework ie. Controls not covered in legislation.  
The Second layer is composed of the intersection of the ISM framework and the 
regulatory requirements. The use of the proposed compliance model will clearly 
establish which regulatory requirements are already satisfied by the existing 
security framework and therefore should not be again dealt with. This layer 
contains those regulatory requirements exceeding the ISM framework. It is at this 
layer that management should focus to fulfill the gap of meeting with new 
regulatory requirements. These requirements are provided in Tables 9, 10, 11, 12, 
and 13. This layer contains all the controls of the ISO 1799 that are addressed in 
the legislation but to varying degrees.  
The Third layer is composed of the unique regulatory requirements which were 
not addressed in the ISM framework.  
It evident that an organization already compliant with the ISO 17799 will requires 
fewer efforts to meet these previously mentioned ECTA, SANHA and HIPAA 
regulations when based on the comparison conducted and reported in Chapter 
five. The ethos of this proposed compliance model can be summarized as follow:  
In order to ensure confidentiality, availability, integrity and 
privacy of health information, healthcare organizations must 
implement common controls found in both security standards and 
regulation requirements plus regulation requirements not covered 
by the ISM framework add security standard controls exceeding 
regulatory requirements. 
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It is crucial to mention, however, that the implementation of this Security and 
Privacy protection model must be driven by a risk analysis which determines 
which security measures are needed in a particular case. For example, the result 
of a risk analysis might require security measures found in the Layer one 
(security standard requirements not specifically required in legislation) and/or 
Layer two (common security measures) and/or Layer three (regulatory 
requirements specifically required by law). 
Compliance with new legislation can furthermore be demonstrated by using Set 
Theory as illustrated in Figure 18. 
Figure -18- Compliance Set theory 
 
The relevant regulatory requirements are for simplicity, represented as a single 
set label law which intersects with the ISM framework. The need to comply with 
multiple regulations will change this diagram dramatically in reality, to contain 
differing intersections between the various regulations, with each other and with 
the ISM framework. 
The question that arises is that, is it possible to illustrate compliance with multiple 
laws with an ISM framework? 
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Executive management should be aware that there can be overlap between 
regulations themselves, for example SANHA and ECTA. However, a comparison 
between those regulations has not been done due to the constraints in scope of 
this project. Its main focus was limited to the comparison of the individual 
mentioned regulations with the ISO 17799. 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
There are a growing number of regulations, currently, that include requirements 
for healthcare organizations to provide security controls and demonstrate 
compliance assurance. The challenge encountered by most healthcare 
organizations is what compliance strategy should be followed to meet these 
regulatory requirements while ensuring that existing efforts already implemented 
are maintained (Tuyikeze & Pottas, 2005). There is a need to perform a 
comparison analysis between those standards and government regulatory 
requirements which reveal any similarities and differences to achieve this goal. 
The main objective of this analysis can definitely facilitate management to 
concentrate only on the missing controls instead of re-inventing the wheel by 
starting at the beginning in meeting new regulatory requirements.  
It emerges clearly from the comparison that health organizations that are ISO 
17799 - compliant exceed in both the requirements pertaining to HIPAA Security, 
Privacy, Transaction and code set standards and SANHA and ECTA regulatory 
requirements by far. Some effort will be required to ensure compliance with the 
issues listed in Tables 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 containing regulatory requirements 
that South African healthcare organizations must take into account in endeavor to  
meet the government legal requirements while ensuring that due diligence,  in 
adopting HIPAA standards and ISO 17799 standards, is not neglected. 
It can be generalized from this comparison, that some legislation has quite an 
overlap with an Information Security Management program, such as the ISO 
17799 and HIPAA. This confirms that a compliance strategy would serve well to 
eradicate redundancy while following an ad hoc approach to compliance with 
various standards and legislations. This provides advantages to the organizations 
through easy compliance with the new regulatory requirements and entails less 
effort while increasing the return on investments. 
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Chapter 5 demonstrates the existence of an overlap between security standards 
and regulatory requirements. This proves that there is a need for a compliance 
strategy ensuring the elimination of this redundancy; therefore reducing the 
complexity and costs associated with compliance to both requirements. 
Chapter 6 provides a model for an Information Security management and 
regulatory compliance. Its main objective is to discuss the major phases of the 
proposed compliance model. 
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Chapter 6 A MODEL FOR INFORMATION 
SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND REGULATORY 
COMPLIANCE IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN HEALTH 
SECTOR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The main objective of this Chapter 6 is to set up a roadmap for Information 
Security Management and regulatory compliance which ensures that 
organizations meet privacy regulatory requirements while simultaneously 
ensuring that best practices for protecting the information of customer are 
being used concomitantly. This represents the core of this research. 
Chapter 7 concludes the research presented in this dissertation. 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Organizations are functioning, globally in a most complex and challenging era of 
Information Security Management and regulatory compliance requirements. The 
Information Security and privacy regulatory environment grows more stringent 
and complicated every day (Teller-Kanzler, 2005). There is inter-trading between 
companies and they struggle to demonstrate adequate levels of risk-reduction 
across geographically and functionally diverse business units, each with unique 
technical and operational challenges. It is no longer enough to manage the 
security of organization to meet internal standards and policies (Cybertrust, 
2004). Additionally, the proliferation of international and nation-specific 
regulation and standards has become a major concern for executive managers 
dedicated to demonstrating regulatory compliance. Security incidents, security 
audits and new regulations are the primary drivers influencing the evolution of 
Information Security and regulatory compliance according to industry analysts 
(Bindview, 2005). Business executives and industry analysts, currently, 
acknowledge that these drivers are interconnected and it is imperative that 
organizations resolve them through a more holistic approach.  
The primary responsibilities of security executives and managers have become 
overwhelming (Bindview, 2005). They are responsible for securing multiple 
technologies within a complex and often, global environment. These technologies 
are constantly changing and new technologies are emerging. Further, they need 
to build security policies and ensure these policies are understood and followed by 
employees and contractors. Most importantly, they need to understand the 
regulations applicable to their business and ensure their organization can 
demonstrate compliance. Executive managers face an ever-expanding number of 
critical demands yet they work in an environment where failure is not an option 
(Vericept Corporation, 2004). Furthermore, a company that experiences a 
“…The existence and adequacy of the corporation’s compliance program is one 
of eight factors federal prosecutors consider in deciding whether to even 
charge a corporation for its wrong-doing under criminal statutes.” 
U.S. Department of Justice Memorandum, 2003 
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security breach can suffer significant damages on many levels, including the loss 
of investor and customer confidence (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004). The Executives 
may be subject to criminal and civil penalties in a case of regulatory compliance 
failure (Trillium Software, 2004). These pressures can negatively impact the 
business goals and IT operations of an organization if not appropriately dealt with. 
Therefore, Executive management are required to carefully inspect the major 
challenges related to compliance in terms of legal, regulatory and standards.  
6.2 CORPORATE COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES 
Compliance encompasses behaviors and activities that assure an organization is 
properly satisfying applicable legal requirements and other standards according to 
EMC (2005). Organizations must comply with the specific standards or business 
practices to which they make a commitment to mitigate legal risks and increase 
investments of stakeholders. These compliance requirements can be external 
such as, laws and regulations through contracts or industry standards to which 
the organization subscribes. Additionally, corporate compliance includes meeting 
internally-defined company policies and other commitments to internal and 
external stakeholders that go beyond what is legally required. Corporate 
compliance is with ensuring that the organization is meeting all its compliance 
commitments. Considering this statement, Organizations are required to conduct 
their affairs in a particular way which clearly demonstrates evidence of its 
business conduct (King Report, 2001). This is difficult to accomplish in this 
increasingly litigated environment with various corporate practice requirements.  
BindView (2005) states that while compliance with regulations is a major issue 
facing businesses today, many IT security executives are confused about what 
specifically they must do to achieve compliance. The result is that they can easily 
allocate either too much or too little staff time, money and outside consulting 
resources, pursuing a seemingly elusive goal. The explosion of legislation 
regarding the privacy and security of information is having a profound effect on 
organizations of all sizes and shapes (Kolodgy & Christiansen, 2005). These laws, 
in combination with less formal standards agreed to among nations and 
organizations across the world, are driving Executives and Boards of Directors to 
inspect details previously ignored (netForensics, 2005). The consequences for non 
compliance according to Unerman & Brendan (2004), can result in penalties, loss 
of trust of shareholders and increase in cost of compliance. These are discussed in 
the following scenario. 
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6.2.1 Consequences of corporate governance failure 
The violation of legal or corporate practices requirements can result in serious 
consequences for a business, its employees, officers or directors – including fines, 
penalties, loss of revenues, government contractor “blacklisting”, business 
interruption, negative media coverage,  reputation damage and loss of trust of 
shareholders (EMC, 2005). Some apt examples illustrating this statement include 
the cases of Enron Corp, WorldCom Inc and other organizations that failed to 
demonstrate good corporate governance practices and these resulted in 
numerous consequences even to the bankruptcy of the whole organization. 
6.2.1.1 Enron, WorldCom, Andersen et al. 
Enron grew during the nineties from a relatively-small domestic Texan energy 
company to become one of the largest US corporations with an array of energy 
trading and utility operations world-wide (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004). At the 
time of its collapse in 2001, Enron Corporation was listed as the seventh largest 
company in the United States, with over $100, 000 billion in gross revenues and 
more than 20,000 employees worldwide (Sloan, 2002). However, in October 2001, 
it shocked the stock market by announcing accounting ‘adjustments’ leading to a 
substantial loss for its third quarter of $618 million and a reduction in its reported 
net asset value of approximately $1.3 billion (Hill et al, 2001). Further revelations 
of aggressive earnings management practices, involving a complicated system of 
off-balance sheet operations, hiding large scale of losses and liabilities were made 
over the following weeks. Sloan (2002) confirms that Senior Executives at Enron 
had set up approximately 3500 off-balance sheet partnership, partly owing and 
benefiting from at least two of them and therefore, causing a clear conflict of 
interest between the shareholders. Enron Corp, two months later, became the 
largest bankruptcy case in US history, with estimates of outstanding liabilities 
ranging up to $55 billion (McLean, 2002). The losses, as a result, claimed so far 
by public pension funds are approaching $2 billion (News Batch, 2005). 
Kenneth Lay, who served the chief executive of Enron for 15 years, was finally 
indicted in July 2004. Lay was charged with conspiracy to commit securities fraud, 
four counts of securities fraud, two counts of wire fraud, one count of bank fraud 
and three counts of making false statements to a bank (Kleinbard, 2005). After 
collapse of Enron, numerous official enquiries were launched to find out the truth 
and the company be put in the hands of auditors.  
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Enron had been audited by Andersen, one of the top five global multinational 
accounting and auditing businesses at that time (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004). 
Allegations were raised that, in January 2002, following the launching of Security 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigations into accounting practices at Enron, 
Andersen had systematically destroyed many of its working papers relating to this 
client (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004). In addition, further investigations showed 
that Andersen had actively played a central role in devising the aggressive 
earnings management techniques employed by Enron; for example, Andersen 
generated more fees in 2000 from selling consulting services to Enron ($27 
million) than it did from auditing their accounts ($25 million), thereby exposing it 
to the accusation of conflict of interest that resulted against the auditing 
profession (McLean, 2002). The consequences of these revelations led to an 
apparent rapid loss of faith in Andersen, with many clients switching to other 
large accounting firms. The drawback of this withdrawal of trust quickly resulted 
in the collapse of their recognition to conduct audits and most of their clients 
being taken by its competitors (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004).  
A series of other large companies subsequent to the Enron failure faced 
allegations of misleading accounting practices and the mismanagement of the 
interests of shareholders. WorldCom, On 21 June 2002, beat the bankruptcy 
record set less than eight months earlier by Enron. This new ‘largest ever’ 
bankruptcy followed revelations that the Andersen audited company had 
fraudulently capitalized $3.85 billion of revenue expenditure as capital 
expenditure, thereby, perpetrating what some called ‘the largest accounting fraud 
in history’ (Doward, 2002). A Manhattan federal jury, after some investigations, 
convicted former WorldCom chief executive, Bernie Ebbers, of criminal charges 
for masterminding an $11 billion fraud that sent the company into bankruptcy 
(Kleinbard, 2005). Ebber, the CEO of WorldCom, testified in his own defence, 
claiming he was unaware that his subordinates were mismanaging the financial 
accounting books for 18 months (News Batch, 2005). During the trial, his former 
Chief Financial Officer, Scott Sullivan, confirmed it was Ebbers who instructed him 
to hide expenses and overstate the revenue beginning, in 2000, so that the 
company could meet Wall Street expectations. Ebbers faces sentencing of up to 
75 years and could spend the rest of his life behind the bars (Kleinbard, 2005). 
Among other companies that had similar scenario of compliance failures were: 
Tyco, PNC Financial Services, Invesys, Xerox, General Electric, IBM, JP Morgan 
Chase and Global Crossing in the US, Shell and Centrica in the UK and Vivedi in 
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France (Serwer, 2002). According to Unerman & O’Dwyer (2004), the main 
reason for the failure of these companies was related to the mismanagement of 
accounting practices and non-experts auditors resulting in mistrust of 
shareholders loosing interests in their companies. One commentator claimed 
generally: “…this is the biggest crisis investors have had since 1929; they don’t 
know who they can trust” (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004). 
It can be summarized that in most of these corporate governance practices failure, 
the consequences become apparent such as the loss of trust by the shareholders, 
bad reputation for the company and stiff penalties for the executive managers 
(Vericept Corporation, 2004). These organizations failed to demonstrate the 
major characteristics of good corporate governance such as, transparency, 
openness and fairness in the way that they manage their organization. Those 
characteristics were discussed in section 1.1 of chapter 1 and constitute the 
principal drivers of any organization willing to increase its business value and its 
return on investment. 
Governments around the world have enacted laws and regulations imposing 
penalties and sanctions with regard to the violations of legal requirements to 
force organizations to ensure good corporate governance, integrity and 
accountability of the assets of shareholders. 
6.2.1.2 Legislations intervention and their consequences 
The governments and regulators have responded to cases such as, Enron, 
Andersen Consulting and WorldCom with laws like Sarbanes-Oxley that mandate 
new standards for corporate accountability and transparency and for information 
management and the privacy of such information (Blair, 2005). The Sarbanes – 
Oxley Act of 2002 requires more auditing oversight and requires CEOs and CFOs 
to certify their financial results or suffer severe personal penalties. For example, 
Section 404 requires each annual report of an issuer to contain an “internal 
control report”, affirming the responsibility of management for establishing and 
maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial 
reporting. It contains an assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control 
structure and procedures that must be certified by the public audit firm of the 
organization. The government of the USA has imposed penalties of a fine up to 
$500,000 or imprisonment of up to five years as stated by SOX 404 to ensure 
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that this section is not violated. Table 14 provides examples of the legal offences 
and the penalties resulting for their violations. 
Table -14- Legislation offences and penalties 
Law Offence and penalty 
HIPAA privacy 
rule 
Federal penalties of up to $50000 and one year imprisonment can be 
levied for knowingly obtaining or disclosing personal health information. A 
stiffer penalty of up to $100,000 and five years imprisonment could result if 
the misuse is under false pretence; and up to $250,000 and 10 years of 
imprisonment for obtaining or disclosing protected information with the 
intent to sell, transfer or use for personal or commercial gain or to cause 
malicious harm. 
HIPAA security 
rule 
Civil penalties include a $100 per person per incident fine with maximums 
of $25000 per person for each standard within a single year. 
ECTA  
Chapter V - 
Cryptography 
Providers 
32(2) A person who contravenes or fails to comply with a provision of this 
chapter is guilty of an offence and liable, on conviction, to a fine or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years. 
Chapter VII – 
Consumer 
Protection 
45(4) Any person who sends unsolicited commercial communications to a 
person who has advised the sender that such communications are 
unwelcome, is guilty of an offence and liable, on conviction, to the penalties 
prescribed in section 89(1) 
Chapter XII – 
Cyber inspectors 
84(2) Any person who contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an offence 
and liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding six months. 
Chapter XIII – 
Cyber Crime 
89(4) A person convicted of an offence referred to in section 86(4) or (5) or 
section 87 is liable to a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five 
years. 
SANHA  
Chapter 2 – 
Right and duties 
of users and 
healthcare 
personnel 
17(1) Any person in charge of health establishment, in possession of the  
health records of a user must set up control measures to prevent any 
unauthorized access to those records and to the storage facility in which, or 
system by which, records are kept. Failure to meet this section results in an 
offence and liable, on conviction, to a fine or to imprisonment for a period 
not exceeding one year or to both a fine and such imprisonment. 
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Organizations are spending money to meet these regulatory requirements 
compliance in order to remain out of legal trouble in response to these penalties 
imposed by legal and regulation. A possible down-side, however, is that meeting 
new regulatory demands can have a serious negative impact on cost and time 
efforts assigned for meeting them if not carefully scrutinized. 
6.2.2 The cost of being compliant 
The need to comply with multiple regulations has taken effect in most countries 
worldwide currently. Consequently, this urgent need has led to a dramatic rise in 
compliance spending (Bindview, 2005). The U.S.A will spend nearly $15.5 billion 
on compliance-related activities in 2005, according AMR Research (2005); with 
the total cost for compliance estimated at $80 billion over the next five years. 
This research further confirms that spending on SOX alone will exceed $6 billion 
in 2005 with $2.6 billion of this total amount  paying internal personnel devoted 
to compliance, while another $1.7 billion is being spent on consultants and 
external audits firms (AMR Research, 2005). The increase of regulatory 
compliance is without exception even in South Africa, as illustrated in the survey 
conducted by the Strategic Partnership for Business growth in Africa (SBP) 
between February and June 2004 and who released its main report “Counting the 
costs of red tape for business in South Africa” in 2005. 
During the survey of SBP, a total of 1794 businesses were interviewed, in depth, 
on the costs of regulation to the South African private sector. The survey covered 
all the sectors of the economy including manufacturing, mining, construction, 
trade, agri-business and services. It examined in detail two types of regulatory 
costs faced by the private sector called; Efficiency costs and Compliance costs 
(SBP report, 2005).  Efficiency costs rise because regulation may distort market 
outcomes. If employment is discouraged by inappropriate labour market 
regulation, for example, then the costs of the resulting unemployment in terms of 
lost output and incomes is an efficiency cost. The Compliance cost is interesting 
as it covers the incremental costs incurred by business in the course of complying 
with regulations. They include the value of time spent by business managers and 
staff on understanding the rules and applying them; interacting with the 
authorities to clarify matters arising from; and the payments made for the 
expertise of professional advisers, such as consultants, lawyers, and accountants 
(SBP report, 2005). It was discussed in Chapter 5 Section 5.2, that with the 
increase of numerous legislations which can result in an overlap of security 
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measures requirements and the time devoted to meet those requirements can be 
overwhelming if not carefully considered and dealt with to remove these 
redundancies.  
The result of the survey reveal that based on the average recurring Compliance 
costs per firm of R105 174 and the estimated of 750 000 firms affected, this 
results that aggregate recurring Compliance costs for the formal sector amounted 
to R78,9 billion in 2004 – an amount equivalent to 6,52 percent of GDP. The 
report states that large firms pay the most in absolute terms but regulatory 
compliance costs are regressive: they weigh more heavily on smaller enterprises 
because of the lack of sufficient resources dedicated at ensuring compliance. It 
was revealed in this survey that, in general, South Africa is going through a 
period of rapid compliance inflation because 76 % of businesses surveyed state 
that compliance costs have increased in the past two years (SBP report, 2005).  
The question is not whether organizations will spend on regulatory compliance 
because not meeting regulatory requirements is not an option. The consequences 
of non-compliance and the harsh penalties imposed by regulators means, the 
likelihood is that organizations will spend and keep the regulators from knocking 
at their doors. The more pressing question is whether they will spend wisely and 
effectively, driven by a well established compliance strategy program, rather than 
by crises. A compliance model is established in Section 6.3, which provides a 
solution by removing redundancy in the compliance to various regulations and, 
therefore, presents a method of reducing unnecessary costs. 
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6.3 A COMPLIANCE MODEL FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
HEALTH SECTOR 
“The strategy for employing the army is not to rely on their not coming, but to 
depend on us having the means to await them. Do not rely on them not attacking, 
but depend on us having an unassailable position.” 
- Sun-Tzu, The Art of War - 
While considering this statement, how can an organization ensure that it is in a 
position to convince its customers that best practices are being used while it is 
meeting regulatory compliance?  The major challenge is to discover a balanced 
way of meeting compliance using less effort and resources. It is necessary to 
adopt a unification process, aimed at reducing redundancy, while providing 
numerous advantages to the organization to solve this problem. 
This section provides the description of the compliance model for Information 
Security Management and Regulatory Compliance in the South African Health 
Sector which is the principal intention of this project. Please refer to fold-out 
Figure 20 at the end of this chapter for the graphical representation of the 
compliance model. 
The objective of the compliance model is not to drill down deeply into details of 
its phases as shown in Figure 20. This is beyond the scope of this research. The 
idea is to rather to establish a roadmap that Executive managers should follow to 
meet regulatory compliance while ensuring customers that best practices for 
Information Security Management are being used. A brief explanation of each 
phase of the model is provided. 
6.3.1 Phase 1 – Identify the scope of compliance  
The organization must identify the scope of the compliance, for example which 
standards, regulations, best practices, etc… are included as part of the 
compliance effort in the First phase. This research argued that an Information 
Security Management framework is required together with regulatory 
requirements. A model for Information Security Management and Regulatory 
Compliance in the South Africa context would, therefore, use the ISO 17799 as a 
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base for Information Security Management and would have to incorporate the 
ECTA and SANHA from a legal perspective. In this research, HIPAA compliance 
was recommended as a best practice. 
6.3.2 Phase 2 – Determine the implementation requirement 
of ISM framework 
After the scope of compliance has been identified, the next step is to determine 
the implementation requirements of the Information Security Management 
framework. The ISO 17799 operates using 127 security controls which are 
grouped into 36 sub-objectives. The main objective of this phase is to ensure that 
level of the implementation requirement of the ISM is at a level comparable with 
the regulatory requirements. For example, the 36 sub-objectives of ISO 17799 
are not on the level comparable with SANHA security measures requirements. 
6.3.3 Phase 3 – Identify the regulatory unit of comparison 
A unit in each regulation is identified, which could be used as a point of reference 
for the comparison with the framework of the ISM implementation requirement 
chosen for Phase 2. This should be at the level comparable with the ISM 
framework to ensure that we are comparing “like with like”. For example, the 42 
HIPAA security measures are on a level comparable with ISO 17799 security 
controls. This is illustrated in Table 15. 
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Table -15- Example of ISO 17799 security control in comparison 
with HIPAA security measure 
Standard / 
Regulation 
ISO 17799 Security 
Control/HIPAA 
Security measure  
Specification 
ISO 17799 6.3.5 Disciplinary Process There should be a formal disciplinary 
process for employees who have 
violated organizational security 
policies and procedures. Such process 
can act as a deterrent to employees 
who might otherwise be inclined to 
disregard security procedures. 
Additionally, it should ensure correct, 
fair treatment for employees who are 
suspected of committing serious or 
persistent breaches of security. 
HIPAA  Security 
Rule 
164.308(a)(1)ii(C) 
Sanction Policy 
Sanction must be applied against 
employees who do not comply with 
the defined policies and procedures. 
 
The ECTA and SANHA legislations are composed into chapters which are at high 
level specifications and not worthwhile to be compared to the low level security 
controls of ISO 17799. It therefore, makes sense to drill down to their specific 
rule requirements in the process of finding the unit of comparison with ISO 17799 
security controls. For example, the ECTA regulation requirement 56.Restrictions 
on disclosure of information is on the level comparable with the ISO 17799 
control 8.6.4 Security of system documentation while its main Chapter IX 
Protection of critical Database is not comparable with this control. 
6.3.4 Phase 4 - Comparison 
Once the implementation requirement of the ISM framework and the unit of 
comparison for the particular regulation are identified, the next stage is dedicated 
to their comparison. A graphical representation of the comparison methodology is 
provided in Figure 19. The steps are numbered and comprise the following actions: 
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1) List the controls of the ISM framework; these controls constitute the basis to 
work from. 
2) Select the legislation for use during the comparison keeping in mind that there 
are multiple laws to be used, in this case, SANHA, ECTA and HIPAA rules. 
3) Identify regulation requirements of the selected legislation in Step 2. 
4) Make a comparison between the regulatory requirement and the identified 
controls of the ISM selected in Step 1. This comparison occurs only if the two 
are at a comparable level.  
5) Verify that the regulatory requirement and the implementation requirement of 
the ISM have the same meaning. A match implies an already existing control. 
Additionally, consideration should be given to the extent that the new 
regulatory requirement meets with the existing security control (Partially 
Covered or Exceeding the security control). The coverage is documented and 
flagged ensuring that the new control security control is not added to the 
previous comparison. This removes redundant regulatory requirements that 
might exist between the various legislations.  
6) Identify to next control of the ISM framework, and verify if it is the last 
security control.   
7) If the control is not the last one, return to Step 4 and repeat the process; else 
add the new control if is not flagged as a previously found control.  
8) Verify if there is more legislation to comply with; if the answer is “Yes” then 
restarts the process from Step 2 and make a new comparison; else Add all the 
regulation requirements not covered at all by the ISM framework plus 
regulation requirements exceeding the ISM (these were documented in     
Step 5). The comparison has been successful accomplished. 
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The output of Phase 4 provides the result produced in the Appendix A. The 
organization should then move to the critical stage of selecting controls that must 
be implemented.  
6.3.5 Phase 5 - Selection of controls  
Organizations need a flexible means to identify, introduce, manage and maintain 
an effective set of security controls in this dynamic regulatory environment. The 
following proposes an approach that can be followed in identifying and selecting 
controls meeting regulatory requirements and the best practices commitment of 
an organization. 
6.3.5.1 Prioritized security controls 
It was previously mentioned that not meeting regulatory requirement is not an 
excuse for an organization. Therefore, priority should firstly be given to all 
mandatory regulatory requirements. It was discussed in Chapter 4 Section 4.5, 
that HIPAA differentiates between “Required” and “Addressable” specifications. 
Required specifications are compulsory ones while Addressable are optional that 
can be implemented when needed by the organization. A regulatory requirement 
that is marked “Required” and not found during the comparison must be selected. 
A good example to illustrate this is shown in the Appendix A: 164.308(a)(4)ii(A) 
Isolating Healthcare Clearinghouse is a Required specification of HIPAA Security 
Rule and is not covered by ISO 17799. The organization must ensure that this 
security measure is added to avoid any legal problems. The same approach 
should be followed for the ECTA and SANHA regulations. These legislations do not 
specifically mention compulsory and optional regulatory requirements. They do 
allude to some requirements that an organization must implement to circumvent 
any legal difficulties. Michalson (2004) argue that only six of the 14 chapters of 
ECTA mention a fine or imprisonment for those convicted of an offence under the 
Act. Therefore, such regulations fall in the category of non-optional requirements 
because non-compliance can result in committing an offense which could incur a 
fine or other legal sanction. The regulatory requirements of these chapters were 
discussed in Section 4.5 of chapter 4. The second category of selection of security 
controls is composed of best practices and optional regulatory requirements. 
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6.3.5.2 Best practices security controls and optional regulatory 
requirements 
The selection of security measures to meet optional regulatory specifications and 
best practices requirements should be driven by a Risk Analysis which is a 
subset of Risk Management. World & Shriver (1997) defines Risk Analysis “as a 
process that involves identifying the threats, which are most likely to have a 
significantly negative impact on an organization as well as scrutinizing the 
associated vulnerabilities of an organization to those threats”. The main intention 
of Risk Analysis is to determine which security controls are needed, depending on 
which risks the organizational information is exposed to. ISO 17799, on the 
selection of controls, states that “Controls should be selected based on the cost of 
implementation in relation to the risks being reduced and the potential losses if a 
security breach occur. Non-monetary factors such as loss of reputation should 
also be taken into account” (ISO 17999). This can only be accomplished by a Risk 
Management plan aimed at identifying, assessing, evaluating and implementing 
risk-reducing security measures. 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology SP800-30 (2001) defines Risk 
Management as a process enabling the achievement of equilibrium between the 
operational and economic costs associated with protecting organizational assets 
from the Risks affecting IT, while attempting to achieve their business goals. 
Therefore, Risk Management essentially focuses on the selection and 
implementation of assorted and appropriate security controls to effectively 
manage the IT-related risks of an organization. Humphreys et al. (1998) suggest 
that the cost of implementing specific types of security controls is more involved 
with whether they are cost-effective.  NIST SP800-30 (2001) even goes further 
by stating that allocating resources and implementing cost-effective controls, 
organizations, after identifying all possible controls and evaluating their feasibility 
and effectiveness, should conduct a cost-benefit analysis for each proposed 
control determining which controls are required and appropriate for their 
circumstances. This is understandable because it does not make economic sense 
to apply controls, should their costs exceed the value of the assets they are 
protecting or the budget that an organization has allocated for security. 
The HIPAA Security Rule, to emphasize on the importance of risk analysis and risk 
management, has imposed them as compulsory to ensure compliance. The 
required implementation specification 164.308 (a)(1)(ii)(A), for Risk Analysis, 
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states that “Every covered entity must conduct an accurate and thorough 
assessment of the potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of electronic protected health formation held by the 
covered entity.” Furthermore, the required implementation specification 
164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B), for Risk Management, requires that “Every covered entity 
must implement security measures sufficient to reduce risks and vulnerabilities 
to a reasonable and appropriate level to comply with the security rule. Both Risk 
Analysis and Risk Management requirements are marked “Required” indicating 
that they are not optional. It was stated in the responses to public comment in 
the preamble to the HIPAA Security rule that Risk Analysis and Risk Management 
are important to covered entities since these processes will “form the foundation 
upon which an entity’s necessary security activities are built” (CMS, 2005). 
The COSO (2004) framework further defines the overall process of Risk 
Management by stating that: “Risk management is a process, effected by a 
entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy 
setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may 
affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of company objectives.” 
This definition clearly illustrates that Risk Management is a process that is 
accomplished by the Board of Directors, management and all other personnel in 
the organization. The Board of Directors is ultimately responsible for ensuring 
that the risk management practices of their organization are effective and it is 
necessary that management ensures that various Risk Management strategies are 
properly implemented and executed within the organization on a daily basis (King 
Report, 2001). This definition illustrates that Risk Management should be 
conducted within the Risk Appetite of the organization in order to achieve its 
objectives. Although, it is possible to reduce the risk to an acceptable level, it can 
be impossible to eradicate it completely and therefore, some residual risks will 
remain (Humphrey et.al, 1998). 
It can be generalized that Risk Management is critical to organizations committed 
to reducing risks occurrences to an acceptable level. Thus, it becomes necessary 
for the Executives Managers to understand what is required of them in terms of 
Risk Management and Risk Analysis as part of their corporate governance duties 
to ensure that risks are kept to a minimum level and therefore, guarantee the 
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stakeholders that their interests are adequately preserved as effectively as 
possible. 
The way that an organization may decide to deal with the risks in reality, will 
depend on the type of the risks that is currently facing and its available resources. 
Whitman & Mattord, (2003) suggest that prior to deciding on a particular strategy 
for dealing with the risk, an organization should conduct a feasibility study with 
the main intention of answering this question: “What are the actual and perceived 
advantages of implementing a control as opposed to the actual and perceived 
disadvantages of not implementing such control?” The answer will help 
management makes decision about whether a risk is negligible or should be taken 
into account. 
In addition to selecting controls based on a risk analysis result, Mash (2002) 
further proposes that by identifying which controls are in place and their 
effectiveness at reducing the risk, requires an understanding of the controls 
themselves. For example, the locks on doors reduce the risk of unauthorized 
access to a building but adding iris scanners could reduce this risk even further. 
However, the threat may not require this additional risk reduction or its cost 
might be higher than the value of the assets being protected, in which case, the 
additional control would be negative and the cost of maintaining the control 
considered unnecessary expense. Therefore, organizations should carefully 
consider existing security controls rather than randomly selecting and 
implementing them.  
6.3.6 Phase 6 - Implementation  
Once the selection of security controls has been successfully accomplished, the 
next step is devoted to their implementation. This step focuses, in general, on the 
formal creation of an Information Security program. ISO/BS 7799-2 highlights 
that such a program shall include “documented statements of the security policy 
and control objectives; the scope, procedures and controls of the ISMS; Risk 
assessment report and risk treatment plan; and documented procedures needed 
by the organization to ensure the effective planning, operation and control of its 
Information Security processes“.  
A compliance program, according to EMC (2005) imposes the responsibility to 
confirm with documentary evidence that the business complies with laws, 
regulations and other standards and commitments applicable to that company. 
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However, a perfect compliance program is of marginal use and will afford little 
risk protection if its policies and procedures are not implemented and enforced 
(Westby, 2005).  
6.3.7 Phase 7 - Auditing  
The next stage, after the implementation stage, should be dedicated to checking 
and ensuring that implemented security measures meet the commonly agreed or 
expected standards or values, legal and regulatory requirements and that they 
are performing their activities in an appropriate, correct and acceptable way. This 
can be accomplished by conducting an internal and external auditing.  
Langelier & Ingram (2001) generally defines an Information Systems Security 
audit as “a process that involves providing independent evaluations of an 
organization’s policies, procedures, standards, measures and practices for 
safeguarding electronic information from loss, damage, unintended disclosure, or 
denial of availability”. This definition clearly highlights that evaluating security 
measures is one of the main aspects of an audit plan. It is illogical to call external 
auditors to audit an Information Security Management System without first 
evaluating and verifying that the security involved in protecting such information 
is appropriate and adequate. Any failure to comply or to provide auditable records 
depending on the regulatory requirement can have serious financial and legal 
consequences. These consequences are in addition to the liabilities caused by 
compromised data, damaged reputation, loss of trust and the harsh penalties 
faced by Executive Managers, as described in the case of Enron and other 
previously discussed cases. Therefore, it becomes necessary to perform an 
internal audit before the external auditors are summoned. The function of internal 
auditors is complementary to, but differs from, that of the external auditors. 
Organizations want to judge their performance against their mission and targets 
apart from the external check. The internal audit report provides an overview of 
the various strong and weak points in the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
organization, for instance, so an improvement program can be developed or 
existing policies and procedures can be adjusted. 
The external auditors, on the other hand are independent of the internal 
organization unit who conduct an investigation to establish the existence of an 
equal balance between the security measures and the standards and regulatory 
requirements that the organization is supposed to ensure compliance against. 
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(King Report, 2001) confirm that the role of internal and external auditor is 
different. External auditors have a statutory duty to report their independent 
opinion on the financial statements to the shareholders of the organization, 
consider statutory requirements and standards for financial reporting and auditing. 
This contrasts to the internal audit function, which is a service to the company. It 
focuses on the internal control framework and reports to the Senior Executive 
Management and the audit committee (King Report, 2001). 
Internal auditing can be considered as a preparatory phase that aims at reducing 
external audit efforts and helps to achieve external auditing efficiency because 
most of the tasks are already performed by the insider auditors and only require 
confirmation with evidence from the external, independent auditors.  
The organizational internal audit function should provide a report to intended 
recipients upon the completion of the audit work. Westby (2005) states that an 
audit report contains the scope and objectives of the audit, the period of coverage, 
the nature and extent of the audit work performed and the associated audit 
standards. The audit report states the findings, conclusions and recommendations 
concerning the audit work performed and any reservations or qualifications that 
the auditor has with respect to the audit. 
There can be, however, confusion between auditing and monitoring. Monitoring is 
a current activity and normally involves active, current data. Whitman & Mattord 
(2003) further confirm that auditing is the process of reviewing the use of a 
system, and not performance checking. Hensley (2003) states that the difference 
between monitoring and auditing is that, auditing is primarily “an after-the-fact” 
and determines if misuse or malfeasance has occurred; whereas monitoring is a 
current, ongoing activity.  
However, Executive Management should realize that a good audit result does not 
imply an end to the compliance process. There is still the need for regularly 
checking ensuring that the implemented security operates efficiently as possible. 
This is accomplished through the reviewing and monitoring process. 
6.3.8 Phase 8 - Review and Monitoring 
Executive Management should not assume that their duties are completed once 
the security measures of the organization have been audited, and that the 
Information Security Systems will continue working perfectly. Executive 
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managers should realize that being currently secure does assure future security. 
There is no control system which is entirely effective (ACL, 2005). Furthermore, 
the pressures of growing workloads and increasing business complexity can make 
it operationally expedient to circumvent controls. Security measures available in 
an organization may be overlooked or simply not implemented due to cost, time 
and efficiency pressures (ACL, 2005). It is necessary that an organization 
demonstrates that it has implemented the necessary security measures and, that 
they are operating properly and providing the intended protection for critical 
information. The ideal solution enables a proactive, ongoing approach to 
protection, with in-depth reviewing, monitoring, assessment and analysis that 
correlates to the organizational risk posture, both from internal and external 
perspective. One major goal of monitoring is to identify problems before external 
auditors discover disparities in the audit results or they become more serious 
(Langelier & Ingram, 2001).  
Executive Management should furthermore, realize that managing Information 
Security is a journey not a destination. It is a continuous process. New changes 
such as new laws requirements and new threats may arise at any time during the 
course of the business. It is necessary to implement new controls or enhance 
existing ones to mitigate those new threats and stay compliant with the new 
regulatory requirements.  
The end-result of the auditing and monitoring process must be reported to 
Executive Management so that precautions can be taken against the problems 
discovered.  
6.3.9 Phase 9 - Reporting 
The last step in the Compliance process is Reporting. Once the organization has 
accomplished the Review and Monitoring process, the information produced 
should be compiled into reports to alert management to its findings. A well 
established Reporting system allows a organization to establish whether it has 
achieved its desired compliance levels and demonstrate to its auditors that it has 
taken significant steps to demonstrate its compliance efforts. 
The reports should be issued in a timely manner allowing management a period in 
which to take corrective actions before they turn into penalties. They should 
inform interested parties such as, stakeholders, about current compliance status 
of the organization. 
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6.3.10 Phase 10 – Documentation and Awareness 
It is necessary to highlight that there are basic requirements that must be 
performed during the process of a compliance program. These are the 
Documentation and Awareness of the implemented corporate compliance 
program. BS 7799 (1999) generally recommends that the ISMS documentation 
includes: 
a. Documented statements of the security policy and controls objectives; 
b. The scope of the ISMS, procedures and controls in support of the ISMS; 
c. Risk assessment report; 
d. Risk treatment plan; 
e. Documented procedures needed by the organization to ensure the effective 
planning, operation and control of its Information Security processes. 
EMC Corporation (2005) argues that “in order to successfully meet a company’s 
compliance obligations, there is a fundamental, ongoing responsibility: To 
preserve the business records that demonstrate the company’s conduct has 
satisfied the relevant requirements”. Furthermore, documentation has arguably 
become a priority for auditors (Bindview, 2005). Proctor (2004) stated that 
“Auditors aren’t simply going to ask you or not you have got controls anymore. 
They are going to want to see documentary evidence to that effect and in may 
instances will want to come on-site to test them”. 
Risks can not be managed and organizational assets can not be protected when a 
security plan is implemented only through documentation and security 
management software (Westby, 2005). It is evident that a compliance security 
program must be communicated to all employees from the top management to 
lower-level employees. Personnel can not be held accountable if they were never 
aware of what was expected of them. Therefore, it is necessary that the 
organization has in place mechanisms for training in Information Security related 
issues to increase security awareness.    
6.4 CONCLUSION 
The Information Security and privacy regulatory environment, currently, grows 
more stringent and complicated every day. Organizations are required to ensure 
compliance with new regulations requirements which complicate the situation.  
Compliance with regulatory requirement is a mandatory requirement for a 
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particular organization and ignorance of the legal requirement is not considered 
an excuse. Such compliance failure can result in heavy consequences such as, the 
loss of shareholder trust, a bad reputation for the company and stiff penalties for 
the Executive Managers as illustrated in the case of Enron and other organizations 
that failed to demonstrate good corporate governance practices. Organizations 
are required to spend excessively to ensure compliance and avoid such legal 
troubles. The question is not whether organizations will spend on regulatory 
compliance; but whether they will spend wisely and effectively, driven by a well-
established compliance strategy program rather than by crises.  
The key solution is to find any overlap that might exist between already 
implemented controls and these new regulatory requirements. It is obvious that, 
depending on the legislation, little effort is required to meet new regulation 
requirements should an organization already has a well-established ISO 17799 
compliance program as shown in Figure 17. This proves that a compliance 
strategy based on a unification process, taking into account both best practices 
and regulation requirements, will definitively provide remarkable advantages to 
the organizational compliance efforts. The idea behind the compliance model is to 
avoid treating each incoming new regulation as a discrete project which can result 
in unnecessary spending, time and resources devoted to an already implemented 
security measures. Therefore, such compliance ensures that common elements 
across regulations and those already covered in an Information Security 
compliance program are not unnecessarily repeated.  
Westby (2005) further proposes that a well-established compliance program must 
be viewed as an essential responsibility for which all levels of management are 
accountable; it must not be seen as set of technical requirements emanating from 
the Chief Information Security Officer or Chief Security Officer, but be considered 
as a Corporate Compliance Program. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
A Model For Information Security Management and Regulatory Compliance in SA Health Sector 
  
156 
Chapter 6 has established a roadmap that organizations should follow in 
endeavors to meet both legal and regulatory requirements while ensuring that 
best practices are being used concomitantly. 
Chapter 7 finally concludes the research presented in this dissertation. 
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Chapter 7 CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 provided a compliance model for Information Security 
Management and regulatory compliance. The compliance model ensures that 
organizations meet privacy regulatory requirements while, at the same time, 
ensuring customers that international standards for the protecting information 
of customers are being used concomitantly. This represents the core of this 
research project. 
This chapter concludes the research presented in this dissertation and 
discusses the benefits of the compliance model. It suggests some areas 
suitable for future research. 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Organizations are, currently, functioning in the most complex and challenging era 
of Information Security Management and regulatory compliance requirements. 
They are required to ensure compliance with multiple new regulations 
requirements making such compliance an even more complex issue.  In addition, 
compliance with regulatory requirements is mandatory within an organization and 
ignorance of the legal requirement is not an excuse. Such compliance failure can 
result in heavy consequences such as, the loss of shareholders trust, a bad 
reputation for the company and various stiff penalties for the Executive Managers. 
Executives and Board members are ultimately accountable for ensuring 
compliance and face penalties, including fines and jail sentences, for non-
compliance.  
The problem addressed in this project is which compliance strategy should be 
followed to meet new regulation requirements while ensuring customers that best 
practices are being used concomitantly. The greatest challenge that faces 
Executive Management to ensure a well established corporate compliance 
program, is how to discover a simple method of meeting these new regulations 
while spending less money and effort. 
This dissertation has demonstrated that the key solution is to discover the overlap 
that might exist between already implemented controls and these new regulatory 
requirements. It was illustrated in Section 5.5 of Chapter 5 which provided an 
analysis of the comparison between ISO 17799 and HIPAA, ECTA and SANHA that 
depending on the regulation, little effort was needed to meet the regulatory 
requirements when an organization had already a well-established ISO 17799 
compliance program. This proves that a compliance strategy based on a 
unification process, taking into account both best practices and regulatory 
requirements, will provide advantages to their compliance efforts.  
7.2 BENEFITS OF THE COMPLIANCE MODEL 
The implementation of this compliance model provides the following advantages 
to healthcare organizations: 
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A. Reduced legal difficulties  
There are a growing number of laws relating to the protection of the privacy and 
security of health information. The implementation of the proposed compliance 
model will keep an organization legal because it will have ensured due diligence 
by complying with the relevant legislation requirements. This will, in turn, keep 
the organizations free when regulatory enforcers come knocking at their doors. 
B. Increased trust in business partners and patients 
An organization wants to establish the security of the IT systems of its business 
partners prior to doing business. The implementation of a well-established 
compliance program will increase trust with other business partners because they 
are sure that international best practices are being used. In addition, the use of a 
compliance program will enhance the trust of patients because they are assured 
that their information is kept secure and private. 
C. Reduced audit time 
Organizations can save a lot of time and efforts dedicated to auditing process by 
addressing common elements employed one time for multiple uses. The 
eradication of redundancy in the auditing process will ensure that no time is 
wasted on duplicating security controls already implemented.  
D. Reduced compliance costs  
Conformance with the proposed compliance model is an effective and 
demonstrable method to ensure that an organization has addressed all the key 
issues of Information Security, thus reducing losses due to security breaches. 
This will in turn, reduce the cost for security breaches. Furthermore, the removal 
of redundancies against the security standards and new regulatory compliance, 
can save costs that would, otherwise, be devoted to redundant security measures 
already implemented in the organization. 
E. Faster compliance cycle  
The implementation of the proposed compliance model will increase the 
compliance cycle because the organization is building on existing controls already 
implemented. The compliance with new regulatory requirements will be faster. 
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F. Unified compliance approach  
Conformance with the proposed compliance model ensures a consistent unified 
approach with the multiple regulatory requirements and security standards rather 
than the following of disparate compliance approaches. 
7.3 CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The aim of this section is to provide the reader with an overview of the work 
presented in this dissertation. 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
Chapter One started by motivating that Information Security Governance has 
become an important business issue which has escalated to Board level. 
Executive management and the Board are, currently, responsible and accountable 
for protecting the security and privacy of the information of their customers. 
Serious personal consequences, specifically legal, could result from ignoring such 
Information Security and privacy protection.  
This chapter states the problem definition and objectives of this research project. 
Chapter 2 – Privacy and Security Concerns Regarding Health 
Information 
Chapter Two highlighted that, although the use of IT in handling medical 
transactions provides numerous advantages for the healthcare organization and 
its patients, it equally raises many concerns about the privacy and security of 
such sensitive information. This chapter illustrated that medical information is 
used by numerous parties for different purposes and this can result in an increase 
in vulnerabilities and the various threats to such information proving that there is 
a need to protect health information. A discussion of various privacy breaches and 
their consequences were provided. 
The chapter concluded by emphasizing the necessity for healthcare organizations 
to have in place protection mechanisms ensuring the protection of both security 
and privacy.  It was confirmed that the protection of the security of health 
information can be assured should a reasonable or adequate security standard 
framework exist; while privacy protection includes various limits of a legal nature 
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to the collection handling, storage or transmission of personally identifiable or 
aggregate data collected from individual users.    
Chapter 3 – Information Security Standards and Best 
Practices 
Chapter Three described the various international security standards frameworks, 
government and private guidelines that can be used in ensuring best practices in 
managing Information Security. The ISO 17799, the mostly widely used 
International Security Management standard was examined. Its advantages and 
critics were discussed. It was proposed that Executive Managers should consider 
using additional existing standards to complement the ISO 17799 and fill any 
exposed gaps to overcome some of those criticisms. Such convergences become 
a necessity especially in the healthcare environment where healthcare 
Information Security standards provide for more stringent solutions in the 
protection of medical information.    
The implementation of proper Information Security Management practices, alone, 
does not necessarily ensure regulatory compliance and vice versa. Healthcare 
Executive management must be alert to reduce the losses from the legal action. 
They must understand the current legal environment, stay current with new laws 
and regulations and watch for new issues as they emerge. 
Chapter 4 – Legal and Regulatory Requirements Pertaining to 
Privacy and Data Protection 
Chapter Four provided a discussion of data and privacy protection on international 
and national regulatory requirements. This chapter focused on privacy protection 
in the Republic of South Africa and specifically in the health sector to 
contextualize with the main objective of this research. 
The challenge encountered by most organizations is which compliance strategy 
they should follow to meet these new regulations while ensuring that existing 
measures are maintained with the growing number of regulations that require 
healthcare organizations to demonstrate compliance. Therefore, a comparative 
analysis of compliance requirements is required which for this project was based 
on ISO 17799, HIPAA, SANHA and ECTA. 
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Chapter 5 – Comparison between ISO 17799, HIPAA, SANHA 
and ECTA 
Chapter Five was dedicated to the comparison between an Information Security 
Management standard (ISO 17799) against the laws applicable to typical South 
African healthcare organizations. These are not the only applicable laws in the SA 
context but were selected for the scope of this research project. The analysis of 
the comparison result illustrated that some legislation has quite an overlap with 
an Information Security Management program. This confirmed that a compliance 
strategy would serve to eradicate redundancy while following an ad hoc approach 
to compliance with the various standards and legislations. This can provide 
advantages to the organization by easily comply with new regulatory 
requirements and spend less effort while increasing the return on investment. 
This chapter concluded by emphasizing the need for a framework which ensures 
full compliance with regulatory requirements while ensuring patients that best 
practices for Information Security management are being used concomitantly to 
ensure the privacy and security of medical information. 
Chapter 6 – A Model for Information Security Management 
and Regulatory Compliance in the South African Health 
Sector 
This chapter used the result of the comparison analysis and built a model for 
Information Security Management and regulatory compliance. Its main intention 
was to establish a roadmap for organizations to follow in their endeavors to meet 
security standards and regulatory requirements. The phases that constitute this 
compliance model were discussed. The concept behind this compliance model is 
to avoid treating each new incoming regulation as a discrete project which can 
result in unnecessary spending, time and resources which are devoted to already 
implemented security measures. Therefore, such compliance ensures that 
common elements across regulations and those already covered in an Information 
Security Compliance program are not unnecessarily repeated. The compliance 
program is viewed as an essential responsibility for which all levels of 
management are accountable and must not be seen as set of technical 
requirements emanating from the Chief Information Security Officer or Chief 
Security Officer but must be considered as a corporate compliance program. 
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
The research is concluded in this chapter. The benefits of the proposed 
compliance model are discussed. Future research directions are discussed in the 
following section. 
7.4 FUTURE RESEARCH 
The International Information Security Management framework (ISO 17799) 
provides requirements structure used to identify controls, but it contains 
insufficient details to enable their implementation. Regulatory requirements are 
typically written for what you must do, and not how to do it. This project has 
provided a roadmap for organizations to follow to ensure the compliance of 
security standard and regulatory requirements. Chapter Six has touched upon on 
the phases that constitute the proposed compliance model. Possible directions for 
future research include a detailed practical implementation for an automated 
compliance solution of this proposed model. The use of technology to automate 
and consolidate many manual activities will significantly reduce the time and 
costs spent on manually managing the many processes related to meeting 
compliance with the multiple regulations.  
Organizations are required to follow a more holistic approach in ensuring 
compliance to successfully implement this compliance solution. Thus, technologies 
such as Continuous Auditing, Monitoring and Reporting will be of the 
greatest use in achieving an automated compliance solution. 
Woodroof & Searcy (2001) define Continuous Auditing as “an assurance service 
where the time between the occurrence of events underlying a particular subject 
matter of a client and the issuance of an auditor’s opinion on the fairness of the 
client’s representation of the subject matter is eliminated”. Miklos et.al (2002) 
argue that while many people believe that a well-performed traditional audit 
could have detected some of the operational problems of Enron, a well-performed 
Continuous Audit would have exposed them much sooner. A Continuous Audit 
would have provided an assurance of processes that are not necessarily part of 
the eventual financial reporting and an assurance focus that is closer to 
secondary supervision than an after-the-fact archival review (Miklos et.al, 2002). 
On the other hand, a Continuous Monitoring process should further provide the 
ability to observe the performance of one or many processes, systems or types of 
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data and report any fluctuations in a timely manner (ISACA, 2002). Continuous 
Monitoring can be defined as the internal continuous provision of key metrics or 
other information enabling the early identification of issues that may affect 
corporate performance (Nehmer, 2003). 
The main goal of Continuous Reporting is, according to Williams (2002), to 
develop reporting systems within a company, whereby management by exception 
enables Boards of Directors and others to gain a continuous assurance on 
corporate performance and therefore, enable to better discharge their governance 
responsibilities in a timely manner. 
One aspect that has been raised, but not discussed, is that of providing a 
structure for the regulatory requirements which were not taken into account 
during the comparison reported in Chapter Five. These regulatory requirements 
are not specifically security and privacy related issues but healthcare 
organizations must meet those requirements because they are part of regulatory 
compliance. For example, Chapter 2 (Rights and duties of users and Health 
care personnel) of SANHA, Section 5 requires that “A health care provider, 
health worker or health establishment may not refuse a person emergency 
medical treatment”. 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter concludes this dissertation and illustrates that all of the objectives 
established at the beginning of this research project were accomplished. An 
overview of the information covered in the various chapters of this dissertation 
was provided and future research directions suggested. The benefits of the 
proposed compliance model were discussed.  
The managing of Information Security in information systems has reached the 
point where sufficient but dispersed knowledge exists in various domains (Denis, 
2003). Some of the areas supporting the Information Security program may be 
required by either law or regulations whereas others may be considered best 
practices.  
Compliance with SANHA and ECTA is a regulatory requirement for South African 
healthcare organizations and ignorance of the legal requirement is not an excuse. 
Any ignorance of legal requirements can result in heavy punishment and the loss 
of organizational credibility. The managers of South African healthcare 
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organization must consider that being compliant with all legal requirements does 
not guarantee the privacy and security protection of health information and vice 
versa. They should adopt international security standards as part of the 
Information Security Management to ensure that best practices are used in 
addition to meeting the regulatory requirements. This statement is used as a 
premise for this research and it is proposed that a compliance strategy should use 
an Information Security Management framework as a point of reference to collate 
further requirements posed by regulations. This is particularly important in the 
health sector in terms of the security and privacy of health information. The use 
of an internationally accepted standard, such as the ISO 17799, will further 
enhance the desired level of security. This can help reduce the security and 
privacy risks to a minimum level while minimizing the redundancy in the 
approach to complying with relevant legislations. Legislations have a profound 
impact on organizations through non-compliance fines, penalties, resulting bad 
publicity and damaged reputation and provide the motivation to help improve the 
privacy and security of health information.     
 
Security and Privacy of health information can only be assured 
if Security standards and Legislations complement each other 
in protecting such critical information. 
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Appendix B 
ISO 17799 Main Sections 
1.Security Policy Provides guidelines and management advice for improving Information Security 
through the issue of an Information Security policy through the organization. 
Information Security 
policy document 
A set of implementation-independent, conceptual Information Security policy 
statements governing the security goals of the organization. This document, 
along with a hierarchy of standards, guidelines, and procedures, helps 
implement and enforce policy statements. Policies are organizations laws, in the 
sense that they dictate acceptable and unacceptable behaviour within the 
context of the organization’s culture (Whitman & Mattford, 2003). 
Review and 
evaluation 
Ongoing management commitment to Information Security is established by 
assigning ownership and review schedules for the Information Security Policy 
document.  
2.Organizational 
security  
Facilitate Information Security management within the organization. This 
addresses the need for a management framework that creates, sustains, and 
manages the Information Security infrastructure. 
Management 
Information Security 
forum 
Provides a multi-disciplinary committee chartered to discuss and disseminate 
Information Security issues throughout the organization. 
Information Security 
co-ordination 
acts as a central point of contact for Information Security issues, direction, and 
decisions 
Information Security 
responsibilities 
individual Information Security responsibilities are unambiguously allocated and 
detailed within job descriptions 
Authorization process 
for information 
processing facilities  
ensures that security considerations are evaluated and approvals obtained for 
new and modified information processing systems 
Specialist 
Information Security 
advice 
Maintains relationships with independent specialists to allow access to expertise 
not available within the organization 
Co-operation 
between 
organizations 
Maintains relationships with both information sharing partners and local law 
enforcement authorities 
Independent review Mechanisms to allow independent review of security effectiveness. 
Third-party access Mechanisms to govern third-party interaction within the organization based on 
business requirements 
Outsourcing Organizational outsourcing arrangements should have clear contractual security 
requirements 
3.Asset Classification 
and Control Section 
To carry out an inventory of assets and protect these assets effectively. This 
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section is more concerned with the effective administration, from a security 
viewpoint, of the organization hardware and software assets 
Accountability and 
inventory 
Mechanisms to maintain an accurate inventory of assets, and establish 
ownership and stewardship of all assets. 
Classification Mechanisms to classify assets based on business impact. 
Labeling Labeling standards unambiguously brand assets to their classification.  
Handling Handling standards; including introduction, transfer, removal, and disposal of 
all assets; are based on asset classification. 
4.Personnel Security  To minimize the risks of human error, theft, fraud or the abusive use of 
equipment”. These risks increased dramatically as computing was first moved 
from the computer centre to the office worker’s desk, and even more so when 
organizations linked their computers with networks 
Personnel screening Policies within local legal and cultural frameworks ascertain the qualification and 
suitability of all personnel with access to organizational assets. This framework 
may be based on job descriptions and/or asset classification.  
Security 
responsibilities 
Personnel should be clearly informed of their Information Security 
responsibilities, including codes of conduct and non-disclosure agreements. 
Terms and conditions 
of employment 
Personnel should be clearly informed of their Information Security 
responsibilities as a condition of employment.  
Security education 
and Training 
A mandatory Information Security awareness training program is conducted for 
all employees, including new hires and established employees.  
Reporting security 
incidents, 
weaknesses and 
software malfunction 
Reporting security incidents, weaknesses and software malfunction 
Learning from 
incidents 
Mechanisms to quantify incidents for the future reference 
Disciplinary process 
 
A formal process to deal with violation of Information Security policies and 
procedures. 
5.Physical and 
Environmental 
Security 
To prevent the violation, deterioration or disruption of industrial facilities and 
data. 
Physical security 
perimeter 
The premises security perimeter should be clearly defined and physically sound.  
Access control Breaches in the physical security perimeter should have appropriate entry/exit 
controls commensurate with their classification level.  
Location Organizational premises should be analyzed for environmental hazards.  
Equipment security Equipment should be sited within the premises to ensure physical and 
environmental integrity and availability.  
Isolating delivery and 
loading areas 
Mechanisms to track entry and exit of assets through the security perimeter. 
General controls Policies and standards, such as utilization of shredding equipment, secure 
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storage, and “clean desk” principles, should exist to govern operational security 
within the workplace. 
6.Communications 
and Operations 
Management 
To ensure the adequate and reliable operation of information processing 
devices. 
Operational 
procedures 
Comprehensive set of procedures, in support of organizational standards and 
policies.  
Change control Process to manage change and configuration control, including change 
management of the Information Security Management System.  
Incident 
management 
Mechanism to ensure timely and effective response to any security incidents.  
Segregation of duties Segregation and rotation of duties minimize the potential for collusion and 
uncontrolled exposure.  
Capacity planning Mechanism to monitor and project organizational capacity to ensure 
uninterrupted availability.  
System acceptance Methodology to evaluate system changes to ensure continued confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability.  
Malicious code Controls to mitigate risk from introduction of malicious code.  
Housekeeping Policies, standards, guidelines, and procedures to address routine housekeeping 
activities such as backup schedules and logging.  
Network 
management 
Controls to govern the secure operation of the networking infrastructure.  
Media handling Controls to govern secure handling and disposal of information storage media 
and documentation.  
Information 
exchange 
Controls to govern secure handling and disposal of information storage media 
and documentation. 
7.Access Control To control access to information 
Business 
requirements 
Policy controlling access to organizational assets based on business 
requirements and “need to know”. 
User access 
management 
Includes mechanisms to register and deregister users; control and review of 
access and privileges. 
User responsibilities Informing users of their access control responsibilities, including password 
stewardship and unattended user equipment. 
Network access 
control 
Policy on usage of network services, including mechanisms to appropriate 
manage interfaces between organization’s network and public networks; 
appropriate authentication and control of user access mechanisms for user 
access to information services. 
Operating system 
access control 
Ensuring that security facilities at the operating level should be used to restrict 
access to computer resources. 
Application access 
control 
Limits access to applications based on user or application authorization levels.  
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Access monitoring Mechanisms to monitor system access and system use to detect unauthorized 
activities. 
Mobile computing and 
teleworking 
Policies and standards to address asset protection, secure access, and user 
responsibilities. 
8.Systems 
Development and 
Maintenance 
To ensure that security is incorporated and maintained into information 
systems. 
System security 
requirements 
Incorporates Information Security considerations in the specifications of any 
system development or procurement. 
Application security Incorporates Information Security considerations in the specification of any 
application development or procurement. 
Cryptography Policies, standards, and procedures governing the usage and maintenance of 
cryptographic controls.  
Security of system 
files 
Mechanisms to control access to, and verify integrity of, operational software 
and data, including a process to track, evaluate, and incorporate asset 
upgrades and patches. 
Development security Integrates change control and technical reviews into development process. 
9.Business Continuity 
Management 
To minimize the impact of business interruptions and protect the company’s 
essential processes from failure and major disasters. 
Business continuity 
planning 
Business continuity strategy based on a business impact analysis.  
 
Business continuity 
testing 
Testing and documentation of business continuity strategy.  
 
Business continuity 
maintenance 
Identifies ownership of business continuity strategy as well as ongoing re-
assessment and maintenance.  
10.Compliance To avoid any breach of criminal or civil law, of statutory or contractual 
requirements, and of security requirements. Information Security is not a 
necessary an option that can be accepted or rejected by senior management of 
an organization. Increasingly, there are legislative and regulatory requirements 
that require an Information Security infrastructure for compliance. 
Legal requirements Includes awareness of relevant legislation; intellectual property rights; 
Safeguarding of organizational records; Data protection and privacy of personal 
health information; Prevention of misuse; Regulation of cryptography and 
collection of evidence. 
Technical 
requirements 
Mechanisms to verify execution of security policies and implementations. 
System audits Auditing controls to maximize effectiveness, minimize disruption, and protect 
audit tools. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Information Security is becoming a part of core business processes in every 
organization.  Companies are faced with contradictory requirements to ensure open 
systems and accessible information while maintaining high protection standards. In 
addition, contemporary management of organizations’ Information Security requires 
various approaches in different areas, ranging from technology to organizational 
issues and legislation. These approaches are often isolated while security management 
requires an integrated approach. 
Information Technology promises many benefits to healthcare organizations. By 
helping to make accurate information more readily available to health care providers 
and workers, researchers and patients, advanced computing and communication 
technology can improve the quality and lower the costs of health care. However, the 
prospect of storing health information in an electronic form raises concerns about 
patient privacy and security. 
To ensure an appropriate and consistent level of Information Security for 
computer-based patient records, both within individual healthcare organizations and 
throughout the entire healthcare delivery system, healthcare organizations are required 
to establish formal Information Security programs, for example through the adoption 
of the ISO 17799 standard. However, proper Information Security management 
practices alone do not necessarily ensure regulatory compliance. South African health 
care organizations have to comply with the South African National Health Act 
(SANHA) and the Electronic Communication Transaction Act (ECTA). It is arguably 
necessary to consider compliance with the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) in order to meet international industry standards. 
The main purpose of this paper is to propose a compliance strategy, which 
ensures full compliance with regulatory requirements and at the same time guarantees 
customers that international industry standards are being used. This is preceded by a 
comparative analysis of the requirements posed by the ISO 17799 standard and the 
HIPAA, SANHA and ECTA regulations. 
 
KEY WORDS 
Information Security management, privacy, healthcare organizations, health 
information, legal compliance, international security standards, compliance strategy 
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INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND 
REGULATORY COMPLIANCE IN THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN HEALTH SECTOR 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The healthcare industry is as competitive and multifaceted as any industry in the 
world today. Healthcare information systems provide many advantages when used for 
improved access, collaboration and data sharing among healthcare providers, patients, 
and researchers (Zhang et all, 2002). However, the shift of medical records from 
paper to electronic formats has increased the potential for individuals to access, use, 
and disclose sensitive personal health data. 
From a historical perspective, the concept of protecting information is a long 
established ethical code in the healthcare environment. Traditionally, physicians are 
bound by the Hippocratic Oath, which establishes that what is seen or heard during 
the course of treatment is to be kept to oneself (Smith, 2004). In today’s electronic 
era, the Oath by itself is no longer sufficient and is extended by government laws and 
other standards. 
Considering the importance of security and privacy, many countries have 
adopted different regulation frameworks and standards focusing on achieving data 
integrity, confidentiality and availability of health information.  
To ensure an appropriate and consistent level of Information Security for 
computer-based patient records, both within individual healthcare organizations and 
throughout the entire healthcare delivery system, healthcare organizations are required 
to establish formal Information Security programs, for example through the adoption 
of the ISO 17799 standard. However, proper Information Security management 
practices alone do not necessarily ensure regulatory compliance and vice versa. South 
African health care organizations have to comply with the South African National 
Health Act (SANHA) and the Electronic Communication Transaction Act (ECTA). It 
is arguably necessary to consider compliance with the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in order to meet international industry standards. 
The main objective of this paper is to propose a compliance strategy that will 
provide South African healthcare organizations with an approach towards Information 
Security management, which ensures full compliance with governing regulations and 
at the same time providing customers with the assurance of meeting an international 
industry standard for health Information Security and privacy. In order to achieve this 
objective, a comparative analysis of the ISO 17799 standard (as basis) and SANHA, 
ECTA, and HIPAA regulations will be done to determine areas of convergence. The 
outcome of this analysis will assist in formulating an Information Security compliance 
program, which does not only meet regulatory requirements but also ensures that best 
practices are being used. 
Appendix C 
0 
A Model For Information Security Management and Regulatory Compliance in SA Health Sector 
  
205 
2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN HEALTH SYSTEM 
According to Roemer (1991), “a health system is a combination of resources, 
organization, financing and administration that culminates in the health services 
offered to the population”. South Africa’s health system is composed of both public 
and private sectors with a grave difference between the two (Bassett, 2003). 
Statistics obtained from safrica.info (2003) show that the public sector is under-
resourced and over-used while the growing private sector, run largely along 
commercial lines, caters to middle- and high-income earners who tend to be members 
of medical schemes (18% of the population), and to foreigners looking for top-quality 
surgical procedures at relatively affordable prices. The private sector also attracts 
most of the country's health professionals. Although the state contributes about 40% 
of all expenditure on health, the public health sector is under pressure to deliver 
services to about 80% of the population. Despite this, most resources are concentrated 
in the private health sector, which sees to the health needs of the remaining 20% of 
the population. 
Considering the increasing number of people in both sectors (35 million in the 
public sector and seven million in the private sector), the South Africa government 
has noticed that the use of Information Technology in handling medical records is a 
necessity not a choice. 
The South African government depends on the State Information Technology 
Agency (SITA), which was established in 1999 with the objective of consolidating 
and coordinating the State’s information technology. As stated in the SITA Act 38 of 
2002 section 6, the objectives of the act are: 
• To improve service delivery to the public through the provision of 
information technology, information systems and related services in a 
maintained information systems security environment to departments and 
public bodies. 
• To promote the efficiency of departments and public bodies through the use 
of information technology.  
Although South Africa’s health system faces many challenges related to staff 
shortages, deteriorating infrastructure, increased centralization, equipment failures 
and shortages, and an increased influx of (especially HIV/AIDS) patients, the public 
and private healthcare sectors are showing confidence in information technology’s 
ability to transform the industry and improve healthcare services (EthicSA, 2000). At 
a Health Informatics Association for Africa conference held in Johannesburg, 
delegates agreed that it was more prudent to increase investment in IT than in medical 
technology. IT in healthcare is growing in popularity because of its ability to provide 
the medical industry with the information it needs to make informed decisions (Powe, 
2003). Nevertheless the application of IT to healthcare, especially the development of 
electronic medical records and linking of clinical databases, has increasingly 
generated growing concern regarding the privacy and security of health information 
(National Research Council, 1997).  
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3. PRIVACY AND SECURITY CONCERNS REGARDING HEALTH 
INFORMATION 
Despite the widespread protection that it is offered in international instruments and 
constitutional provisions, ‘privacy’ is however a term that is inherently difficult to 
define and its definition varies widely (Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) 
Report 2002). According to Meyer (2001), security and privacy are distinct but related. 
Privacy is the right of an individual to control the use of his or her personal 
information. It should not be divulged or used by others against his wishes. Security 
refers to all the ability to control access and protect information from accidental 
disclosure to unauthorized persons and from alteration, destruction or loss.  
According to the National Research Council (1997), electronic medical records 
are potentially vulnerable to misuse from both authorized and unauthorized users who 
inappropriately access patient information for their personal or economic gain. 
Authorized users may take advantage of their legitimate authority to access 
information that they have no valid need to see (often regarding a friend, relative, or 
celebrity), or they may reveal patient information to others often without the patients’ 
consent. Outside attackers may break into computerized information to steal, destroy, 
or to render the system dysfunctional, preventing legitimate users such as doctors and 
nurses from accessing information critical to care. Yet considering the highly personal 
and potentially destructive nature of the medical data, it comes with significant 
concerns to the privacy and security of such information. In order to gain an 
understanding of these concerns, it is important to look at major threats that could 
harm the privacy and security of health information.  
The American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)’s Provisional 
Standard (PS 101) "Guidelines for a Technical Security Framework for Transmission 
and Storage of Healthcare Information" identifies the following security threats 
relative to healthcare information (CPRI toolkit, 1995): 
• Masquerading, in which one entity pretends to be another, facilitating any 
subsequent attacks. 
• Modification of information, including message or data content, destruction 
of messages, data or management information. 
• Message sequencing threats, including replay, and delay of messages. 
• Unauthorized disclosure, which reveals to an unauthorized user message 
content, information derived from observing message flow, and information 
held in storage on an open system. 
• Repudiation, in which a user or system denies having performed some 
action, such as modification of information. 
• Denial of service – this prevents the systems from performing its functions. 
In order to counteract the aforementioned threats, many countries have adopted 
various regulatory frameworks that focus on achieving data integrity, confidentiality 
and availability of health information. 
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4. PROTECTING THE PRIVACY AND SECURITY OF HEALTH 
INFORMATION 
Medical data are considered to be amongst the most sensitive data for civil use as they 
contain very detailed, personal information about patients and their health information. 
For centuries, the Hippocratic Oath has expressed the physicians’ duty to respect 
patients’ privacy (Kohl, 95). Today, this is no longer sufficient and is extended by 
civil law and international security standards.  
To ensure an appropriate level of Information Security management, South 
African healthcare organizations are required to establish a formal Information 
Security program, for example through the adoption of an internationally recognized 
standard such as the ISO17799 standard. However, it is indeed necessary to adopt the 
Healthcare Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) standards to 
overcome some of the criticisms of ISO17799, such as being too general and therefore 
not providing stringent solutions to specific organizations’ requirements, such as in 
the case of healthcare organizations. In addition, South African healthcare 
organizations must ensure that they comply with the South African National Health 
Act (SANHA) and the Electronic Communication Transaction Act (ECTA) 
requirements in order to ensure due diligence practices.  
4.1. Overview of SANHA, ECTA, HIPAA and ISO 17799 
The increased use of IT in handling medical records has brought more concerns about 
privacy and security regarding health information. Such concerns are growing as more 
sensitive information, such as HIV status, psychiatric records and genetic information 
is stored in medical records. Addressing these concerns requires both understanding 
of regulatory requirements and various Information Security standards available for 
protecting such information. 
The ISO/IEC 17799 International standard resulted from the British Standards 
Institution’s (BSI) BS7799 code of practice, which was introduced in 1995 and 
revised in 1999. Part 1 of BS7799 became ISO standard 17799 in 2000 after being 
adopted by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC1 – Information Technology. Part 
2 of BS7799 “Information Security management systems – Specification with 
guidance for use” has not been yet adopted by ISO as such, but has been accepted by 
many national standards organisations, among which the South African National 
Standards (SANS). It is the Part 1 Code of practice for Information Security 
management that will be used in this paper. 
Instead of mandating a specific implementation of Information Security 
practices, ISO17799 is intended to be used as a “best practice” framework in the 
development of organizational security policies and practices. The benefits of the 
framework are to provide a code of practice that induces organizations to consider all 
factors when developing their security program. However, ISO/IEC 17799 
recommends that this code of practice be used as a starting point for developing 
organization-specific guidance, with particular emphasis on the fact that not all the 
guidance and controls in the code may be applicable to each organization. Conversely, 
additional controls not included in the code of practice document may be required 
(ISO17799). In this sense, healthcare organizations may decide to deal with a subset 
of controls instead of considering the full list. In addition, it is worthwhile to consider 
incorporating more controls from other security standards dealing with specific 
Appendix C 
0 
A Model For Information Security Management and Regulatory Compliance in SA Health Sector 
  
208 
organizational requirements, for example the use of HIPAA standards by healthcare 
organizations. 
The Healthcare Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
became law on August 21, 1996. The primary focus of HIPAA is to mandate that 
healthcare information become “portable” and “available” by legislating the use of 
uniform electronic transactions and other administrative measures. In forcing the 
healthcare industry to adopt uniform electronic transaction standards for healthcare 
information, it is also necessary to protect that same information by including 
standards for how the information would be secured and safeguarded (CMMS, 1996). 
The portion of the HIPAA law that most impacts technology interests is the section on 
Administrative Simplification (Title II, Subtitle F). This section seeks to force 
uniform standards in the electronic interchange of health information (through the 
Transaction standard) and also mandates guidelines for the security (Security 
standard) and privacy (Privacy standard) of that information whether in transit or 
stored. This paper deals specifically with the security standards because it specifies a 
series of administrative, technical, and physical security procedures that healthcare 
organizations should follow to assure the security and privacy of electronic health 
information. 
The South Africa National Health Act (SANHA) or Act 61 of 2003 was signed 
into act by the South African president on 18 July 2004. SANHA provides a 
framework for a structured, uniform health system in order to unite the various 
elements of the national health system in a common goal to improve universal access 
to quality health services (National Health Act). In briefing media on the National 
Health Act by the Minister of Health Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, she highlights 
that this act rests heavily on the constitution with 50 sections of the Constitution 
relating directly to what is covered in this act. As noticed in section 27(2) of the 
constitution, the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures to 
progressively achieve the right of access to health care services and reproductive 
health care, within its available resources. This paper will only deal with chapter 2 
section 17 (“Protection of health records”) of this Act because it highlights security 
and privacy-related issues.   
The Electronic Communication and Transaction Act (ECTA), or Act No.25 of 
2002 was signed into act by the South African president on 31 July 2002. Being the 
first South African law governing cyber activity, the act facilitates the development 
and propagation of electronic communications and transactions within South Africa 
and aims to promote consumer confidence in electronic transacting and their online 
privacy (ECTA, 2003). With the increased use of electronic communication 
transactions in healthcare business transactions, this Act places a heavy burden on 
medical providers, insurers and claims clearinghouses and other healthcare services 
partners who need to communicate electronically on a day-to-day basis to accomplish 
their tasks. The ECTA is expected to facilitate electronic interchange relating to 
healthcare business transactions for example order placement and processing, 
shipping and receiving, invoicing, payment, cash application data, insurance 
transactions, and other data associated with the provision of products and health 
services. 
Currently there are a growing number of regulations that include requirements 
for healthcare organizations to provide security controls and demonstrate compliance 
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assurance. The challenge encountered by most healthcare organizations is what 
compliance strategy should be followed to meet regulatory requirements while 
ensuring that the existing efforts already implemented are maintained. Therefore, a 
comparative analysis of compliance requirements is required, which in this paper is 
focussed on the ISO 17799, HIPAA, SANHA and ECTA. The result of this 
comparison will help to ensure that no security controls are being duplicated in 
endeavours to satisfy requirements from the various standards and laws. 
 
5. COMPARISON BETWEEN ISO 17799, HIPAA SECURITY 
STANDARDS SANHA AND ECTA LAWS 
Following is a comparison of each of the ten ISO 17799 controls against SANHA, 
ECTA and HIPAA security standards. The ISO 17799 will be used as a basis for this 
comparison. For reasons of simplicity, the HIPAA security standard is often referred 
to as just "HIPAA" and the ISO/IEC 17799 International Standard is often referred to 
as just "ISO". 
A graphical representation is used which depicts the particular ISO subsection as 
relating to its coverage in HIPAA, SANHA and the ECT act. Each graph will show to 
which extent the ISO subsection is covered by the regulation. This can either be not at 
all (none), partially, similar coverage (similar) or the regulation exceeds the 
requirements of ISO. It is also important to highlight that this comparison will only 
deal with the 36 subsections of ISO since dividing these subsections into more 
subsections will be too lengthy indeed and goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
                                                                   
 
 
 
     
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Partial 
Section 3: Security Policy
3.1 Information security
ISO 17799 Subsection
Hipaa
SANHA
ECTA
None 
Exceeds 
Similar 
Section 4: Organizational Security
4.1 Information
Security
Infrastructure
4.2 Security of
Third Party
Access
4.3 Outsourcing
ISO 17799 Subsection
Hipaa
SANHA
ECTANone 
Partial 
Similar 
Exceeds 
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Section 11: Business Continuity Management
11.1 Aspects of Business
Continuity Management
ISO 17799 Subsection
Hipaa
SANHA
ECTA
None 
Similar 
Exceeds 
Partial 
Section 5: Asset Classification and Control
5.1 Accountability for
users
5.2 Information
classif ication
ISO 17799 Subsection
Hipaa
SANHA
ECTA
None 
Similar 
Exceeds 
Partial 
Section 6: Personnel Security
6.1 Security in job
Definition and
ressourcing
6.2 User Training 6.3 Responding To
Security incidents
and Malfunctions
ISO 17799 Subsection
HIPAA
SANHA
ECTA
None 
Similar 
Exceeds 
Partial 
Section 7: Physical and Environmental Security 
7.1 Secure Areas 7.2 Equipment Security 7.3 General Controls
ISO 17799 Subsection
HIPAA
SANHA
ECTANone 
Similar 
Exceeds 
Partial 
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Section 8: Communications and Operations Management
8.1 Operational
Procedures and
Responsibilities
8.2 Systems
Planning and
Acceptance
8.3 Protection
Against Malicious
Softw are
8.4
Housekeeping
8.5 Netw ork
Management
8.6 Media
Handling and
Security
8.7 Exchanges
of Information
and Softw are
ISO 17799 Subsection
HIPAA
SANHA
ECTA
Similar 
None 
Exceeds 
Partial 
Section 9: Access Control
9.1 Business
Requirement for
Access Control
9.2 User
Access
Management
9.3 User
Responsibilities
9.4 Netw ork
Access Control
9.5 Operating
System Access
Control
9.6 Application
Access Control
9.7 Monitoring
System Access
and Use
9.8 Mobile
Computing and
Telew orking
ISO 17799 Subsection
HIPAA
SANHA
ECTA
None 
Similar 
Exceeds 
Partial 
Section 10: Systems Development and Maintenance
10.1 Security
Requirements of
Systems
10.2 Security in
Application Systems
10.3 Cryptographic
Controls
10.4 Security of
Systems Files
10.5 Security in
Development and
Support Processes
ISO 17799 Subsection
HIPAA
SANHA
ECTA
None 
Similar 
Exceeds 
Partial 
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6. ANALYSIS OF THE COMPARISON RESULTS 
The main objective of this comparative analysis is to deduce how much effort is 
required for healthcare organizations to meet regulatory compliance requirements 
when there is already a well-established Information Security program, which in this 
case is assumed to be the ISO 17799 security standard. 
As shown in the comparison results in section 5, there are some cases where 
HIPAA, SANHA and ECTA requirements exceed the ISO requirements. Conversely, 
those items that do not show up in ISO, but are covered in HIPAA, SANHA and 
ECTA, are shown respectively in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 with a brief 
explanation for each item. 
Table 1: Requirements of HIPAA not fully present in ISO17799 
 HIPAA requirement Explanation 
1 Administrative:(a)(2) Assigned Security 
Responsibility  
HIPAA requires a single person responsible for both information 
and physical security  
2 Administrative:(a)(3)ii(C) Termination 
Procedures 
ISO has no mention of terminations anywhere in the document 
3 Administrative:(a)(4)ii(A) Isolating 
Healthcare Clearinghouse Functions  
Unique requirement of the HIPAA legislation 
4 Administrative:(a)(5)ii(C) Log-in 
Monitoring  
ISO does not have a specific training requirement with respect to 
log-in monitoring  
5 Administrative:(a)(7)ii(C) Emergency Mode 
Operation Plan   
ISO does not specifically address security for contingency 
operations 
6 Physical:(a)(2)(i) Contingency  Operations  ISO does not specifically address physical security for 
contingency operations 
Section 12: Compliance
12.1 Compliance w ith
Legal Requirements
12.2 Review s of Security
Policy and Technical
Compliance
12.3 Systems Audit
Considerations
ISO 17799 Subsection
HIPAA
SANHA
ECTA
None 
Similar 
Exceeds 
Partial 
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7 Physical:(a)(2)(ii) Facility Security Plan Documentation not required by ISO 
8 Physical:(a)(2)(iv) Maintenance Records   Documentation not required by ISO 
9 Physical:(a)(2)(iv) Data Backup and storage  ISO does not specifically require data back-up before moving 
storage units 
10 Technical:(a)(2)(i) Unique User 
Identification  
ISO allows group user ids in some cases. Does not address entity 
authentication  
11 Technical:(a)(2)(ii) Emergency Access 
Procedure  
ISO does not specifically address access controls for contingency 
operations 
Borkin, S. 2003. As part of Information Security reading room. SANS Institute 2003 
Table 2: Requirements of SANHA not fully present in ISO17799 
 SANHA requirement Explanation 
1 Access to health records by a health worker or 
healthcare provider, duty and procedures to 
disseminate information by National health 
department 
Unique requirement of the SANHA legislation 
2 Disclosure of health information only if the user 
provides consent in writing, a court order or any law 
requires that disclosure, non-disclosure of the 
information represents a serious threat to public 
health. 
Unique requirement of the SANHA legislation 
 
Table 3: Requirements of ECTA not fully present in ISO17799 
 ECTA requirement Explanation 
1 Admissibility and evidential weight of data messages, 
Retention, Notarization, Acknowledgement and 
Certification of data messages 
Not specifically covered by ISO 
2 Registration of cryptography providers ISO does not specifically require registering 
cryptography providers 
3 Accreditation, criteria of accreditation of 
authentication products and services 
Unique requirement of the ECTA legislation 
4 Identification, Registration, and Inspection of critical Not specifically covered by ISO 
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databases  
5 Liability of Service Providers: Hosting, Caching, 
Mere conduit, Information Location tool  
Unique requirement of the ECTA legislation 
6 Appointment of Cyber Inspector and their power to 
inspect, search, seize, and obtaining warrant 
Unique requirement of the ECTA legislation 
 
The results of the comparison are now further analysed and summarised in 
Figure 1. 
ISO and HIPAA: The HIPAA security standards meet the ISO 17799 controls 
for 20 (or 56 %) of the implementation requirements (quantified as ISO subsections). 
While HIPAA is only about the protection of one kind of information namely “health 
information”, ISO 17799 is for the protection of all types of information. The HIPAA 
security standard includes 1 (or 3 %) control requirement for which it has a more 
stringent requirement than ISO. Table 1 details this requirement and provides more 
information about various other HIPAA control measures that are not included in the 
ISO. 
SANHA and ISO: The ISO 17799 controls exceed the SANHA in 35 (or 97 %) 
of the implementation requirements. In fact, these controls are not covered in SANHA 
at all. SANHA contains 1 (or 3 %) control requirement that exceeds the corresponding 
requirement in the ISO. This is detailed in Table 2 together with a list of requirements 
included in SANHA that are not included in ISO at all These results come without any 
surprise as the two have different objectives and coverage scope. The scope of ISO 
17799 states: “This standard gives recommendations for Information Security 
management for use by those who are responsible for initiating, implementing or 
maintaining security in their organization. It is intended to provide a common basis 
for developing organizational security standards and effective security management 
practice and to provide confidence in inter-organizational dealings” (ISO 17799); 
whereas the main objective of SANHA is to provide a framework for a structured, 
uniform health systems in order to unite the various elements of the national health 
system in a common goal to improve universal access to quality health services 
(SANHA). 
It emerges clearly from the comparison that health organizations that are ISO-
compliant will exceed requirements pertaining to security and privacy as detailed in 
SANHA, by far. A small effort will be required to ensure compliance with the issues 
listed in Table 2.  
ECTA and ISO: The ISO controls meet the ECTA for 1 (or 3 %) and exceed 31 
(or 86 %) of the implementation requirements. While the ISO specifies controls that 
should be in place to ensure organization information assets’ security, the main focus 
of ECTA is to provide a framework for the facilitation and regulation of electronic 
communications and transactions. This is an over-arching difference in focus between 
the two. ECTA contains 4 (or 11 %) control requirements that exceed the 
requirements of the particular ISO subsection. Further requirements of the ECTA that 
are not covered in the ISO are expanded on in Table 3. The reason for this is because 
the ECTA puts more focus specifically on E-commerce issues including the validity 
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of electronically concluded agreements, the legal validity of electronic data, the 
admissibility of electronic documents in courts of law and the legal status given to 
electronic signatures which are not specifically covered in detail in ISO 17799.  
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Figure1: Summary of the comparative analysis 
 
From the comparison, it can be generalized that some legislation can certainly 
have quite an overlap with an Information Security management program, such as in 
this case the ISO and HIPAA. This confirms that a compliance strategy would serve 
well to eradicate redundancy in following an ad hoc approach to compliance with 
various standards and legislations. 
 
7. PROPOSED COMPLIANCE STRATEGY 
The challenge encountered by healthcare organizations is which compliance strategy 
to use to meet regulatory requirements while providing customers with the assurance 
of meeting international standards for information security? 
In answering the above question, the strategy outlined in steps 1-5 is proposed: 
1. Identify the scope of the compliance strategy. This must include the 
identification of an Information Security management framework (eg ISO 
17799) as well as the regulations that should be complied with (eg HIPAA, 
SANHA, ECTA). 
2. Determine the implementation requirements of the Information Security 
management (ISM) framework. For example, the ISO operates using security 
controls, which are extrapolated from organizational security requirements. 
3. Identify a unit in each of the regulations, which could be used as a point of 
reference for comparison with the Information Security management 
framework. For example, the 42 HIPAA security standards implementation 
requirements would be on a level comparable to the ISO security controls. If 
such a unit, which facilitates a comparative analysis is not evident from the 
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particular regulation, it is envisaged that such a unit should be defined – it 
would require further research to substantiate this statement. 
4. Use the implementation requirements of the ISM framework identified in step 
2 as a basis to work from. This provides a single point of reference from which 
to collate all the relevant security controls (using the ISO terminology). For 
each legislation, add the necessary controls that are not covered in the ISM 
framework. This should be done sequentially (ie finish one legislation before 
starting with the next) to facilitate an incremental comparison. Comparing 
each legislation with the ISM framework could lead to redundancy in controls, 
which might be covered in more than one legislation. 
5. Develop a compliance maintenance and review process that facilitates this 
collated approach. This would obviate redundancy in executing maintenance 
and review procedures designed to review the specific ISM framework and/or 
legislations in isolation. 
This compliance strategy will ensure that common elements across regulations 
and those that are already covered in an Information Security management program, 
will not be repeated unnecessarily. In addition, it is proposed that a compliance 
approach should use a proper Information Security management framework as basis 
to work from. In the health sector this is particularly important in terms of the security 
and privacy of health information. The use of an internationally accepted standard 
such as the ISO will further enhance the desired level of security. 
 
8. CONCLUSION                                                
Managing Information Security in information systems has reached the point 
where sufficient, but dispersed knowledge exists in various domains (Denis, 2003). 
Some of the areas supporting the Information Security program may be required by 
law or regulations whereas others may be considered as best practices.  
Compliance with SANHA and ECTA is a regulatory requirement for South 
African health care organization and ignorance of the law requirement is not an 
excuse. Ignorance of legal requirements can result in heavy punishment and loss of an 
organization’s credibility. Also, South African Healthcare organizations’ managers 
should keep in mind that being compliant with all legal requirements does not 
guarantee privacy and security protection of health information (and vice versa). In 
addition to meeting the regulatory requirements, they should also adopt international 
security standards as part of Information Security management in order to ensure that 
best practices are in use. Using this statement as a premise of this research, it is 
proposed that a compliance strategy should use an Information Security management 
framework as a point of reference to collate further requirements posed by 
regulations. This can help to reduce the security and privacy risks to a minimum level, 
while minimizing redundancy in the approach to complying with relevant legislations. 
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